Stewart Zimmerman
Management
We had two philosophy questions, on one of these calls, so I would say when the fed communicated that an end to QE, might be approaching, 10%, it went from 160%, 260%, which was a very large percentage increase. No matter how well they telegraph that change in fed policy, it’s disruptive and as you point out the reaction was broad-based. There was increased volatility, there was credit spread widening, there was outflows from bond funds and impacted all financial assets, emerging market equities, high yield bonds, U.S. equities, so what do we about that, likely the question is when the value of a Non-Agency change, how much of it was credit spread and how much was due to the fact that the interest rate sensitivity changed and that’s what we debate, and we said, gee, there is more interest rate sensitivity. So maybe you’d be arguing, there is no interest rate sensitivity, this is all just credit spread widening. So we sort of have to allocate it and we did allocate a part of it in interest rate, and part of it is credit spread widening. So Non-Agencies now yield close to 5 and treasuries yield 260. So is that a widening of credit spread, when there is more disruption with the credit spread widened, it might on the disruption, but we think that’s about the right spread over the medium-term. So we’re comfortable that the value of the Non-Agencies will not go down a lot if there’s a credit spread widening. So hopefully, I was close to addressing your question.
Michael R. Widner – Keefe, Bruyette & Woods, Inc.: I think you did. I think that again, everyone sort of talks about the credit spread widening, it happened most recently, but I mean, you guys have been in this business for a while and running credit assets for a while, I mean, longer than a lot of guys in the business. And so, our credit spreads really wide to treasuries right now relative to historical norms or is it really we’re removing from artificially tight levels to on the journey back to something that’s a little more normal and if you approach it from that angle, again, it suggests that maybe one needs to hedge differently and obviously the reason for all this question is, I mean, the reason most of the stocks are trading at discounted book and investors are having a hard time, but the sector is everyone is trying to wrap their head around, god, if we’re really in a secular bond bear market, what do I need to believe about management’s ability to hedge in order to be willing to buy these things, as leverage bond funds effectively?