Yes, Neil. Yes, it's very topical right now. There are a lot of moving parts, as you discussed. And I'm not sure with regards to Russia or India. I'm not sure if anyone knows exactly how that's going to play out. But the data that we do have in front of us shows that if I start on the demand side, as I said in the opening remarks, demand in Q1, which is typically a little bit seasonally softer, was really pretty strong. And then demand too, while it was volatile with some of the announcements on potential tariffs and how those would implement, where they would exactly land, just like any change in policy, you saw a little bit of volatility in there. But ultimately, the implementation, not only was it delayed, but I think it was at levels that were somewhat more priced in. And so you saw even demand in Q2 was a bit strong. And you started to see demand revisions throughout the year for 2025 and some of that coming out of China as well. So indications that you've got China doing a bit better year-over-year. We still have modest decline based on -- or I'm sorry, demand growth based on historical levels for year-over-year growth in '25. And then we continue to see the demand growth increasing into '26. So a little bit stronger demand growth in '26 than over '25. So the demand side looks -- the back half maybe flattening out, maybe not as much demand growth, but still strong demand. And then that brings us to the supply side, which there's been a lot of speculation on how and when and how is the spare capacity going to hit. And I think the most important thing to touch on is where we're at with inventory levels, historically, very, very low. And so we think the first thing for that spare capacity is obviously, it's going to fill into the inventory levels and bring those up back to more of in line along the 5-year average or slightly above the 5-year average since we've been running at a deficit the last couple of years with the spare capacity being higher than usual. But ultimately, once we get through the next quarter or 2, maybe seasonally demand weakness in Q1, we actually find ourselves looking at a potentially balanced market going forward. And what we see is less non-OPEC supply growth coming on in the next couple of years than what we've seen. And so it really sets up. That's why I said in the opening remarks that we start to see in 2026, you arrive at a spot where pricing is likely more driven by fundamentals without as much spare capacity offline and a market in general that looks more balanced in '26 than it does today.