Good morning and thank you for joining us today. And can I ask you all to turn your phones to silent for the benefit of your neighbors, thanks. We know that you need to get to Singapore by 11, so we’re going to talk fast. The bottom line loss that we’re announcing today is stark seen in isolation and is difficult for our shareholders. But the results do reflect progress in two areas, firstly the significant strides we’ve made this year in clearing our outstanding legacy issues and the continued run down of non-strategic assets. But secondly it shows the continuing strong underlying performance of the core bank, particularly in mortgages and business lending that is very evident, and the business is now growing healthily. On the first point, related to the past, 2016 saw the bank concluded a number of outstanding legacy issues. You will see in our announcements and the related one from the treasury about a potential way forward on the project formally known as Williams & Glyn. The European Commission will now be consulting on a revised plan which we and the treasury think will achieve earlier benefits for competition, particularly in small business banking and would remove a continuing burden on the bank. We now wait the conclusion of that consultation and a formal decision by the commission which we hope will be positive. It has however been frustratingly difficult to make progress on the issue surrounding the bank’s participation in residential mortgage backed securities in the US before the financial crisis. We remain under investigation and as we’ve said face potential criminal and civil action. At this point we cannot say when those issues will be resolved as the timing is out of our hands and we will not be providing any further updates…

Always a fear that the person before you walks off with your script and you’re left standing here wondering what to say. But thanks very much Howard and welcome to everyone this morning for our full year results presentation. Look, you’ve all have seen the results statement this morning and when we last spoke we said it would be much tougher quarter, and we have delivered that by concluding as many of our legacy conduct and litigation issues as we possibly can. These costs are a stark reminder of what happens to a bank when things go wrong and you lose focus on the customer as this bank did before the financial crisis. This is also been another tough year for our colleagues at this bank, and I’m grateful for the determination and serving millions of customers day in and day out despite the many headline negatives that we have taken. We can now increasingly shift our focus from the legacy of the past to the future of this core bank. Despite an eventful 2016 from a macro perspective, and some uncertainty around the future, the fundamentals of our strategy remain unchanged. I’d like to talk you through the progress that we’ve made since we set our strategy in 2014 and I’ll then outline the bank we’re becoming as we invest in our service model to meet our customers’ ever evolving needs. The Ewen will provide you with the details on the banks financial performance in ’16 and more importantly he will give you an over view of how we’re going to meet our revised financial targets. Finally I’ll look ahead to the bank we will be in 2020, a simpler, safe, customer focused bank that delivers for its shareholders. And then we will finish by taking your questions. We’ve…

Thanks Ross. The magnitude of our full year loss today clearly reflects a further £10 billion of one-off costs we took in 2016, the final debt payment to HM Treasury, further conduct and restructuring costs and additional capital resolution disposal costs. But underlying the poor headline results was a lot of progress last year both with the core bank and with resolving our legacy issues. We’re targeting 2017 to be our final year of substantive clean-up and subject to this being achieved. We are thinking to return in a 2018. As part of this turnaround, Ross and I are very keen to stop our practice of what I would describe as a just [artist]. In recent years in order to show you a true and fairer view, we’ve been showing you adjusted numbers of shares. From Q1 2018 we plan to only report unadjusted numbers and unadjusted ratio. For our core businesses, 2016 was another year of good progress, combined adjusted operating profits of £4.2 billion, that’s up bent on 2015 and that’s despite a tougher interest rate environment. Adjusted ROE of 11.1% against all of our financial targets we delivered again adjusted for business transfers, personal and business banking, commercial and private banking at combined income growth of 2%, and together with NatWest markets, our three core businesses had positive operating jewels of 4%. We had our third year of over delivering on cost a further £985 million taken out last year. That’s a combined £3.1 billion of cost take-out over the last three years in context the 26% nominal reduction. With capital resolution, our RWAs declined by a further £14.5 billion down 30% during 2016 and down 64% since we established capital resolution at the start of 2015. Turning to Q4 in more detail, the substantive loss we…

Thanks very much Ewen. And as Ewen described despite a significant bottom line, a loss, we continue to make progress against the medium term goals we set ourselves, and today we are intentionally not dwelling on the past years performance but instead we sort to explain the progress of the three years positions us well today to go forward and being able to achieve our vision for 2020. Look, we’ve published a lot of information today, so I just thought I’d leave you with five key takeaways. The first of those is, we have the right strategy and it is starting to deliver the results. Secondly, we have made progress on dealing with the many material legacy issues that have been holding this bank back and we have some issues still to resolve in particularly, RMBS at the final W&G resolution, but I don’t expect legacy issues to dominate our story in the same way that they have in the past. Thirdly, we have delivered our financial targets for the third year in a row. Fourthly, our customer’s behavior is changing at an ever greater pace and we will change with them. Going further on reducing cost to serve, going faster on digital transformation and giving them more control over how they bank with us. And my final point, we’re targeting a profitability in2018, and we’ve set clear targets for an unadjusted 12% return on tangible equity and below 50% cost to income ratio by 2020. Ewen’s laid out the financial roadmap of how we expect to get there. This bank has great potential and we believe that they are going faster on the cost reduction and faster on digital transformation we will deliver a simpler, safer and even more customer focused bank with a compelling shareholder investment case. And with that I’ll hand it back to Howard to host the Q&A.

Thank you Ross and Ewen. We will have, I expect some questions from the ether and I’ve got a little screen that tells me. But lets’ begin in the room. First over there.

It’s Robert Noble from RBC. The RWA guidance that you’ve given in the core, is the non-core on top of that? So should we expect 15 billion to 20 billion to fold back in to the core business on top of the 163 you gave? And then in Saudi Hollandi on top of that as well, and given all of the RWA and movements and all of the restructuring cost heads, do you think pre-dividend you’re going to have any excess capital by 2020 to a 13% target? And then on a core question, I guess you’ve said the structural hedge will have less of a drag. Is it still a drag and do core NIM still run backwards, and so I have one more on the non-core. Actually the funding cost, I’ve got about 24 others if the funding cost related to non-core to what funding cost of your side is non-core at the moment?

So on capital resolution, 15 billion to 20 billion. I don’t think we would describe it as core at the end of next year. We’ll still be non-core, but yes it will be folded back and not all of it necessarily will be folded back in to - I mean it predominantly sits across asset classes that would be in NatWest markets and commercial banking today. But some of it may well sit in a further vehicle outside of those two businesses as well. So you should add that number on top. The only reason for excluding the Alawwal Bank stake was - look the timing on that is again we’re committed to exiting that stake, but the timing on that is uncertain. So you should assume that our aspiration is to also exit the 8 billion or so of RWAs that’s sitting in that bank safe today. So your second question was --.

On NIMs you said there’s going to be lower structural hedge drag.

So look in terms of NIM overall I think Q4 was 219 basis points at the bank level. You know that we don’t guide on NIM, but if you think about sort of what’s going on in our various - we’ll get less of a benefit this year I think from the reduction in non-core. We still got a significant benefit from that last year. We’ve repriced a whole bunch of deposits in Q4, not all of that benefit is reflected in to Q4. The SVI book which has been a big drag for us in terms of the conversion, the SVI percentage declining that has now stabilized over the last couple of quarters. So we think that will be less of a drag in terms of our changing mix on our NIM. And in terms of what we’ve said, in terms of commercial we’ve said that we expect to keep income stable, quarterly stable this year. So you should assume that there is a mix change going on from lower ROE, lower margin commercial business in to higher margin commercial business. So you take all of that together with some pluses and minuses, we do think there will be very modest NIM pressure this year overall.

Next one over here, I think.

It’s Jonathan Pierce from (inaudible). Can I focus on the 2020 RAT target lease, given there’s lots of pieces at the jigsaw and thank you for that. But can I just ask three questions to help us get to the bottom line. Firstly, impairment charges, I assume you’re using it through the cycle there. Give us an idea of what you think through the cycle impairments? Second question, the [CET 1] ratio you’re assuming, I guess it’s still 13% in 2020, but what’s that apply to sounds like it is RWAs on the current regulatory basis only adding in the mortgage uplift due to the PRA proposals, but if you could confirm there that would be helpful. And the third one is, some color on IFRS 9, I think if you look at a section in the report accounts, but there’s no numbers as of yet. Maybe you can help us a little that today, but if not could you at least tell us whether equity tier one ratio you expect to run in 2020 will be 13% after any IFRS 9 impact or do you think you can run lower than 13 if you include that. Thanks.

We talk impairments trends this year being below normalized trends. We find it quite hard to think about what normalize does in this interest rate environment. But somewhere between 30 and 40 basis points over the cycle, I would have thought. The core tier one target we are targeting is 13%. That includes the mortgage RWA uplift, it includes some modest impact of some parts of the BASAL 4 initiatives, but doesn’t assume the imposition of significant apple flows on us and their contract. And on IFRS 9, you’re right there is quite a bit of detail for those of you who got that far on the annual report. But it’s all qualitative at this point. We expect to provide quantitative feedback as part of Q2 reporting. But you should assume for the time being that we’re modeling on the basis of a 13% core tier one target.

And just to clarify, supposed to any IFRS 9 impact, I’m sorry just follow-up on the BASAL 4 comment because that’s interesting that you are assuming some inflation in there, but still targeting 13%. Can I push a little bit more on the areas of inflation that you are assuming within the RWA phase, doesn’t sound like output flows from what you say that you’ve seen in some operational risk increase.

Yeah, we’re assuming bits and pieces of the BASAL 4 package to get announced on a time table that’s consistent with implementation in 2020. As we said today, I think that looks to be a relatively conservative assumption.

I’m going to take one webcast question from Rohith Chandra-Rajan from Barclays.

Please could you discuss where the additional cost savings are planned to come from, and if you expect any associated revenue impact? Similarly with the 20 million RWA reduction could you provide some details on how much of this comes from each business, what types of assets these area and what type of returns they deliver?

You have done a pretty good job of just outlining where the cost savings are going to come across the business over the next three to four years, because they’ll be different from what they were in the past, and the past has been as we’ve pulled down 26 countries and taken assets off the book, reduced our markets business. But going forward other than the cap raise cost that Ewen did outline and the cost of running that operation, which will be coming down, certainly we’ll be seeing some cost come out of that NatWest Market business from its current 1.3 down to the 800 million. So there’s 500 million over the next four years on an annual basis will come down. And the (inaudible) will come throughout the business itself as we use a lot more technology and simplify this business on an end-to-end basis. We believe that there is significant cost to come out, but more importantly those significant will make it easy for our staff to deal with customers, and our customers do business with us so it’s a win-win. I don’t see a lot of revenue impact other than what we’ve already signaled with cap raise coming off from assets associated with that. If anything making this business a simpler business has shown in the past that we actually get revenue increases and we certainly seeing that as we make it a simpler business to deal with we’re doing more business. So we’ll continue on with that. On the 20 billion RWA reduction, most of this will come out of our commercial business. But I’ll leave you and just take, if there’s any other detail feel free --.

A decent part of its out of commercial consistent with what I said earlier. But it is tough across all three franchises. In terms of the income the current returns they deliver, we said that was 250 million to 300 million pre-tax of income reduction as a result of that £20 billion reduction. So you should assume from that, it has a relatively modest impact on income.

Andrew (inaudible) from Honda Advisors. Just coming back to the return on tangible target that the gentleman before me asked, just a couple of things really, one, could you just give the interest rate assumption for that. I think you talked about consensus right, but (inaudible) just reduced their targets because they have to move their interest rate ups and downs. If you could talk to that that would be very useful. And the second thing is, I hugely welcome the idea of moving to only reported numbers in the future in 2018. But that being the case, on the ongoing restructuring of [combat] issues, maybe something that power normal life than a bank going forward. Are they assumed in your targets as well?

On the second one, yes we are assuming consensus interest rate assumptions. So if those consensus assumptions were to change then it would have some impact on our forecast. But on the conduct and restructuring charges I think not probably just similar to one of the banks earlier this week, we are assuming on a run rate basis there will be some ongoing modest impact of conduct in our numbers and that’s included within the effectively £6.4 billion cost guidance.

But just on restructuring, I mean surely it feels like restructuring is a part of banks life not just today and tomorrow --.

No, got to be clear. As long as restructuring everything is within the £6.4 billion guidance.

Yes, so I think this is why we are keen to get to an unadjusted basis rather than the adjusted and everything else on it. And as I’ve said, we see those numbers included in our 6.4 billion guidance.

Just a last observation, during the period of time that you’ve had that target, the consensus view on interest rate has moved quite a lot, both up and down. So your target stays the same, so how should we interpret that or is that just more bit of aspirational guidance sort of reading through those ruins of market forecast.

Look since you wouldn’t assume its aspirational guidance, we have to take you through a lot of governance to be able to put targets out in the market and we do take them very seriously. I think you should interpret that when Ross first got the math it was probably a decent amount of freight in terms of getting through the 12% plus return on equity and since then the interest rate environment has changed certainly relative to the way we were in Q3, the interest rate environment has improved and therefore we’ve got more confidence in the delivery. But as you would recall that was previously 2019 target and that’s very much why we shifted back a year on the back the changed outlook for interest rates post Brexit.

Hi, its Fahed Kunwar coming off from Redburn. Just had a question on the deposit side of things. You said there’s more to come in ’17. I think one of your peers is going to break down off your book in to the saving rates and what the move was from Q3 to Q4, so can have a think about how much benefit there is to come through. And then also going forward from that new rate in Q4 ’17, how much can you cut? And I asked that question because you talk about sharp increase in swap rates benefiting your NIM by reducing the drag in the structural hedge. If that was to reverse which is possible I guess, would that then change your balance sheet targets besides, you and your NIM will aggregate greater or have you got more flex on the deposit side to offset that.

May be if I take the last one and then you can go and make the first. I don’t think we have a lot of flexibility left in the deposit pricing in the books. They are as you’ve probably seen down, it is at very low levels at the moment. So any further reductions I think would be hurting for us and the customers exactly from a banking revenue perspective. So I don’t think there’s a lot of flexibility left, only just the benefit left to fly through. Do you have any idea of what’s left?

It’s relatively modest, because the deposit change came through mid-way through the quarter. So we gave you the interest spreads in our disclosures, so you can assume relatively modest improvement. But as I said overall, if you think about UK, PBB and where a lot of that free pricing came through, obviously the SVR which has been a big drag has now stabilized at around 12% in the last two quarters. The mixed change that we’ve had over recent years of a very rapidly declining unsecured book is also now stabilized. So as I said, I think more of the - and we said today that we do expect income and UK PBB to go up this year.

Someone over there, thanks.

It’s Andrew Coombs from Citi. If I could ask one on 2017 statutory profits, and the second question just coming back to the new HMT proposals and the state aid obligations, and on the 2017 statutory profits. If I look at your 2016 accounts to start with you printed 3.7 billion of adjusted operating profit, do you expect some cost to be 750 million lower of which any part should be offset by higher loan losses. And I think your CR disposal costs are not too dissimilar in 2017 versus ’16. So if we take that in to account and then adjust for the one being in restructuring that you’ve taken and your commentary that you only expect that bank to potentially return to profits in 2018, it would seem to suggest conduct and other charges of 2.5 billion or more. Is that fair assumption? So that would be the first question. Second question on at the HMT proposals; the original proposal had a dividend lock up based on an exit showed Williams & Glyn. Now I know your limit and what you can say here, but would it be fair assume that there would be some kind of SME switch assured i.e. a certain amount would need to shift before you were allowed to resume dividends or is that way off the mark?

I will start with the last one and then Ewen can get back to the first. But you’re right that there will be differences made up around conduct litigation, restructuring charges that will make up the difference. On the Williams & Glyn there’s still a lot of detail to be put around the place of the options that’s been put forward. But there would be a number of SME customers that would move across, and I suspect if they didn’t move across, it would be some sort of number that they’d have to pay up accordingly. But there’s a detail of history going through. The advantage of this arrangement, it gives much greater certainty to customers which is I think very important, much greater certainty to our staff, much greater certainty to the bank that we can actually fill in at a very short period of time as oppose to the current arrangement which we’ve said will take probably through to 2019 or 2020. And we still don’t have, we get in to the details about what does that mean for dividend. We’ve always said that satisfying Williams & Glyn are in the ace stress test and getting ourselves profitable were the four criteria for getting back in to dividend. So we’ll see that’s why we came to get those numbers off as well.

I’ve got one from the webcast from [Claire Kane] of Credit Suisse. Just three questions and I’ll get them very quickly. 12% return on tangible target seems to be based on the ability to achieve 6.5 million pre-provision profits. You confirm guidance of 6.4 for 2019 so why push the target out by year. Secondly, is the leverage different higher risk density, what impairment assumptions more below the line charges? Third one, on cost guidance does the 2 billion cost reduction plan include cost take out for Williams & Glyn i.e. Williams & Glyn is included in the 6.4 billion 2019 cost target, if so are we just waiting to hear what the additional restructuring charges will be to get there or could be expect with that update to hear that the cost reduction is above 2 billion.

Firstly just a point of clarification that the 6.4 billion is not a 2019 target, it’s a 2020 target. The £2 billion cost reduction does include an assumption around Williams & Glyn. It’s obviously sort of premature at the moment for us to be able to do a detailed modeling on us until we know what the final proposal package is and therefore what any time table and therefore what the integration plan is around, reintegration plan would be for Williams & Glyn. So as and when we’re able to confirm that we will. And as I said earlier that may include needing to modestly adjust what our restructuring charges are - assumptions are at that point. Is the leverage different, however the density. Look I don’t think you should assume as we model out there’ going to be significant change RWA density in the bank overall. I mean we’re growing mortgage book well. It’s not based on a significant change in leverage assumption during the planning there.

There was somebody else over here I think.

It’s James (inaudible) from [Soft Gen]. I had a couple of questions please, the first one is on your markets business. I guess what you’ve been saying today is yes that you will finally shrink the 30 billion risk rated asset, but it’s been pretty sticky where it is. So I guess the question is what’s the hold up and will this be happening this year for the markets business? And I’m thinking about that in relation to the income guidance that you’ve given. And then the second question is on the DOJ provision until recently. What does that number actually represent i.e. is that your estimate of a best case outcome or there’s just nothing we can read in to that numbers it’s just a stinking post, nothing else.

I’ll take the last one on the DOJ provision, it was after obviously a very serious discussion at the Board on what we should take - one of the issues that we looked at was what settlements had happened in the months prior to us which gave us a slightly bit effect. And also your last point about would the Board be comfortable sitting with it. We’re not in negotiations, the situation from a month ago hasn’t changed and I think it’s got a little way to play through before we do get the final resolution. And as we see it, the number could be much higher than what it is in the plain. So until we get to that position there’s really no change from that last conversation. On the markets business, Ewen do you want to pick that up.

Look we’re not changing our guidance, but we expect the market franchise to be at around 30 billion of RWAs. You should assume that it’s sort of within that gross 20 billion that I talked about earlier. And in 2016 there was obviously some adverse FX movements which meant that there were some FX translation which kept RWAs higher than otherwise it would have been. But we’re not changing the guidance on the 30.

How much is the 35 sterling at the moment?

We’ll get you that number.

I have a question online from Goldman Sachs. Two questions, one your target seems to imply that you have significant excess capital further out. How should we think about return both in terms of timing i.e. earliest first half ’18 now and form for example, buybacks versus dividends. Second question, could you comment on the competitive trends you currently see in UK mortgages. Shall we expect RBS to maintain its current strategy focusing on volumes and continued market share gains?

May be do the latter one first, I mean the market is competitive that we have as I’ve said many quarters in a row been building distribution very strongly in this market place which we did lack. I think we still got some very good growth to go through here. Just in one of the branches this morning and the mortgage volumes are very, very strong because the proposition of service delivery is fantastic and that’s what people are enjoying. It’s not so much around the (inaudible). But I do see more compression of the nature and the NIM, but I think our current strategy will remain. We are focusing on getting volumes but not at all cost thank you very much. It has to be within risk appetite and we are not the price leader here. We sit middle market and the volumes are going very well. So I’d stay with that strategy.

Yeah on the first question on returning capital was, as Ross said, clearly are not on the four hurdle that we see is obviously resolution of Williams & Glyn, RMBS passing a stress test and being profitable. So we can clearly see a very visible past achieving all of those. We talked previously about returning capital both in the form of dividends and buybacks. If we were to do directed buybacks, we would need to get shareholder approval to do that which we don’t currently have, and we are not proposing to put that in front of the shareholders at this AGM. But certainly for this year, it’s not a topic that we spend a lot of time debating internally and we’re very focused on ticking off the four things we need to tick off.

John Cronin from Goodbody. Just coming back to the Williams & Glyn question, you’ve indicated that there would be further cost ahead of the £750 million to the extent that that business is reintegrated. And can you give any guidance in terms of how we should think about that? I mean substantially less than £750 or another £750 million again perhaps. And then secondly, on the specific approval of the timing for a potential product proposal. And you mentioned that it would be no earlier than Q4 ’18 before you’re renegotiating the state aid agreement. But in terms of the actual approval of the proposal, when could we expect to see some progress on that if you can give any guidance on that that would help. And then just thirdly to come back to the £20 billion reduction in core RWAs and I suppose just that given you what the Q4 2018 timing on that, does that indicate any progress recently with regulators in terms of discussions around risk densities and this was specifically within that you’ve alluded to scope to reduce the RWAs of the Ultra Bank business that you are currently still very high. Any update you can give on the discussion of the Irish regulator in that respect would be helpful. And finally, within that if there’s anything you can point to in terms of the actual operative associate us with. Why you have assumed from a BASAL 4 perspective that would be helpful too. Thank you.

We have got some costs set aside for the WMG reintegration. But at this stage we don’t know how big that will be. So they may well be. I personally don’t anticipate being another 750 million on top of the 750 of getting through the solution. But we will keep you updated as we go through that and make determinations. Timing wise, it’s quite a complex process because both at the European Commission we want to do some testing on the solution. I suspect there’ll be negotiations around the actual solution itself. Treasury have put forward proposal and that would have to tested in the market place and I think that will take at least three to six months to get the complete approval through on that. So I think we’ve going to have to be patient. As I’ve said I think it is a very good solution for everybody, customers. Speed of getting it done in the market place, creating more competition in the market place, but then this is the best way of doing it. And obviously certainly for us, but I think this will probably take us at least three if not six months. And Howard you have worked through these process before. But I think it’s going to timing.

We understand that there’s a short an initial consultation by the treasury on the safety of that scheme, and then the EC has to consult for a period of three months or maybe slightly longer than that and then it goes back to the Commission for a final decision.

And before you answer on the risk rated assets, there’s a related question, very similar question from David Lock of Deutsche. Saying that the Ulster Bank presentation in December Gerry Mallon mentioned high RWA sensitivity versus Irish peers and also was due to the point in time model you used and that you have new models in time which should be deployed in 2018 reducing that disparity. What proportion of the 20 billion core bank RWA reduction expected is related to these model changes, and is there further potential optimization for Ulster risk rated assets to come during 2019 to 2020. It’s a linked question.

So around Ulster Bank RWA as Gerry mentioned back in December, last year we’ve reduced RWAs in Ireland by 20% in euro terms, The track of book RWA gets it either you can see it in the Pillar 3 document came down a lot already. Their track of book RWAs came down by 30% last year. As bigger issue is model changes, there’s still we’ve got about 55% of the Irish lend book either in the form of track of book or an MPL portfolio. So we do think there is material further, RWA reduction coming out or if Ireland which will go beyond ’18. So there’s some, but its within that 20 billion, it’s as we said earlier by far and away the bigger piece is commercial a bit in NatWest Market is getting down to the 30 billion, then you’ve got bits and pieces across RBS, UK PBB and Ulster.

Another one there.

It’s Chris Cant from Autonomous. I just want to follow-up your comments on group margin being down a little bit overall. It feels like we’ll see more growth in retail or PBB this year than commercial, and I’m just wondering to what there’s a mix benefit supporting that, because some of the other comment you’ve given about limited room for maneuver on deposit rates and the fact that whilst the SVR book isn’t presenting a headwind anymore, the back book of fixed mortgages I would guess still has better spreads than the front book mortgages you’re going to be adding today. It feels like the retail margin the PBB margin will continue to decline potentially reasonably quickly and the reason for stability at the group level is just because you’re growing retail more quickly than commercial. So I think the first question, if you could speak to that. And secondly, if I could push you a little bit further on Williams & Glyn. I know it’s a difficult topic, but its feels like this is an important and there are assumptions being made within your 2020 targets about the restructuring potential. So how much of the revenue base of Williams & Glyn should we assume is going to stay, will you assume something like 50%, two-thirds. And on the cost side, I understand you’re optimistic that you can take out a lot of that cost base. So should we be looking for a number beginning with a 100 million to 200 million there? That would be really useful if you could put some figures around it.

Well look on William & Glyn I think we’ve given you as much guidance that we feel like we are able to. At this point the overall cost guidance is within the £6.4 billion that we’ve given. We’ve told you that we expect to keep almost all of the retail franchise at Williams & Glyn under that proposal, and some of the commercial franchise. But that’s going to be part of an ongoing discussion, as part of finalization of that proposal. But on the UK PBB margin I don’t think that we said that we expected margins to go down in the way that your described them. We said that given the SVR book is now stabilized, a lot of that margin pressure that you’ve been seeing over the last couple of years, that’s been because of a change in mix within the retail book together with a run-off of the consumable going because of us down on some credit cards. Those two trends have stabilized substantially now. So we don’t think that we’ll see another type of spread conversion. And we’ve talked about an increase in income in PBB this year. So you should assume that within that there is some margin compression and good volume growth.

I think we need to wrap up now, because we said we would try to wrap up at about quarter to 2, because we know some people have got somewhere else to go. Thank you very much for coming. Thank you for some interesting questions. Thanks to you in particular for answering most of them. And we’ll see you next year.