Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for standing by. Welcome to the Ellington Residential Mortgage REIT 2018 First Quarter Financial Results Conference Call. Today's call is being recorded. At this time all participants have been placed on a listen-only mode and the floor will be opened for your questions following the presentation. [Operator Instructions] It is now my pleasure to turn the floor over to Maria Cozine, Vice President of Investor Relations. You may begin.

Thank you, Crystal, and good morning. Before we start, I would like to remind everyone that certain statements made during this conference call may constitute forward-looking statements within the meaning of the Safe Harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements are not historical in nature. As described under Item 1A of our Annual Report on Form 10-K filed on March 14, 2018, forward-looking statements are subject to a variety of risks and uncertainties that could cause the Company's actual results to differ from its beliefs, expectations, estimates and projections. Consequently, you should not rely on these forward-looking statements as predictions of future events. Statements made during this conference call are made as of the date of this call, and the Company undertakes no obligation to update or revise any forward-looking statements whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise. I have on the call with me today, Larry Penn, Chief Executive Officer of Ellington Residential; Mark Tecotzky, our Co-Chief Investment Officer; and Chris Smernoff, our Chief Financial Officer. As described in our earnings press release, our first quarter earnings conference call presentation is available on our website, earnreit.com. Management's prepared remarks will track the presentation. Please turn to Slide 3 to follow along. As a reminder, during this call, we'll sometimes refer to Ellington Residential by it's New York Stock Exchange ticker, E-A-R-N or EARN for short. With that, I will now turn the call over to Larry.

Thanks, Maria. It's our pleasure to speak with our shareholders this morning as we release our first quarter results. As always, we appreciate you're taking the time to participate on the call today. The first quarter of 2018 started out much as 2017 ended with volatility historically low and equities continuing to reach record highs. Of course, we saw all of that change in a hurry in February with investor concerns over inflation and rising interest rates sparking a sharp sell-off in the equity markets. The S&P reached correction territory on February 8, just 9 trading days after reaching an all-time high. The VIX jumped 282% between the start of the year and early February with it's largest one day movement on record occurring February 5. The 10-year treasury broke out of it's 2017 range reaching 2.95% on February 21, it's highest point during the four years. During the quarter Agency RMBS prices came under substantial pressure with the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. MBS Agency fixed rate index recording a negative return of 1.19%. It's not surprise that Agency RMBS underperformed with all of these jarring forces at work in the broader markets, especially when you consider that Federal Reserve has increased it's tapering of Agency RMBS reinvestments twice since the end of 2017. Currently, the Fed is tapering reinvestments by $12 billion a month; as announced, a further increase to $16 billion a month in July. In total, expected Fed tapering will require the market to absorb an additional $168 billion of Agency RMBS in 2018 and when combined with the expected new issue supply of $300 billion this year, that's almost $500 billion of net additional supply for private investors to absorb which is a lot to ask for without putting pressure on Agency RMBS prices. During the first…

Thank you, Larry and good morning, everyone. For the quarter ended March 31, 2018, we had a net loss of $4 million or $0.30 per share as compared to net income of $790,000 for the quarter ended December 31, 2017. The primary driver of the decrease in our net income was unrealized losses on our Agency RMBS investments which were only partially offset by net interest income and net gains from our interest rate hedges. The components of our first quarter earnings were as follows: core earnings of $4.3 million or $0.32 per share, net realized and unrealized losses from our residential mortgage-backed securities portfolio of $29.2 million or $2.20 per share as prices of securities in the portfolio decreased and interest rates moved higher, and net realized and unrealized gains from our interest rate hedges of $20.9 million or $1.58 per share again because of higher interest rates. Note that, net realized and unrealized gains from our interest rate hedges exclude the net periodic costs associated with our interest rate swaps since they are included as a component of core earnings. Our core earnings include the impact of catch up premium amortization which in the first quarter decreased our core earnings by approximately $150,000 or $0.02 per share. As they are backing out the catch-up premium amortization from interest income and both the current and prior quarters we arrive at our adjusted core earnings of $0.34 and $0.40 per share respectively. Further compression of our net interest margin this quarter led to a decrease in our quarter-over-quarter adjusted core earnings per share. In the current quarter, our net interest margin adjusted to exclude the impact of the catch-up premium amortization was 1.09% as compared to 1.41% in the prior quarter. With the average yield on our portfolio also adjusted…

Thanks, Chris. This was a challenging quarter across most financial markets. The S&P had a negative quarter as did all of the major bond indices; treasuries, investment created corporates, high yield corporates and Agency RMBS. At EARN, we think of ourselves as having our own dual mandate, preserve book value, involve the markets during risk-off moves and capture upside in good markets. We are pleased with how we preserved book value this quarter in a very challenging environment. After the [indiscernible] of the bond market in 2017, Q1 was a stark change. It seems like every corner of the bond market was conspiring to separate investors from their money. Interest rates shot up and volatility roared back. CRAB [ph] strategy is more expired with both and high yield down between 1% and 3% for the quarter, and that's on an unlevered basis. We came into the quarter positioned defensively with less MBS exposure in the peer group. As we didn't think investors were getting paid for owning MBS in front of the increase in the Fed's balance sheet reduction; that allowed us to play offence and better opportunities erodes mid-quarter as MBS got very cheap and we added a lot of net mortgage exposure. Look at Slide 5, you can see that the MBS, OAS as of the quarter end were right around their two-year wide or corporate bond spreads widened during the quarter but we're still below the midpoint of their two-year range. So far our aggressive buy of mortgages towards the end of the quarter is paid off; MBS has done well post quarter end and our performance in April was strong. You can see this change in positioning in two places in the presentation; on the bullet point on Slide 17 we show our net mortgage exposure…

Thanks, Mark. We've mentioned in prior quarters that our use of TBA short position sets us apart from most other agency mortgage rates. And along with our interest rate hedges serves as an important stabilizer to our book value. Going into year-end, we believe that the combination of low volatility, low prepayments and tight spreads was not a compelling environment to add risk, and so we lowered our net mortgage exposure accordingly. This conservative positioning enabled us to withstand the quarter sell-off with only limited book value decline, and this in turn allowed us to play offence towards the end of the quarter by opportunistically covering TBA shorts and adding asset leverage at more attractive NIMs. In total, we increased our net exposure to agency pulls by about $300 million in the first quarter to $1.4 billion resulting at a 7.8:1 net mortgage assets to equity ratio at March 31, an increase from the prior quarters 5.7:1. Although strong dollar rose caused TBAs to outperform specified pulls this quarter, we continue to believe that the outlook for specified pulls is strong. The Fed exclusively purchases agency pulls via TBA contracts. So as it's tapering ramps, it will be removing an important technical support for TBAs. We believe that demand for specified pulls will only grow from here and we continue to unearth new pockets of mortgage pulls that we believe are undervalued and underappreciated. Additionally, despite the quarter spread widening that largely reflected technical factors, the fundamentals for Agency MBS remains strong with prepayment risk low, and a multitude of financing outlets providing competitive funding. We believe that the opportunity set an Agency MBS will remain highly attractive and with the increased volatility we're seeing this year we will look to continue dialing up and down our Agency RMBS exposure…

[Operator Instructions] And our first question comes from the line of Steve Delaney with JMP Securities.

I want to offer my congratulations on the book value performance. I think you would not normally, probably jump up and down with minus 3.8% but we have the final scorecard for the Agency REITs now this morning, and I think from the median decline we saw was 7.2% and your performance was the second best. So, well done on that regard, it's certainly a tough market. The leverage -- adjusted leverage slipped up a little bit and I realized you took some short TBAs off and -- but help us get an idea of how much flexibility that you think you have with respect to leverage, especially in an environment where MBS were to widen now significantly? Because it's -- when I saw that, I'm really thinking about true debt-to-equity rather than long TBAs because what I'm hearing you guys say is, your TBA activity maybe more on the short side but when you want to be long, you want to still be long spec pools and not TBA. So it would seem the true balance sheet leverage is going to be a factor and how big a long bet you can put on?

I guess what I would say is, the first decision we make when we look at market pricing and market conditions is; how much more good exposure we want to have in the company and that -- we mentioned that number where it is in the presentation book. So that to us is the biggest thing to get right. Then once we sort of know how much mortgage exposure we want in the company, then we think about what's the best way to get it. Is it long TBAs, is it long specified pulls, or is it just buying back TBA shorts, right. So what we thought in this quarter was given rates were rising, given dollar prices were lower, and payment indices were dropping, to us it made more sense to buyback the TBA short as opposed to adding more specified pulls that -- where you're paying up for some prepayment. We thought the market would probably put less of a premium on prepayment protection; so a lot of the pulls we had -- some of the pulls we had were really pulls at extension protection. So that's why this quarter we choose to dial-up the mortgage exposure primarily by reducing our TBA short. In other environments we could make a different decision, so it just came down to the view that the reason why mortgage is widening was it's share of inflation fueled by the tax cut and higher rates. And so in that environment, we rather reduced short than increased along if the long was going to come with buying more prepayment protection. And also to -- just from like a risk management standpoint, it's always riskier to sort of -- it's always less -- it's derisking to unwind trades, to put on new trades; and so we had that TBA short -- those big part of our hedging strategy in the fourth quarter. So unwinding that, if we were agnostic on that sort of size TBAs versus specified pools, just unwinding the trade and taking it off is sort of reduces risk, it's always something that we prefer to do than adding additional risk, we don't think this is compelling reason.

And I want to add to that. So I think if you look back and -- look, I don't have these numbers in front of me but I can't remember -- I think we've been close to 9:1 leverage, maybe we've been a little bit higher at times, but I don't think we've ever been much higher; Chris actually just confirmed that. And we've had some TBA hedges that were little on the low side now at 20%, we certainly been at 50% at times, perhaps even a little bit more. So if you want to imagine a market where we thought that mortgages were just pound on the table cheap; I think you're going to look at that 9:1 level and say, look, these guys have never really been much higher than that before. It's -- we're very conscious here firm-wide at the risk of leverage, been through a lot of cycles where leverage has obviously cost people a lot of money, had to liquidate at the very worst times. So we've been through cycles where we've seen investors punished for over leveraging and therefore having to liquidate assets to worst time. So I think if you -- it's hard for me at this point to imagine where we would both lift all of our TBA shorts and be more than 9:1 leverage. So that's pretty -- so if you want to sort of set [indiscernible] what we're thinking; you know, I think that at least based upon our experience, that I think is a pretty good guideline.

In the first quarter, obviously a tough environment but you slightly under-earned your dividend on adjusted core earnings. We're thinking about this LIBOR repo spread and we're looking at it as being more beneficial to the mortgage REITs in the second quarter of this year than it was in the first quarter. And I'm wondering if you see it the same way? And that has to do with the sort of timing of when three month LIBOR moved and it seems like it's moved a lot more here since March 31. Just curious if you think that will give you -- an even bigger benefit in 2Q versus 1Q?

You're exactly right. The other components of that is when you're swap three set. So when you additionally do a swap booking leg is set when you're at trade time, right. So you're going to see swaps reset up. Look, I don't -- we don't expect that this difference between three month LIBOR and repo rates gets bigger, we wouldn't be at all surprised to see it narrow. Our point is that it's such a big move that even it retraces 50%, it's a better operating environment for REITs on that basis than what they've seen in -- it got to be at least the last five years. But you're absolutely right about the timing of all this and that it takes a little while for all this to sink in; A) as your swaps reset, and then, B) as your repo's role. So -- because we -- we rolled our repos in the past at sometimes agreeing to spread that obviously now, we can get better spreads. So as those repo's role, we'll be able to lock-in better spreads.

And do you link most or index most of your big space swaps to three month LIBOR rather than one month?

Yes, they are all I believe are three months.

We don't remember talking about this going back over -- however many years, more than a decade; we don't remember talking about this phenomenon. And it was easily overtime back during the crisis and everything where repo was well above LIBOR. And if it does hold, it would just seem like 20 basis points of it's becomes kind of built into the systems and people have a high percentage of their repo hedged with big space swaps. It would seem -- if leverage is 7-day times, we're talking about over 100 basis point contribution to return-on-equity. I would think just from this financing benefit.

Yes, it's a big deal. I remember back 2-3 years ago, when the banks were operating -- trying to operate under the regime where they had to have more capital, people talked about the return-on-equity from agency repo wasn't good for banks and people worried about repo going away, and repo costs then were -- three month repo was above three month LIBOR. So it's materially better environment. And I guess -- the counterpoint is that you've got the Fed getting it's balance sheet back for this, a lot of supply but our point is that the supply is priced in the mortgage market now, because every investor feels that but it's only a very small part of the mortgage market that takes advantage of these financing ability. Most of the mortgage market is banks, it's money managers, it's insurance companies, it's not levered in the repo market.

You're correct, it would be mortgage REITs and hedged funds and I don't think the hedged funds are in the trade that much anymore with the Fed feed [indiscernible] with raising rates. Thank you very much for the comments and good luck in the second quarter.

Our next question comes from the line of Doug Harter with Credit Suisse.

Larry, can you share how you think about the balance between accretive share repurchase and shrinking your equity base further and increasing your expense ratio? And if you could just remind us what the current buyback authorization is; that would be great. Thanks.

The current buyback authorization is 1.2 million shares. And you saw that our expense ratio ticked up 20 basis points in the first quarter versus last quarter but part of that was due to timing of expenses. So as I said in my script, we expect for the 2018 year that our expense ratio will be roughly 3.2%. And something that we are obviously mindful of as a small company, we saw this as a great opportunity to repurchase shares in the last quarter but -- as Chris mentioned, the effect on our expense ratio was not -- I want to imply that by 3.8% of our shares caused our expense ratio to go up 20 basis points, that's absolutely not the case but it does have a marginal impact and we need to be mindful of that as well. So our stock price is now somewhat higher on price to book ratio as we speak, so all these things have taken into account, as well as the opportunities that we're seeing. So as we mentioned on the call, we really want to be opportunistic about our capital management strategy and have that ability to buyback when stock is really cheap. We were trading below 80% a book [ph] and -- be less aggressive about that when we're trading higher.

At this time there are no further comments. I will now turn it back to the presenters for closing remarks.

I think we're good.

This concludes today's conference call. You may now disconnect.