Greetings and welcome to the Ambac Financial Group, Inc. fourth quarter earnings conference call. (Operator Instructions) It is now my pleasure to introduce your host Sean Leonard, Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer for Ambac Financial Group, Inc. Thank you, Mr. Leonard. You may begin.

Thank you. Good morning, everyone, and welcome Ambac's fourth quarter 2008 conference call. I'm Sean Leonard, Chief Financial Officer at Ambac. With me today are David Wallis, Chief Executive Officer, Cathy Matanle, Managing Director, Portfolio Risk Management, and Doug Renfield-Miller, Chief Executive Officer of Everspan Financial Guarantee Corp. Our earnings press release, quarterly operating supplement, and a slide presentation that follows along with this discussion are available on our website. I recommend that you view the slide presentation as we speak today. Also note that this call is being broadcast on the Internet at www.Ambac.com. During this conference call we may make statements that would be regarded as forward-looking statements. These statements may relate to, among other things, management's current expectations of future performance, future results and cash flows, and market outlook. You are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements which reflect our current analysis of existing trends and information as of the date of this information, and there is inherent risk that actual results, performance or achievements could differ materially from any future results, performance or achievements expressed or implied by such forward-looking statements. These differences could arise from a number of factors. Information concerning factors that could actually cause results to differ materially from the information we will give you is available in our press release and in our most recent Form 10-K and subsequently filed Form 8Ks. You should review these materials for a complete discussion of these factors and other risks. Copies of these documents may be obtained from the SEC website. I will now turn it over to David Wallis, who will comment on Ambac's strategic priorities. David?

Thanks, Sean, and good morning, everyone. Since we last reported to you on November 5, 2008 events in the financial markets have continued to evolve in a mostly downward direction with astonishing rapidity. Sparing you a blowbyblow account of these extraordinary developments, I'll summarize by saying that the fourth quarter of 2008 and indeed all of 2008 obviously represents the most challenging period of our recent financial history. The good news, despite these headwinds the strength of our business model, together with the common sense of our regulator, have allowed Ambac to successfully navigate a very difficult period. A major achievement for Ambac during the quarter was the successful handling of the collateralization requirements that arose from ratings triggers in our Financial Services business. In retrospect, this business was an outlier to the take no liquidity risk business model that has been a core strength of Ambac and is intrinsic to Financial Guarantee in general. In this environment or any other, it is now abundantly clear that the business model of principal and interest payments over time juxtaposed against premiums collected upfront is the lifeblood of this industry. We have learnt from this and will not stray again. Another major activity in the quarter was furtherance of our goal of launching a pure play municipal subsidiary. We continue to work closely with our regulator and the rating agencies and hope for proceeding with this initiative soon. Everspan, the reincarnation of an existing subsidiary, will have a simple and permanent focus on municipal finance. Doug Renfield-Miller will give more detail on this later in the call. Before the detailed presentations of my colleagues, let me briefly look forward and outline our priorities for 2009 and thereafter. We have three key areas of focus, namely, one, aggressive portfolio management; two, the launch…

Thank you, David. Please turn to Slide 4. Slide 4 provides a brief overview of the financial results, focusing primarily on factors driving our results, and then I will also briefly comment on statutory surplus levels and liquidity. Net loss for the fourth quarter of 2008 was $2.3408 billion or $8.14 per share. That compares to a net loss of approximately $3.2739 billion or $32.03 per share in the fourth quarter of 2007. The fourth quarter of 2008 loss was driven by changes in the fair value of our CDO portfolio, increased net provision for loss and loss adjustment expenses primarily related to RMBS transactions, and an increase in the valuation allowance on our deferred tax asset, partially offset by increased accelerated earned premiums resulting from refundings. The fourth quarter of 2007 loss was driven by $5.2 billion of changes in fair value related to our credit derivative portfolio. Total net premiums earned amounted to $228.1 million, up 9% from the fourth quarter of 2007. Normal earned premium, a component of total earned premiums, amounted to $146.9 million in the quarter, down 18% from the comparable prior quarter primarily due to runoff and accelerations of the portfolio due to refundings and a large reinsurance transaction which took place in December of 2007. Accelerated premiums of $81.2 million increased significantly once again, up about $51 million over fourth quarter of 2007. Refunding activity remains heavy in auction rate and variable rate debt notes as issuers refund existing bonds due to increasing interest rates experienced in those securities since early 2008. This heavy refunding activity enhances our capital position as we free up capital as the exposure comes off our books. Our net par outstanding at December 31, 2008 amounted to $434.3 billion, down 17% from the beginning of the year. Our…

Thanks, Sean. Let's move on to the portfolio, starting on Page 13. Page 13 shows the high level breakdown in ratings of our $434 billion insured book. What started in the early part of 2008 as a U.S. residential mortgage crisis has deteriorated into a global economic crisis. This has caused us to heighten our surveillance efforts throughout 2008, to aggressively identify vulnerable credits and asset types across the insured portfolio. The reserve and impairment activity to date is still substantially driven by our mortgage-related assets, and these continue to be our major concern from a materiality perspective. However, as you know, the Financial Guarantee business model is well developed around active remediation and exerting our control party rights, and as a result we aggressively work transactions in all areas to achieve the best possible outcomes. We do not divert surveillance staff to the more troubled classes, preferring instead to both increase staff with the requisite expertise and apply proper analytics so as to maintain appropriate oversight across the entire book. Because the vast majority of ratings deterioration has been in the structured finance sector, I will focus all of my prepared remarks on this part of our portfolio, starting with MBS on Page 15. The direct MBS portfolio comprises 350 unique exposures totaling $40 billion of net par at year end 2008. In this presentation and the appendix we have updated many of the charts and graphs we've discussed in past quarters. I will focus my remarks this morning on our own views and tactics in light of this continued and well-reported performance deterioration. Almost one-third of this portfolio is now rated below investment grade by Ambac and approximately half of the portfolio is now adversely classified due to poor performance against expectations. Our U.S. residential mortgage pools are…

Thank you, Cathy. I'd like to provide a quick update on our recent Everspan efforts but first, for those who are new to the story, let me provide a brief background and our key objectives for this new Financial Guarantee subsidiary. Everspan Financial Guarantee is the new name for Ambac's wholly owned but dormant subsidiary formerly known as Connie Lee Insurance Company. Ambac acquired Connie Lee in 1997. It is licensed to write Financial Guarantee insurance in 47 states and we are working on the remaining U.S. jurisdictions. Connie Lee did not write any new business after Ambac acquired it in 1997 and thus the company's book of business has steadily amortized down to approximately $640 million today. The company currently has about $150 million of capital. Our key objectives in bringing Everspan to market are forthright, as follows: We hope to redefine the Financial Guarantee business with a back to basics purely municipal public purpose business platform. Everspan will offer unprecedented transparency via its website, allowing investors and others the ability to evaluate Everspan for themselves in real time. Everspan will operate to a no surprises, what you see is what you get standard. Everspan policyholders will be insulated from Ambac Assurance. Everspan will have segregated capital, an independent Board, independent risk management, and will be separately regulated by the Wisconsin Commissioner of Insurance. Everspan will also have strong governance. A majority of Everspan's directors will be independent and unaffiliated with Ambac Assurance and significant changes to Everspan's narrow business scope, payment of dividends, etc., will have to be approved by a majority of Everspan's independent and unaffiliated directors. Note that Everspan's bylaws prohibit it from paying dividends to its parent for the first three years of its operations. There are no current plans for Everspan to assume any…

Thanks, Doug. Now we would like to open the call up for questions. Operator?

Thank you. (Operator Instructions) Your first question comes from Andrew Wessel - J.P. Morgan.

I just had a couple of questions about the intercompany transfers of assets. But first, so the hold co has $2.3 billion in lines about, available from Ambac Assurance. How much of that has been drawn as of 12/31 and to date?

Andrew, we have a good slide in the deck, Slide 38. But what Slide 38 shows is the various approvals we have for the different companies and different products, Financial Services products. But it shows the approved limit and it shows the amount used. So as it related to the investment agreement book, it's pretty clear there. We purchased in about $2.6 billion of securities. Those securities had a par value of $3.1 billion. They had a book value of $2.6 billion. The difference between par and book was impairments that were already taken in the business in prior quarters, and the market value of those securities were about $1.2 billion.

So the market value was $1.2 billion?

Yes. And they're primarily Alt-A RMBS securities.

So from a cash transfer basis, it's market value of $1.2 billion and you borrowed $2.6 billion against that?

Well, the insurance company paid $2.5 billion and it got assets which we believe have a statutory value of that but have a lower market value due to the stress pricing on that portfolio.

And then there's the $1 billion of unsecured lending up and I guess my question is, if you go back to Slide 9, it mentions the $233 million of cash and intercompany loans. It seems like total on the hook to the op co is going to be, I mean, you're looking at like almost $3 billion, right, or over $3 billion that you would owe back to the op co over time?

Well, the Ambac Assurance - the op co in your language - received the securities. So it purchased the securities for the first line, so it has those securities. The deal is that those will sit in the back end of the portfolio from a liquidity perspective; we won't have to sell those. So the current market price is kind of a very distressed price, so we think that the value's going to there's going to be more cash flow coming back than the market value. So the securities are already in the business, so there's nothing else to be done there. The unsecured lending, the $1 billion, was cash provided as well as the cash that arrived into the IA business due to the intercompany purchases, asset purchases. That was used to pay off the investment agreement liabilities and to collateralize some liabilities that are already there. So there is value, we believe, in that business in the same way in that the market value of the securities that remain in the IA business versus the amortized costs or par value, there's a wide difference there, and we think there's ultimately value between those two numbers due to the extremely low market value.

So for the Alt-A - so just, I mean, I guess I'll break it up into two parts - the Alt-A securities were sold. It's not like that's out on a repo agreement or anything like that. It's just there was a sale for $2.5 billion and that's it. There's no follow up transaction or obligation?

That's correct.

And so that was $2.5 billion of cash on $1.2 billion of market securities, market value. And then the loans that you had, I guess, going back to Slide 38, $1 billion of unsecured lending and $760 million of lending on the swap book and another $150 million of, I guess, a security purchase. So, I mean, you can call it $1.7 - $1.8 billion, something like that, of just loans that are unsecured - I understand that - but when you look at the parent company liquidity or holding company liquidity, we're looking at $233 million cash balance and intercompany loans. I mean, you're on the hook to pay back on an unsecured basis almost $2 billion, or am I looking at that incorrectly?

No, I think you're looking at it incorrectly. There's a couple of points I'll make there. The swap book, when you look at the amount used for the swap book, that's to help that business post collateral. In that portfolio we have contracts with municipalities and then we've hedged those. There's interest rate risks with folks on Wall Street. The loan here is for collateral posting. The business itself has net GAAP book value on a marked-to-market - and when you mark all the swaps it has value. So that's viewed to be a temporary lending, collateral lending, and that will come back as we continue to aggressively remediate and bring down those exposures. The TRS business is cash for securities, so it's similar to the first line on this chart. Ambac Assurance has the obligation for the investment agreement liabilities. It's issued a policy, so the operating company has that obligation already. This is performance of the obligation providing, you know, to push the liabilities out, give us a chance to negotiate terminations, which we've done, and to keep the claim payments away from Ambac Assurance and then let the asset values recover. And since you're not forced to liquidate those securities at incredibly low prices, you're allowing those securities to cash flow. So it's not an obligation of the parent company, in your language. On Page 9 that's just the parent company, you know, that cash is obviously available to pay its interest and any expenses that it has, so I wouldn't combine the two.

And so then the last question on this topic, the unsecured loan, the $1 billion unsecured loan, that is just counted as collateral somewhere in the parent company and it isn't part of that $233 million of cash [inaudible].

Yes, these loans obviously were not made to the parent company, you realize that. These were made to the businesses, the investment agreement business and the various different businesses reside in separate legal entities.

And then other question is on mortgage remediation. So if there haven't been any cash returned yet and it sounds like a very onerous process to go through - obviously if you've bought assets underwritten fraudulently, it makes sense to try to get some remediation - but the way you're recording future revenue or expected future revenue from those remediations on those bonds, first I guess there's a cost benefit and I wonder if you could address that just from a kind of strategic perspective? And then also how does that revenue that you're recording or the expected gain or recovery, how does that flow through statutory income?

Sure, I can take that. I mean, clearly the cost benefit's there because the numbers are huge, the performance is abysmal, the underwriting is atrocious. So there's clearly a lot of benefit compared to the cost of utilizing vendors and law firms to go through individual loan files. I don't think there's any question about that. So that's clearly why we're pursuing folks with deep pockets. We're not pursuing all sponsors in this case because some of them don't have deep pockets, so we're weighing that from a cost-benefit perspective. But for those major financial institutions that we're pursuing, we believe obviously the benefit far, far outweighs the cost. From the standpoint of your comments on revenue, we're not booking revenue. What we're doing is from a loss reserve perspective we're trying to estimate what the present value of our future claim payments are. Claim payments are actually made to an RMBS trust and obviously out to the bondholders, and clearly we haven't missed any of those claim payments so that's obviously what's going on here. So we're trying to assess what types of remedies the trust has to recover based upon the legal agreements that were struck at the beginning of the transaction. So I would look at it as we're calculating a net liability that represents the present value over time of the money that will leave Ambac. So it's not revenue; it's a reduction of a liability.

So from a statutory income basis, it's not reversing out future loss reserve or loss provision expense?

Well, it's a net number. For statutory we record loss reserves for defaulted items, so we call them CASE reserves. What we do is we look at an individual transaction and project out its performance, including any potential remedies - recoveries, if you will; no different than recovering on a sale of a piece of collateral that exists underneath the loan - we look at that as kind of a recovery, and we set up the net liability present valued at 4.5%.

I was just trying to get to the fact of whether or not that was going to be included in total statutory.

Yes.

Your next question comes from Arun Kumar - J.P. Morgan.

A couple of questions for you, one regarding Everspan and one as a follow up to Andrew's question earlier on the intercompany. Starting with Everspan, you said, Doug, you mentioned that you wanted to capitalize the company at $500 million. Could you tell us how much capital you actually have there now? I believe it was $150 million or so last year. And what is the status of your discussions with the Wisconsin regulator in terms of approving the capital transfer? In your slide presentation you stated that you've already presented your plan to the rating agency and you expect to hear back in a couple of weeks. Presumably you've already gotten the approval from the regulator, but could you spend 30 seconds on that?

Certainly. You're correct, we currently have, I think it's $153 million of capital within Everspan. And then if you recall back last year we had gotten approval from Wisconsin to put an additional $850 million down; that was prior to our downgrade. So we've had very good ongoing discussions in terms of what is the correct number to put down. But we're quite confident that, again, subject to Wisconsin approval, we'll have at least $500 million in total capitalization, so an additional $350 million down and possible more. Just one point to stress, though. The capital that goes down does not actually leave Ambac per se. All it does is convert was is essentially an investment in the investment portfolio in, say, municipal bonds at the moment into an equity investment with Everspan, of which there should be very good value going forward. So it's not capital lost forever; however, it's clearly segregated from a legal perspective once it is down there.

The other think you mentioned in your slides is the existing municipal business is going to stay with the Ambac Assurance and only new business is going to be written out of Everspan. Now, have you considered any kind of a cut-through reinsurance like some of your peers have now publicly announced or are you going to end up with two classes of wrapped municipal bonds, one at Ambac Assurance and one at Everspan with totally different credit qualities?

We'd obviously love to make everybody happy, but the fact is that Everspan will have a limited capital base and we think the capital base is best utilized supporting new municipal finance out in the market. Also, as noted, the value creation within Everspan does accrue to the benefit of Ambac Assurance before flowing back to shareholders. And Wisconsin's taken a very strong view, which is perfectly understandable, that they owe a duty to all policyholders; they cannot discriminate among policyholders. And so that is effectively what this structure achieves. So if we could make everybody happy by providing cut-through, obviously we would. But given the capital base of Everspan, we think it's best utilized to help jump start the municipal finance business and just get out with the market.

The follow up question I had was a numbers question related to AAC and the support to the Financial Services business, which is on, I think, Slide 38, and I think Andrew Wessel asked a couple of questions on that. The question I have is that unsecured lending from AAC, the $1 billion, now based on the discussion you had a couple of minutes ago is it right to assume that that unsecured loan from AAC, that's the admitted asset on the statutory balance sheet of AAC?

That's a partially admitted asset on the balance sheet of AAC, so the numbers that we had provided, the $1.6 billion of statutory capital, it has approximately $700 million of that billion as an admitted asset, so a reserve of $300 million against it.

And the second follow up question on the same topic is why would you give an unsecured loan from AAC when you had a secured facility of $1.2 billion? Wouldn't it be safer to give a secured facility? Could you comment on that?

Yes, we needed to, I mean, the whole idea here was to meet some collateral posting and termination requirements. It is possible with - the other reason is due to the market value of the securities, so you would have to - the market value doesn't exist in the business to support a secured loan in the sense that the business needed more money to meet its financial obligations on a market value basis. So that's why we did it that way. There is a possibility with further downgrades of securities, so the business still has asset-backed securities, it's got a mix of asset-backed. A lot of the Alt-A RMBS have been purchased out based on what we've been talking about. But there is additional downgrades that have come in that portfolio so we might have to switch the unsecured and secured a little bit. But the major reason is that the market value did not support a secured lending facility.

And what's the terms of that unsecured - is it a five-year loan or is it more than that or is it a twoyear loan?

Well, it'll be outstanding as long as the business - any excess cash flows that come off the business will be used to ultimately repay that loan. So you can see kind of what the profile of our liabilities looks like. I'm looking for the chart to refer it to you; 33 kind of provides a good example of it. So that's kind of a view of the liability runoff. The assets themselves, you know, are probably pretty similar to that type of timeframe so an average life of five years. But if the market value recovers on the RMBS and the ADS securities, obviously then, if those assets are sold, we can pay off that loan.

Your next question comes from Darin Arita - Deutsche Bank Securities.

I had a question on the qualified statutory capital and was wondering how far can that decline before you start bumping up against single risk limits?

Well, we've already run into single risk limits, Darin, at these levels, so we're in the process of remediating those through some plans that we have to discuss with the New York Insurance Department. So the single risk limits, which are basically, you know, it's just a limit, it's not a surplus or a solvency type limit; it's kind of a discuss with your regulator your plans for remediating that. Part of that is clearly some of the things we've been talking about here today about remediation. We also have available to us the use of potential intercompany transactions. So we'll be talking that through. We do not trigger any other types of tests like what's called an aggregate risk type calculation, which is a statutory calculation, or any other calculations, so it's just the single risk is something we need to address with New York.

And can you talk about how the transfer of contingency reserves to surplus works and to what extent that can continue?

Sure. What's left is about $1.9 billion. We released during the quarter about $1.5 billion. What the contingency reserve is it's a formulaic kind of establishment of reserves. The idea is that you can release that when the policies in which you're actually setting it up for have been canceled or refunded, whatever the case may be, but you're no longer on those exposures in which you're setting us this formulaic reserve, or you have large losses in pieces of your portfolio and there's some tests relating to loss ratios and the like. We've clearly exceeded the test as it relates to our structured finance business based on the losses we've taken in the portfolio, so the view was that we were able to release it based upon those rules with discussion with Wisconsin. And the overall notion is that it's redundant reserves because you're setting up CASE reserves and credit derivative impairments and you still have a contingency reserve, so you're double counting the reserve on the exposure. So that's kind of the idea. And when policies are you're no longer on the risk, it's considered to be redundant as well. In both cases, though, you need to get permission from your domiciliary regulator, which in our case is Wisconsin.

And then just a question on your Alt-A exposures. I was wondering how the credit quality compares on the Alt-A securities that Ambac insured versus those that it purchased from the investment agreement business?

The general comments there and I'll turn it over to my colleagues. The investment agreement business, all of the exposures, all the investments that were originally AAA rated investments. They're kind of split between the various tranches of AAA being that there's first pay, second pay, third pay, so they were split among those, but they were all originally AAA rated securities. So I think our overall impairment views in that portfolio - which is probably less than $100 million on a fundamental basis, not a marked-to-market basis - so I think that probably compares favorably that the standpoint of the original credit enhancement in the investment securities was all at the AAA level.

I think the most important feature here is vintage. And obviously the various charts are on our website, but one of the more pleasing aspects of our Alt-A portfolio on the insured side is that of the roughly $5.7 billion in relation to mid prime, as I think we call it on that website, we have, I think it's about $2.7 billion in 2007, but then quite a chunk in 2005 and prior to that, which generally speaking, as we all know, is less stressed.

Your next question comes from Bryan Monteleone - Barclays Capital.

I had a question on Slide 10, where it talks about statutory loss of $1.46 billion. Based on the $225 million of premiums and the $916 million of impairments, then apply the $500 or $600 million statutory loss, and it sounds like you add another $300 million out of reserve against the unsecured investment agreement loan gets you up to $800 or $900 million. I was just trying to understand the delta between that and the $1.46 on Slide 10. Is that related to a change in the discount accretion rate on reserves or is there something else there?

I had a question on Slide 10, where it talks about statutory loss of $1.46 billion. Based on the $225 million of premiums and the $916 million of impairments, then apply the $500 or $600 million statutory loss, and it sounds like you add another $300 million out of reserve against the unsecured investment agreement loan gets you up to $800 or $900 million. I was just trying to understand the delta between that and the $1.46 on Slide 10. Is that related to a change in the discount accretion rate on reserves or is there something else there?

No, there's a couple of things going on there. One is the numbers that we report in our press release are U.S. GAAP. That differs from statutory in premium recognition, if you will. The statutory premium recognition is different, so there's some differences there. Statutory accounting only requires the booking of reserves for defaulted items, so it would just be the CASE reserve changes so there's no changes in discount rates or anything like that. So statutory income statement would pick up changes in CASE reserve amounts, and we disclose those in our operating supplement on Page 19. The other difference, the other big difference is deferred taxes, how deferred taxes are treated from a statutory and a GAAP basis.

Right, but there were no deferred tax assets on the statutory balance sheet at September 30th, right? There was nothing to write-off?

Right, but there were no deferred tax assets on the statutory balance sheet at September 30th, right? There was nothing to write-off?

Well, it's very large non-admitted amounts. The non-admitted deferred tax asset in the statutory counts at the end of the year. I don't have September in front of me, but at the end of the year it was about $2 billion.

Right, but that was non-admitted, right?

Right, but that was non-admitted, right?

Yes, so there's a non-admitted concept there. That's different than, obviously, what we're doing for GAAP. The last item is we did book an additional impairment for an exposure that we viewed to be imminent, if you will, of default, imminent being in the next 12 months, so that was booked in the fourth quarter as well from a statutory perspective. So when you add the mix of all those things, that's what creates the difference.

What was that last [inaudible] related to?

What was that last [inaudible] related to?

It's relating to a credit derivative transaction that's somewhat unique that we have on the books.

Your next question comes from [Paul Steinborn – Plainfield].

I realize you don’t have a lot of cash at the hold co, but given where your bonds are currently trading and [inaudible] language in the stimulus bill, any thoughts on buying back some of your debt?

I realize you don’t have a lot of cash at the hold co, but given where your bonds are currently trading and [inaudible] language in the stimulus bill, any thoughts on buying back some of your debt?

Sure. We believe there's a lot of value creation opportunities available to us. One of them relates to the potential to purchase back our preferred stock that exists at the Ambac Assurance level. We're able to and we've successfully executed a number of transactions to buyback some of our RMBS - Ambac wrapped RMBS securities that we're paying claims on, so we've been successful in purchasing securities at a very heavy discount. We think there's a lot of value there. There's value in preferred stock. And I think down the road I think there is value in potentially buying back our debt securities as well. So I would say all those are value creation opportunities, coupled with commutations and other things that all compete for the liquidity we have around the company, but within the Ambac Assurance and the parent company level.

I'd just add to that that Sean's right to highlight the fact that there are different and competing uses of cash and cash is an important and vital resource for us, so we have to weigh all these things up in taking those sorts of decisions.

Your next question comes from Eleanor Chan - Aurelius Capital.

My question also relates to the holding company liquidity. It was mentioned that the [AFG] cash and intercompany loans at 12/31 was $233 million. I noticed that this was a change to like how you guys previously disclosed it. You previously only disclosed the cash amount not including the intercompany loan. So I'm just wondering if you can provide us a breakdown of how much of that $233 million is cash and how much of that is intercompany and also which entity is it a receivable from?

Sure. The breakdown of the cash balance, of the $233 million, the cash balance is $111 million; loans that were made to mainly the interest rate swap business were $122 million. That's the breakdown of those balances.

Ladies and gentlemen, there are no further questions at this time. I will turn the conference back over to management for closing comments.

Sure. Thank you very much. We appreciate the questions we received today. We will be available clearly to discuss any additional questions that folks may have, so please give us a call. And thanks again for attending our conference call.

Ladies and gentlemen, this concludes today's conference. All parties may disconnect now.