Good day everyone, and welcome to the Second Quarter 2016 Earnings Call of Everest Re Group, Ltd. Today’s conference is being recorded. At this time, for opening remarks and introductions, I’d like to turn the conference over to Ms. Beth Farrell, Vice President of Investor Relations. Please go ahead.

Thank you. Good morning and welcome to Everest Re Group’s second quarter earnings conference call. On the call with me today are Dom Addesso, the Company’s President and Chief Executive Officer; Craig Howie, our Chief Financial Officer; John Doucette, the President and CEO of our Reinsurance Operations; and Jon Zaffino, President of our North American Insurance Operations. Before we begin, I will preface our comments by noting that our SEC filings include extensive disclosures with respect to forward-looking statements. In that regard, I note that statements made during today’s call which are forward-looking in nature, such as statements about projections, estimates, expectations and the like, are subject to various risks. As you know, actual results could differ materially from current projections or expectations. Our SEC filings have a full listing of the risks that investors should consider in connection with such statements. Now, let me turn the call over to Dom.

Thanks, Beth. Good morning. We are pleased to report this morning another favorable quarter, particularly during a period where there have been a number of global cat events for the industry. Despite these events, we posted $3.67 of net income per share for quarter. On an operating income basis, earnings were $3.17 per share, compared to $5.03 for last year’s second quarter. This difference is primarily due to cat losses with the net impact of $105 million after reinstatement premium and taxes. Also impacting the quarter were foreign exchange losses of $27 million or $0.44 per share after tax. Excluding cats, the underlying attritional combined ratio is virtually the same at 86% in this year’s second quarter versus last. Furthermore, the attritional loss ratio has actually improved year-over-year. This highlights the changes to businesses and product mix that have been achieved. You will hear later when the business leaders describing some of those changes, but it is worth emphasizing as we have in the past that the flexibility and nimbleness of our business model continues to yield good outcomes. Of course offsetting the decreased loss ratio is an increased expense ratio as we invest in our insurance build out. As I mentioned in the first quarter, this will moderate through time thereby allowing the improved loss ratio to work its way through the overall combined ratio. This moderation is already occurring, as you note the decrease in the expense ratio from the first quarter to the second. Notable however is that the total expense ratio for the insurance segment coming in at 28.3% for the quarter remains several points lower than our competitors and we intend to maintain this advantage as we expand the operation. That expansion is well-underway. Growth in the insurance book is beginning to take hold as…

Thank you, Dom. And good morning, everyone. Everest had a solid quarter of earnings with net income of $156 million, this compares to net income of $209 million for the second quarter of 2015. Net income includes realized capital gains and losses. On a year-to-date basis, net income was $327 million compared to $532 million for the first half of 2015. The primary differences were catastrophe losses and foreign exchange. After-tax operating income for the second quarter was $134 million compared to $225 million in 2015. Operating income year-to-date was $357 million compared to $554 million for the first six months of 2015. The overall underwriting gain for the Group was $234 million for the first half compared to an underwriting gain of $370 million in the same period last year. In the second quarter of 2016, the Group saw $149 million of current year catastrophic losses net of reinsurance. Of that total, $90 million related to losses from the Canadian wildfires, $36 million related to Texas hailstorms, and $23 million relate to the earthquake in Ecuador. The 2016 cat losses were partially offset by $25 million of favorable development on prior year cat losses, primarily from the 2011 Japan earthquake. The net impact of these losses after reinstatement premiums and taxes was $105 million. This compares with $23 million of catastrophes during the same period in 2015. The overall current year attritional combined ratio for the first six months was 85.7%, up from 84.5% for the first half of 2015. This is primarily due to the one point increase in the expense ratio. Our year-to-date expense ratio rose to 5.7% as we anticipated with the build out of the insurance platform and our Lloyd syndicate, but it was below our first quarter 2016 expense ratio of 5.9%. Foreign exchange…

Thank you, Craig. Good morning. Despite a very active quarter for the industry with property catastrophe losses around the world, our reinsurance book performed well with $97 million of underwriting profit. This outcome highlights both, strong underwriting by our experienced underwriting teams and the benefit of a mature well-diversified book of business. We maintain a highly diversified portfolio by line and geography around the globe, which allows underwriting profits in one part of our book to offset losses that might arise in another part of the book. Our sub 90% combined ratio for reinsurance for the quarter demonstrates the value and robustness of this strategy, despite all the cat events. For our total reinsurance segment, net premiums were $771 million, down 8%. On a constant currency basis, they’re down approximately 6% as we carefully manage our net reinsurance book with hedges, higher attachment points and reduced exposures on deals with less attractive risk adjusted returns. Our reinsurance underwriting profit was $80 million lower than the underwriting profit in Q2 2015. The difference is driven predominantly by the $85 million in cat losses this quarter in the reinsurance segment compared to $27 million of cat losses in Q2 last year. As Craig indicated, cat losses this quarter emanated from Canadian wildfires, Texas hailstorm and flooding, and the Ecuador earthquake. Underwriting profits were also impacted by lower net earned premium and exchange rate fluctuations. Drivers of lower net premiums this quarter were non-renewals and reductions on some property pro rata treaties, which did not meet our risk adjusted return requirements. The attritional loss ratio this quarter is 53%, 2 points below Q2 last year and in line with Q1, as well as the full year 2015. Business mix and deployment of capacity in profitable areas such as mortgage and credit helped us…

Thanks Jon and good morning. Everest insurance continued its expansion in the second quarter as we made steady progress on our core strategic initiatives. We experienced another quarter of solid growth across our global operation, marking the sixth consecutive quarter of underlying growth with contributions from each insurance business unit. Echoing earlier commentary, North American division’s results, our largest insurance division were impacted by cat activity within the quarter. Despite this, our underlying attritional performance was solid and in line with our expectations. As announced yesterday and discussed on this call, given the sale of Heartland, I will share 2016 numbers with you excluding this operation. The full results including Heartland are outlined in the financial supplement released yesterday. Our global insurance operations inclusive of the North America division and Lloyd’s, gross written premium increased 23% quarter-over-quarter to $405 million while net written premiums grew to $343 million, an increase of 19% over the prior year quarter. Looking at the first half, again excluding Heartland, we produced gross written premium of 764 million, an increase of 17% and net written premium of 652 million, an increase of 12%. As mentioned on previous calls, net written premium growth slightly lags gross written premium growth, primarily due to a marginally more conservative reinsurance strategy in our U.S. operations as we add new businesses. The insurance segment GAAP combined ratio for the quarter ex-Heartland was 109 impacted by 13 points of cat activity or 38 million. This was attributable to exposure with our U.S. and Canadian property portfolios from the Texas hail events in April and the Fort McMurray wildfire. On an attritional basis, the calendar year combined for the quarter improved to 95.7% while the attritional loss and loss expense ratio for the quarter improved 130 basis points over the comparable prior…

Operator, we’re ready to take questions now.

Thank you. [Operator Instructions] Our first question is from the line of Michael Nannizzi with Goldman Sachs. Please go ahead.

Maybe, start a bit on the insurance book and the growth there, clearly a very nice growth. Are the dynamics in the markets that you’re growing in, is there a shortage of capital that is allowing for you to pursue growth and continue to see a profitability improve or what other dynamics are at play just because I haven’t seen a lot of growth in insurance from some of our other companies so far? So, I just want to get an understanding of how the dynamics there? Thanks.

Michael, I don’t think it’s a case of capital. We all know that this industry is awash in capital. I think it’s really taking the opportunity to -- there are certain markets and particularly that in disarray. Companies are changing and the marketplaces always influx. And I think brokers are in particularly always looking for highly rated carriers coming to the space to either replaced markets that are reshaping their own portfolios or the distribution for one reason or another or changes in their in their own teams, in addition perhaps upgrading some of the credit quality of markets that they offered to their customers. So, it’s more -- it’s not about capital, it’s ore about taking advantage of opportunities from what I’d describe as dislocation and the offering that we could make to brokers of top quality.

So, these are opportunities that you are not winning on price specifically, you are able to come into the market to help fill a gap based on the profile of reinsurance counter-parties, either the brokers or the insurers want, is that?

I thought -- what I was answering was an insurance question; I thought that’s what you are referencing, correct?

Yes, your insurance, so either brokers that you’re placing. You said that brokers like you’re rating and profile. And so, I would think that either the brokers want you there and that’s part of the reason why you can write the business at attractive profitability or the insurers themselves want you there, is that…?

What I was specifically addressing though was the insurance segment, not the reinsurance segment, although some of the same qualities are there as well. And also, remember that on the insurance side, we have hired some notable talent in the industry, and with that comes relationships and business flows that way as well.

Okay. I think I was saying insurance not insurers, but okay; that’s right. And then, I guess is it possible to give us a little bit more color on the impact of the sale of the crop business, how much premium should come out of the insurance segment; how much should we expect to come into one of the reinsurance segments, I guess in U.S. reinsurance, just any context on -- and was there a dollar amount for the sale or was it all kind of bit part and parcel of then exchange of the franchise for a reinsurance premium on the back of that?

We are not at this point, since it’s just really a letter of intent, we are not disclosing detail [ph] of the transaction. But, I can say that there will be no material impact, gain or loss from the sale of company. As I mentioned in my comments that the premium impact of these from the short-term to the Group will be minimal, will be about the same in another words. So, right now, we have approximately $200 million of premium in the insurance base that we will transition forward to and be reflected in the reinsurance segment. So, it will be about the same, at least in the short-term. And then of course going forward, our participation with the buyer on reinsurance arrangements could -- and their expansion could make that -- the reinsurance premium go up over time. But no [ph] significant premium change to the Group; it’s just basically shifting it from one segment to the other of what we think as improved profitability.

And then, just on the prior year development of attritional cats, I just wanted to understand, was there a reason that number, the 2011 development didn’t go into a prior year category and why it ended up in -- I mean that was just accounting but why that ended up in the current accident quarter attritional cat load?

Mike, this is Craig, We show cats on one line, that’s the only reason that we don’t breakout prior year cats and current year cats, that’s the only significance. That’s the reason we book it out in our discussion topic for the call.

That’s where [multiple speakers] originally, so, it flows through the same line item, if you will, in the second quarter.

So, in the past, when you had reinsurance prior development that’s been casualty development or underlying loss ratio development but not catastrophe development, is that the difference?

That is correct.

Our next question is from the line of Jay Gelb with Barclays. Please go ahead.

I think there was a fair amount of concern going into the second quarter around the catastrophe loss exposure, especially in Canada. When you think about the end result of roughly 10 points of earned premium and still generating around 9% return on equity on an operating basis in the first half, how does that shake out relative to what you would have thought of catastrophe of these magnitudes in the quarter?

How does that translate into earnings?

No, I mean, is it -- would you expect it to be this size or when you go through your risk management, would you expect it to be a bigger impact or maybe that’s just kind of jumping off point where you can talk about the risk management framework?

Well, I think this loss and how it impacted our results was kind of what we would have expected. We speak to kind of writing business with the best risk adjusted returns. So, as an example, in Canada, we tended not to write reinsurance deals that are heavy personal exposure. So, that obviously had some benefit to us. In addition, at least for last renewal season, we tended to be in the higher attaching layers. So, the lower layers did not meet our risk-adjusted return characteristics. So, yes, it kind of translated into what we would have expected. Given our presence in Canada, we did not experience any kind of an outsized loss, generally because we are directing our underwriting to those areas that we feel give us the best returns. I don’t know if that’s frankly what you’re asking.

It is, yes. That’s helpful. Thank you. My next question is on the international reinsurance segment, the 14% gross written premium growth in the second quarter. Can you give us some insight in terms of what was driving that and whether we should anticipate growth at that level going forward?

I think that was adjustments due to some large transactions that happened in 2015.

That happened in 2015. So, this is -- 2016 year is more consistent with what you would expect to see going forward. There were accounting adjustments made in 2015, which is causing that comparison.

So, just to clarify that 14% growth is normalized for international?

I think the way to think about it is look at the entire six months of last year and compare it to the entire six months of this year and that is a more appropriate comparison, because it was basically a kind of -- and we talked about it on last quarter. And it kind of washes over the first six months of the year.

Okay. So, normalized down high single digits, gross?

Right.

And that’s partially given by the FX.

Thank you. Our next question is from the line of Quentin McMillan with KBW. Please go ahead.

Just a quick numbers related question, Dom, I think you had mentioned 27 million in FX losses. I just wanted to ask about Mt. Logan. Is the remainder of the other income expense bucket, the 28.4 million, is that all just a small loss from Mt. Logan basically?

Mt. Logan actually had 3 million of income year-to-date for…

The number 27 million by the way was after-tax [Multiple Speakers]

So, the 28.4 million is a 3 million gain from Mt. Logan and then like a 31 million pretax loss in FX, is that about right?

3 million of gain was for the year, Quentin.

Oh, for the year, my apologies. Okay, but for the quarter -- okay, I think the rest of the numbers are actually in 1Q, so I can break it out that way. Secondly, just John, thanks very much for sort of just talking about the cat related losses in the quarter. I just wanted sort of understand a little bit more, it sounds like you are saying they came from Canada and then from the Texas hailstorms, but the 38 million is a lot higher than we’ve ever seen out of that portfolio. Can you just talk us about sort of why there might have been elevated property losses in the cat line this quarter, should we expect sort of a higher cat load in the insurance segment going forward?

Quentin, I don’t think it’s really out of line from our perspective. You remember, we’ve been steadily growing our E&S property book over the last several years, it’s been incredibly profitable for us. We do manage all of our accumulations at the Group level. So, in relation to a number of different benchmarks we look at, first and foremost group accumulation, our cat model, but secondly also our representative market share and any given market, the nature of the underlying events, both obviously two extreme events here with Fort McMurray and the Texas hail. So, the number might seem bigger than you’ve seen in the past, but in relation to depth of these books of business, we think it’s very much in line.

So, if I could just say that slightly different way is sometimes the wind doesn’t blow your way, this might have just been a little of an outsized quarter, correct?

I think that’s correct.

Okay. And then, just last question, Dom, you had mentioned in the first quarter the 11% growth rate in the insurance segment was a little bit below what we should expect for the full-year but the 20% you had previously mentioned maybe not quite in that level. Given the strong growth in the second quarter, is it safe to assume that you guys are targeting more of a 20% plus type growth rate or still sort of no real change?

Yes, our growth rate in the insurance sector will certainly be in the high teens. I don’t know if we readily admit over 20%. But, again that’s going to be based on what the market opportunity presents to us. If pricing continues deteriorating to any great degree then perhaps we pull back in certain areas. But we have got a number of new initiatives that we are just getting off the ground. So, I think the growth rate should be solid teens.

Next question is from the line of Amit Kumar with Macquarie. Please go ahead.

Thanks and good morning and congrats on the beat. Just a few follow-ups. The first question is on the Canadian wildfire. Can you tell us what industry loss you had used to compute that number?

Amit, we did not -- we really don’t go at it really that way. That certainly can be one methodology but we obviously had people on the ground assessing what’s going on there, as well as report from our clients. And it’s a little difficult with this of events because models aren’t unnecessarily built for this -- for wildfires. So, basing an estimate off of an industry loss is, in our view, very difficult and frankly not really appropriate. You can use that as a benchmark but at the end of the day, it really is about being on -- within the site as well as talking frequently to our clients and getting reports from our clients.

Got it. That’s a fair comment. And was Mt. Logan impacted by these cats?

A little bit, yes, sure.

And did the reception -- I know that you are talking about the reception from investors, did that change? Because as you mentioned, this is not a modeled peril?

Not to my knowledge; we have not heard any negative feedback from investors about these kind of events.

This is John. I think we communicate a lot with them on a regular basis, the Logan does and talks about the types of losses and exposures that they had and the Logan investors get access to a global portfolio and frankly expect to get losses all over the world, not just from hurricane, not just from earthquake. But again, given the returns that Logan has seen, Logan investors have seen which really are best in class, I think it just highlights the strength of diversification and the value of the mousetrap, the value competition of the mousetrap that we’ve built between Logan and Everest. I think if the investors -- it was nothing out of line for the investors side to the Canadian wildfires.

That’s very helpful. And just moving onto capital management, I know you talked about I think buybacks were blacked out for maybe a period, how many days were you blacked out? Because I am looking at the buyback number, it’s higher than Q1 and just trying to reconcile that and asking myself is valuation still attractive to ramp the buyback during the wind season or should we think differently about that?

First of all, it’s not technically a blackout period. What I was -- have mentioned is that the -- because we possessed material amount of public information about cat events, the fact that those reports of what those losses might be were streaming in, it became frankly little difficult for us to be in the market, not because of the size of the events but more because we were in the possession of material non-public information. But that’s -- I don’t know that that will technically be called a blackout period. As Craig pointed out earlier, we returned almost 90% between dividends and share repurchases, 90% of income. So, frankly, that’s not out of line with what we said we would do in the past, so.

And then, just finally wrapping up, I know there was this question on Heartland, and I appreciate, it’s difficult to share all the mechanics. I’m curious what led to the decision. Was it a function of scale or was it A&O payments, what prompted it and was it sort of shopped around? Some background on that would be very helpful, because we’ve seen other companies also do these kinds of things, I’m just curious as to the background.

As we’ve said in responses to questions about our crop operation for a long time that we’re always looking at strategic options. So, strategic options, in the earlier days, many months ago were more ago how we could build scale and how we could diversify because those were the two things that we needed to do to be successful kind of the primary MPCI [ph] writer. And folks at Heartland put certainly the great effort. But given the market dynamics it was very, very difficult to we found out to grow it organically and to diversify. And when we were presented this opportunity or this option from CGB, it was something that as we looked it, we said well, this would be a way given their scale, they’re already there in the space and we can immediately get the diversification of the scale that we need. And that’s what led to the decision to move in this direction. But, it was always with an eye towards wanting to grow it and diversify it, and recognizing that needed to be a scale business.

Next question is from the line of Elyse Greenspan with Wells Fargo. Please go ahead.

I was just hoping to talk little bit more about the insurance book that pointed to about 96% attritional combined ratio ex the crop business. Is that the right margin to assume on that book on a go forward basis? And then just tying into that in terms of your expense ratio, you did mention that it came down a bit sequentially. Is that something we should expect to continue to see as we go forward through the rest of this year?

So, the 96, I would expect overall to frankly improve a little bit more from there, as we grow the Lloyd’s operation. The Lloyd’s premium has been slow to book because of the accounting that takes place in our Lloyd’s operation. And frankly if you look at attritional without Lloyd’s, it’s more like a 95%. So, as Lloyd begins to prove its economics, which it will do through the balance of the year, that attritional combined ratio we would expect to move even lower. The improving expense ratio, as I said in the last quarter, I would expect that to continue to moderate over time, but compared to historical levels it will probably still be above those for certainly probably the next 12 months at least, but trending downwards towards the more normalized level.

Okay. And then, in the reinsurance commentary, you guys mentioned some one-off structured risk solutions, is there kind of a way to quantify kind of the impact of that on top line, was that a Q2 comment or was that a more about when you guys were looking forward towards the rest of this year?

Those kinds of transactions generally are pretty lumpy. And so, there really isn’t any way to quantify that frankly on the top line basis. And I think the value we’re mentioning that was more of a strategic choice and direction that we’re taking relative to our bottom line focus. These are transactions that require a lot of time. And so, there really isn’t any smoothness to the premium that we can outline for.

Okay, thank you. And then, last on just the capital management, you guys -- last year, at the Q3 was actually when you were most the active in terms of capital return. Is there any thought process behind slowing down repurchases surrounding hurricane season or is it kind of a similar philosophy the last year where just depending upon opportunity?

Probably depends upon opportunity; we do tend to see more cautious going in the wind season, but that obviously is relative to the opportunity as well.

Next question is from the line of Sarah DeWitt with JP Morgan. Please go ahead.

On the insurance business, given your new initiative there, how big you think the segment could be over time?

What’s time?

3 to 5 years.

Certainly, it could easily double.

Okay, great. And what’s driving, is that mostly from new hires or can you just elaborate a bit more on that?

Well, I think certainly new hires. You need to have the staff in place in order to garner the business, but it’s really more about distribution relationships and opportunities in the marketplace to fill in void created by disruption, the disruption in the market that I mentioned earlier.

And then, on reinsurance prices, do you think prices are bottoming, and what’s your outlook there going forward?

Well, I do think, it does appear in certain sectors that we’re kind of hitting a bottom. I am not though here predicting that next quarter or the quarter after that we’ll see some uptick. Perhaps we’ll be at this bottom point for a while. But I do think that at these levels, there really isn’t any room to go lower, if you want to maintain any semblance of adequate returns in your capital. And I think that’s -- those are the pressures that we all face. And we are seeing some discipline in the marketplace for now. But, I am certainly not predicting any major uptick at this point. So, there is still opportunity. You’re seeing some areas that are showing rate increase in the loss affected regions. So, those will be the opportunities to think about going forward.

The next question is from the line of Kai Pan with Morgan Stanley. Please go ahead.

The first question is just a follow-up on Heartland deal. I just wonder from your experience for the last three years buying a business, eventually it’s like sorted, [ph] does that change your appetite how do you think about acquisitions?

Kai, as you know, we have not been that acquisitive. So, I am not -- it doesn’t necessarily change my appetite. You always have to be very mindful of any kind of acquisition, what it’s going to do to the business, is it strategic, what are the integration concerns et cetera. In this particular case, the acquisition is done because of round of skill sets that it did have, the marketplace was changing, but then a change began on us and we were really unable to really get the scale and diversification we needed. But no, it doesn’t necessarily change your appetite for looking at transactions that are -- that can be strategically important to us. But having said that, we are not a very acquisitive company.

That’s fair. I was just curious because this is a real deal you have done in past few years. It didn’t turn out as well as you had hoped for. Then if the business, $200 million is transferred from the insurance to reinsurance, you mentioned better combined ratio. The insurance segment I think in the past you had targeted 95; if you look at reinsurance running at the low 80s. Is that magnitude of difference in terms of profitability?

I mean crop business doesn’t run to the low 80s on an expected basis; it’s probably more high 80s, low 90s kind of business.

And then, on the foreign exchange losses, I just want to make sure this is like mark-to-market especially if exchange rates stay the same, you will not see big movement in the third quarter?

That’s correct; it’s quarter-to-quarter.

And lastly, just a very philosophically, if you look at insurance segment, you are growing pretty fast. Is there any risk you worry about growing that business that fast; what could be the downside there? Because if you look the history of insurance operation, the profitability of it has been like near breakeven. And what gives you confidence by growing it at like high teens and at the same time, you can have -- actually you can improve on the combined ratio really having right now?

The insurance model today is much different than it was back 10 years ago, which was mostly a program-oriented model. So that’s number one. Number two, I think we have offered or added awful lot of great talent to the organization that’s focused on the underwriting of business. So, it’s risk by risk, which we think gives us potential for a better outcome, as well as kind reengineering, if you will, of our program business. So, those two things we think will help dramatically. In addition, keep in mind that we are not growing at these kinds of percentages in one line of business in one territory, it’s a very diversified play across a wide distribution network. And so that I think we’ll also ensure that we have good outcome.

Thank you. Next question is from the line of Josh Shanker with Deutsche Bank. Please go ahead.

The first question, during the prepared statements, Jon Zaffino said that the Heartland -- the ex Heartland combined ratio for insurance was 109. Is it reasonable for me to think that historically Heartland has been a maybe 150 basis points, 200 basis points drag on your results?

150 basis points of what, combined ratio?

The combined ratio, yes.

I hope that’s the right math or not, Josh, but...

That’s why I’m asking.

You bet. I mean generally that business over time has been running at just the Heartland operation itself?

I don’t think over time, it’s been over Z100; we have shown losses. I don’t think it would be quite that high. The current quarter, it’s running at about 120, 119 for the current quarter.

And the premium on that is?

For the current quarter, the earned premium is about 31 million.

And this is going to sound incredibly nitpicky, I apologize. But, I’ve gotten a few questions about it. It’s a question about when did you know what -- you guys were sort of -- due to material non-public information, you guys were locked out of repurchasing shares. But, you could have put out a press release and sort of brought yourself back to the market. When did you know what sort of the cats were -- why didn’t you put out a press release? And when did you know you had a favorable development which offset your need to put out a press release?

Yes, Josh that is incredibly nitpicky.

I’m sorry.

The challenge with Canada was that the number was moving around quite a bit. And we did have a number early on. And in fact as we got more and more information, that number frankly got a little better, but it kept changing. We did not have -- because of the question I was asked earlier, we didn’t think it was appropriate, we weren’t getting a right answer by using kind of an industry loss estimate, market share given how we participated in that particular event and with those particular clients. It wasn’t a simple matter of taking an industry loss estimate and a market share number. We had reports from clients as well as on the ground investigation. We didn’t know that frankly until relatively late in the game, probably two weeks ago, that we were comfortable with the number. In the meantime, as we have said in the past, we generally look at -- in an event or series of events going to be within our expected cat load. And thought that this was probably going to come in at the expected cat load and therefore a release on the event was not required. That’s kind of what we said in the past. Had we thought that this was going to be materially above our expected cat load, then we probably would have had reconsidered weather to put something out.

Ladies and gentlemen, that’s all the time we have for questions. I’d like to turn the call over for closing remarks.

Thanks everybody for participating in the call. As I mentioned, we’re quite satisfied with our results given the frequency of events, some of which didn’t even reach the level of cat for us. So that’s a testament to our numbers. Our insurance initiative as we’ve mentioned is going well. And with crop moving to the reinsurance segment, improved underlying performance of this book should become more apparent on a go forward. On the reinsurance side, we continue to manage through the cycle. And as noted in some areas, our PMLs are down, pricing does appear to be bottoming, and we’re well-positioned to shift when warranted. So, again, thank you all and talk to many of you in the weeks ahead. Thanks again.

Ladies and gentlemen, that does conclude our conference for today. Thank you again for your participation. And you may now disconnect.