John F. Barry III
Chairman
Well, Robert, just to link your questions – we obviously appreciate your excellent questions on FT and CLOs. We are bottoms-up investors, so we don’t start at the beginning of the year “Okay, we need to hit this allocation, that allocation, this percentage of our assets – let’s go look for things that will fill those buckets.” We look at everything that comes in and when we think we see an excellent risk/reward we’re going to go for it. That was true with Cash Solutions, which at the time was a significant percentage of our assets; it was true of Patriot, it was true of FT and it’s true with these CLOs. So when people ask “Well, what’s the grand scheme here?” and I have been asked that – “What’s the grand plan, what’s the total strategy?” The total strategy is to keep doing bottoms-up investing with a very sharp eye on risk, and we believe that that’s the reason why I think our IRR in our controlled book is above 60% from 2004 to date. We’ve seen nothing going on nonaccrual in over five years – the item that went on nonaccrual went on nonaccrual for a very specific - we made the investment and it went on nonaccrual years later for specific reasons, which we can go into. When you look at the CLOs for a variety of reasons we think that the market substantially overestimates the risk there. If you look at a portfolio, a risk portfolio like ours which is running at a high IRR – 13% and change current return in this environment, when Treasuries are yielding I don’t know what, 25 basis points – you have to ask yourself “How are these people doing this with no nonaccruals in five years?” We’re doing it by focusing very carefully on risk, and I submit that the number one risk in our business is single point of failure risk. So when you invest in one single company, what if they lose a contract? What if there’s a regulatory issue? What if a gigantic competitor decides to devote huge resources to taking market share? What if a unique CEO dies? So those are single point of failure risks that we have every time that we make an individual loan. We don’t have those in the CLO book. The main risk in the CLO book is the macro risk of a significant economic downturn. Now you might say yeah, well that’s what you were thinking about. Our CLO investments are structured so that the marked to market that occurs will not be a problem for us because none of ours are marked to market investments in the CLO book. Number two, we are investing only with managers on a fund to fund basis where we have various control or call rights and only with people that we have determined to be the best of the best by analyzing their track record, by analyzing their performance, by analyzing their systems – by analyzing the capacity of the teams that are there overseen by us. And in every case, I think the lowest IRR of any of our managers going through the credit crisis of ’07 and ’08 was I think 9.4%, meaning that when it was really ugly out there these managers managed right through it and made money for the equity with no defaults, as Grier said, no defaults in any of our sales book, and when you look at that you ask yourself, well why has this type of investment frightened so many people? Well, because there were other people that did not structure their deals so carefully. The result of their lack of care was that there were problems. I don’t know that there were any defaults or loss of capital with those marked to market – I just don’t have the data because we don’t invest in those – but the result of the mistakes that people made doing marked to market CLOs is that many people won’t look at them. Many people have this visceral view “CLO, whoa – alphabet soup, I’m not going near that,” and that’s great for us because the result is the entire market appears to be mispriced. I don’t know how long that will continue, and we are able to invest on a very risk-controlled basis; and our results to date have been above our base case. So the concern is some significant economic downturn, but we saw the same structures, the same managers, the same types of portfolios in ’07 and ’08 perform just fine. So that’s why we believe that we have identified and structured a way much, not all – you can’t structure it all the way – but much of the risk in no CLOs.
Robert Dodd – Raymond James: Okay, I appreciate that, it’s very helpful. If I have one more, not on CLOs but just one last question, an easy one – if we take out the structuring fees from First Tower from other income it was about $5 million left over; $5 million on some $520 million in gross originations. Is that indicative that currently the origination income you’re generating is about 100 bps on originations?