A pleasant good morning, everyone. Welcome to our conference call and webcast to discuss the results for our fourth quarter and 12 months ended December 31st, '09. I'm Harry Vafias, CEO and President of StealthGas. I'd like to remind you please that we'll be discussing forward-looking statements in today's conference call and presentation. Regarding the Safe Harbor language, I would like to refer you to slide number one of this presentation as well as to our press release on our fourth quarter and 12 months '09 results. With me today is Andrew Simmons, our CFO. And if you need further information, please contact myself or Andrew. Slide number two, we continued with our stated business strategy in the fourth quarter of '09. And later, I would like to discuss the outlook for 2010 and beyond. Our primary objective continues to (inaudible) highly efficient and modern fleet on secure employment contracts with first-class charters that serve a very specific niche market. Our Courchevel [ph] fleet has no correlation whatsoever to most of our shipping sectors, many of which, as you know, will continue to experience significant downturns in both charter levels and particular vessel values. During the fourth quarter of '09, we negotiated the cancellation of the (inaudible) brand new product tanker albeit the cost in the short term. But I certainly believe that this was a prudent decision as the vessel's value had declined substantially from the time of contraction to (inaudible), until now when we have all the (inaudible) substantial portion of debt at the time when we are seeking to consolidate the already strong financial standing of the company. Last, we have realized sales concerns with respect to the design of the (inaudible) ability to charter going forward. We have no further scheduled deliveries of such until the…

Thank you, Harry. Good morning, everybody. With slide number five, we now turn to the financial highlights of the fourth quarter 2009. With an average of 42.8 vessels owned and operated in the fourth quarter, we realized a net loss of $27.2 million on voyage revenue of $28.4 million, and produced a negative EBITDA of $17.6 million. For the fourth quarter of 2009, we reported (inaudible) loss of $4.4 million on interest rates local currency hedging arrangements, which included an unrealized non-cash loss of approximately $3 million and a realized cash loss of approximately $1.4 million, plus a non-cash provision of approximately $200,000 for restricted stock portion of deferred stock-based compensation. Also in the fourth quarter as previously announced, we incurred a $9.9 million non-cash impairment loss on vessels held for sale, plus we incurred a loss of $10.75 million, plus the forfeiture of a previously paid deposit through the cancellation of the contract to acquire Stealth Argentina. Including these non-cash items and the payment via the cancellation of the Stealth Argentina, net income was $2.3 million or $0.10 per share calculated on 22.3 million average shares outstanding. Our net debt capitalization stood at 46% at the end of Q4 ’09. We continue to believe that maintaining our leverage at moderate levels is important. As currently structured, no further debt will be incurred by the company until early 2011. (inaudible) in our recent press release, we have kept -- we are currently refuting our overall level of indebtedness through the sale of some of our smaller and older LPG vessels. We now turn please to slide number six. This slide provides you with an overview of the development of our income statement for five consecutive quarters. In comparing our results flow from the fourth quarter of 2008 to the fourth…

Moving on to slide 12, this slide shows the volatile spread markets of the past six years for the medium-sized and large-sized gas ships. In comparison, the mid-sized and smaller semi-raft and the fully pressurized ships, our core sector, have experienced the much lower volatility, and until recently, steady growth in freight earnings from mid '05 onwards. It’s clear from this data that our type of ships, which form the core of our business and that are far remote from dry or wet or the container markets for over the past six years of experience; the wild fluctuations in rates that these other shipping sectors have seen. And we are hopeful that this relatively non-volatile trading pattern will continue to remain intact as I believe we have proven today despite the prevailing economic conditions through our reported revenue for ’09. And this is further emphasized at slide 14, which shows that the one year time charter equivalent volatility since the year 2000 between the dry bulk and crude tanker sector, and the 3,500 fully pressurized gas ship, and 3,200 semi-rough LPG vessels, which are typical of the majority of our fleet. As you can see, based on the mean average for these sectors over this quite extended period, the level of volatility is far higher in the dry and wide spaces than our core segment. We continue to expect that the supply of products will increase next year, plus demand is expected to continue to be steady, particularly in the Far East, and developing well. We therefore continue to believe that the outlook for our core market is encouraging. And thus, we will continue with the contracted acquisition during ’11 and ’12 of five brand new LPG ships, while in the meantime as we have already commenced looking to reducing…

(Operator Instructions) We'll pause for just a moment so everyone (inaudible) for questions. The first question is from Daniel Burke from Johnson Rice.

Good afternoon, guys.

Good afternoon.

Hi, Daniel.

Hey, Harry, just to start off, there was a bit of a winter-related bounce in rates. I was curious if you were able to capture any of that in terms of either rate improvement that we'd see or maybe improved spot utilization, after your spot (inaudible) here in the first quarter of '10?

We didn’t see the winter firming that we have seen the previous years. Whereas you might remember, we saw some really crazy rates being pegged. Indeed, we saw multiple (inaudible), which obviously is a good thing. We didn’t see so many new inquiries for a long period, but (inaudible) we negotiated them with fixed amount you saw from our announcement. So generally, a far smaller boom than the previous year, I have to say.

Okay. I understand. And then, you mentioned yourself, just in your answer, “not too many inquiries for a long period.” You picked up a couple in the press release towards the end of last week. Your comment this morning, I noted, you are resisting, to some extent, period business. Can you maybe elaborate then on what you see are the intent of interest in term business and maybe what type of price levels you see now and how many you see that unfolding as we go forward?

You saw what we did to fix. And you saw the average rate of those charters. Those we did fix, which means those weren't at acceptable levels and for longer period as well, longer than one year, I mean. Obviously, there are a lot more charters that are at lower levels. But as I said, I think 2011 will be a much better year not only from the LPG point of view, but from the global economy point of view. So we don’t want to fix too much at low levels because we need to have the significant amount of free vessels next year to take advantage, hopefully, fix at much better levels than we have done in '09.

Okay. And then, I wanted to talk a little bit about the fleet strategy. You've been selling a couple of vessels ahead. I have two questions. They're unrelated specifically, but both deal with how you are thinking about your fleet. The first was post the announced asset sales, how many vessels will you have in the China cabotage trade? The second question was it looks like four to five semi-refs are on spot. How are those performing? And what’s your interest in the semi-ref coastal market versus the fore fresher fleet. Can you differentiate how you're thinking about the assets?

In the Chinese market, we will have about four vessels. I'm not sure because some are coming to an end, and I do not know if it will be extended or not. So that is what is happening at the moment. And on the semi-refs, despite the semi-refs being more flexible ships and more expensive ships, on a pro rata basis always, the majority of the interest we've seen for the period or for selling the vessels has been on the pressure side that’s why we have not fixed the semi-refs' period. That’s why we have not sold any of the semi-refs. So that’s what it is.

Okay. Great, maybe if I had just one last question for you or for Andrew. Just wondering post-asset sales, how the -- have the account changed any in terms of how may unencumbered LPG vessels you all currently have?

We have six.

Okay. Thank you very much, Harry.

Thank you.

(Operator Instructions) And we’ll take our next question from Tom McKay from Simplon Partners. Please go ahead.

Good morning. Given your decision to cancel the Argentina and forfeit the deposit, can you elaborate on the -- your original thinking in ordering the four product tankers that represent the fundamental departure from your small LPG tanker strategy?

Your question was first, why we bought the tankers. That’s the question?

Right, because you -- continuing in your calls over the last couple of years, you've emphasized stability of the small LPG tanker market and the niche market aspects to it. And now, you have something like a third of that capacity of the balance sheet devoted to three product tankers that are -- that you don’t even operate. So it doesn’t seem to make sense to me. and I just wondered what your rationale has been?

A tanker level question. First of all, during the good times, there was a lot of free cash flow and we needed to do something with it instead of filing it in the drawer and earning nothing or earning an significant interest from the bank. Number two, we are always of the belief that you should not always have all of your eggs in one basket because if that basket breaks, you break all your eggs, meaning that I would never want to have 50 gas ships and nothing else. It's very, very dangerous. If something happens in the gas market, then that sends you exposed on a 100% basis. Thirdly, we never bought product tankers to gamble or to play the market. We always bought them in advance, having arranged the long bareboat charter, which is the safest charter that exists. So not operating the ship is exactly a good thing because as you know very well, if you operate the tanker and you have the pollution incident, or an accident, or something like that, then you’re finished. In the State, especially, there's no limit on the damages, which means it might take over your whole company. So actually, not operating the tankers, I think, is something you should congratulate, as I not say it as a bad thing. Don’t forget that on the debt side, you are correct. These are expensive ships. But obviously, these are brand new 50,000 deadweight vessels and not brand new or 10-year old 5,000 deadweight vessels as the majority of the gas ships are. So we're not comparing apples to apples. And secondly, don’t forget that these ships bring in approximately 15,000 net bareboat per day, which obviously, not the G ship or many of the G ships together cannot bring. So having three such tankers on long bareboats bringing this kind of money in the company I think is a very good thing and a very good floor if the LPG rates fall further, which I don’t think. But in this market and in this heart of the crisis, if I can say that, you’ll never know what will happen. So obviously, we bought them on quite high prices. Nobody can disagree with that. But instead of gambling like other companies did, and obviously, bridging long covenants and having to drop off with cash, and of these things, we did not. We fixed them along charters and the charters are performing. And therefore, we have a very good cash flow, and very easily repaying this big debt, as you mentioned. So that’s my thought on there.

So on the Argentina, was the Argentina on a bareboat charter subject to delivery?

Yes. Yes, solar tankers, we never buy a tanker because they are very big, and expensive, and dangerous assets, if I can say that. We’ll never buy them unless we have lined up a good charter, a long charter.

So the charter though is not responsible, in part, for the loss and cancellation?

Why would the charter be? We cancelled the ship because we felt it was twice the price we had to pay. It was nearly twice the market value. And on top of that, there was a design flaw, which meant that at the end of the charter, we would not be able to fix with some oil majors. Why would the charter be responsible for that? The responsible parties are the buyers, ourselves, and the owners that built the ships, i.e. the sellers.

Right, right.

So no, the charter -- we’re not responsible whatsoever.

Okay. All right. Well thank you.

Thank you.

(Operator Instructions) As there are no further questions, I’d like to turn the call back over to Mr. Vafias and Mr. Simmons for any additional closing remarks.

Thank you. We would like to thank everyone for joining us at our conference call today, and for your interest and trust in our company. We look forward to having you with us again at our next conference call for the first quarter 2010 results. And I’m sure that next year will be definitely better than the last one. Thank you very much.

Thank you. That will conclude today’s conference call. Thank you for your participation, ladies and gentlemen. You may now disconnect.