[Spanish] Good morning. We're going to, first of all, take questions that we have received over the web page. We will group these into subjects. We will try to cover all your questions. But if there are any additional questions that come over the phone, then we'll try to make some time for them, too.

The first question which has to do with strategy and regulation. The first question is by Sergio Gamez from Merrill Lynch, Bank of America Merrill Lynch, is what is our opinion on the possibility of asking for aid from the ECB because of the consequences in the funding cost for banking. This is a question from the point of view of aid and intervention through these vehicles. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: [Spanish] In this type of aid situation where the -- where funding is facilitated through contingent lines or credit lines that are subsided by international bodies in the conditions that have been mentioned, well, clearly, that would give rise to a reduction in the risk premium for the sovereign risk, and consequently also, a fall in the spreads that banks, particularly the most important banks in Spain and of the Spanish financial system, can get in international wholesale markets. This link that is always mentioned between sovereign risk and banking debt will probably continue to be related. There will be a high correlation and that will mean that the spreads and the premium will be lower. Therefore, from that viewpoint, we see that as a very good thing.

There are quite a lot of questions on the bad bank in Spain. Mario Lodos from Sabadell, Axel, from JP, Britta Schmidt , Carlos Peixoto from BPI, Sergio Gamez and others, have basically 2 questions on this. First of all, what is our approach to a potential participation in the bad bank, or what are your expectations? What role do you think you're going to play [indiscernible] in the selling of banks and the creation of a bad bank? And do you think that we will need more provisions, given the transfer prices of the real estate assets, assets and loans? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, this is very difficult to answer because it is being built as we speak, by the Ministry and the Bank of Spain. So it's too early to say. We private agents still don't know yet how this is going to be done, the bad bank, how that it's going to be built. So I -- it's too early to answer. I can imagine that in a few weeks, we will have more information, and we'll be able to answer these questions on what our role will be, but we can't say now. Of course, this is something that worries us about the bad bank. What worries us is the possible relations between transfer pricing to the bad bank and the prices at which we have valued our assets once we have covered the provisions from the Royal Decrees, because the information that we have, which has not been validated, I must say, and this information hasn't been fully certified, but according to that information, transfer prices will be 7% to 13% below the established levels, levels established by the basic scenario of Oliver Wyman, and therefore, very near the price level of prices established in the stress scenario of Oliver Wyman. How do those prices compare with the prices derived from the provisions of the Royal Decrees? Well, there is a difference. This difference, according to our information, while, as I say, we don't have full information, so you have to take my word with a pinch of salt because it's not the -- that information hasn't been verified yet, but it seems that there are transmission expenses, operating expenses, expenses to manage the bad bank and also some additional incentives that they want to give, of potential profit for potential future investors, that all these things have an impact on the pricing of these assets. But these -- but the difference in prices stem from these elements more than from a different valuation of the assets themselves. But as I say, we are concerned about this, but we still don't know exactly what those prices will be and what the differences will be, and therefore, what the consequences will be. But we'll have the chance to talk about the bad bank when we have more information in a few weeks' time, and where we can answer with more information at hand.

About Spain and our strategy, there's a question from Matteo Ramenghi from UBS. And that is, whether we're planning any structural decisions in Spain, cutting costs or closing branches or anything structural? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, if you look at our numbers with some perspective, and you look at 2012, but also at 2011 and 2010 and 2009 and 2008, you will notice that our costs have not risen in all of those years. For several years now, I can't even remember how many, but quite a few, retail banking in Spain has kept its costs practically flat. Of course, that is the net result of some costs which rise, because inflation rises or because wages rise because of new labor agreements, plus permanent adjustments we make in our network costs, which are not apparently very significant, but which we constantly are rationalizing and monitoring the profitability of our retail network and adjust it accordingly. We are not planning any major changes in this strategy. Again, we prefer a more gradual approach. We make gradual adjustments, as we have done in the last few years. So if the question is whether we're going to be more aggressive in cost reductions, I'd say "no", because we don't feel it necessary. It's not really warranted. Branches we have are all profitable in the current market conditions, and if any seems to be lacking medium-term growth or profitability opportunities, we make adjustment decisions, as we have done for many years now. I can't even say how many, but at least 7 -- or 6 or 7 years, and that's why our costs have remained flat throughout this period, this very long period of time.

Moving on to the U.K., there's a couple of questions. The first is about the RBS transaction, someone in the Amelia Banca, N+1, Rohith Chandra from Barclays and Juan Pablo Lopez from Espirito Santo, are asking whether this changes our strategy for the U.K., the fact that we've canceled the acquisition of the RBS branches, and whether we can give an update on our future strategy, given this change, and does this affect the targets that we reported last year in the Investor Day? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Right. A first point is that our strategy in the U.K. does not change. Our strategy is to turn Santander U.K., the old Abbey, into a full-fledged commercial bank, that is with business both with individual customers, which is its main activity right now, as well as with businesses. This is a strategy that is apparent in Santander U.K.'s organic evolution. In fact, in 2012, in these 9 months of the year, growth in lending to businesses, in spite of the fact that our market share in businesses is low, lending to businesses has grown very significantly, and that, in a context in which other banks have increased their lending very little. We've increased our lending to SMEs by over 20% in these first 9 months of the year. And so I think that, together with our mortgage book, which has remained stable, it's only grown by 3%, I think demonstrates our strategy. That is our strategy, and we felt that increasing our, or growing our branch network by acquiring the Royal Bank of Scotland's branches was useful. In the end, it didn't come through, but it doesn't change our basic strategy. It just makes it more organic and less inorganic, I guess.

There's another part to this question, and that is whether we expect any fines or penalties, because of pulling out of the contract, have we provisioned anything? José Antonio Álvarez has said that the only provisioning we've done has been for operational expenses, charged to the provisions for the tender? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: We have provisions, but it's only for direct costs. And that's basically the work and hours spent by people in the bank on this process, which will now not materialize. And we've quantified that, and I think it was EUR 39 million, as José Antonio Álvarez told you, in the quarter -- sorry, pounds.

And as for the regulatory environment in the U.K., there's 2 questions from Mario Lodos from Sabadell, Bolsa, and he's asking whether we've started to feel the effect of the Funding for Lending Scheme announced by the Bank of England and what might the impact of this scheme be on this year, particularly on 2013? And then there's a second question, and that is asking for an update on potential impacts of the Vickers Commission's recommendations in the U.K. Do we have any idea of how this might affect us and how things are going at that level? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, as for Funding for Lending, that's something that has just been launched. We will be taking part in that process. It's a GBP 80 billion scheme, if I'm not mistaken. And we will participate with approximately, something in the order of our market share. But of course, the outcome of this scheme has yet to be seen because it's only just begun. So we'll see it throughout next, where we expect to grow lending. But as I said earlier, do not forget that we have already been growing our lending to SMEs. And so this Funding for Lending Scheme is actually targeted at banks to get them to increase lending to this particular segment, SMEs. And we had already been increasing our lending to SMEs, so we didn't really need this Funding for Lending Scheme to grow, because it was one of our strategic priorities already, to grow lending to this market segment. Having said that, we will, of course, take advantage of the boost provided by this scheme, Funding for Lending, in order to accelerate our growth in this segment. As for Vickers Report, it's not yet -- well, it's a set of recommendations, the Vickers Report, which, as you know, have to be turned into provisions, standards for the banking sector. But we don't really know which of these recommendations will eventually become rules or provisions or laws and which will not. And so it's highly speculative to say anything on this point now. So it would just be guess work based on possible scenarios of what might or might not become a legal requirement. It's really far too early to say. In general terms, for our business model and for our business profile, let's say, in the U.K., the impact would be somewhere between tiny and negligible or even nonexistent. But there might be some impact, but in any case, it won't be significant.

Moving on, continuing with the U.K., there's 2 more questions about strategy and regulation from Frederic Teschner from Natixis and Daragh Quinn from Nomura. The first is somewhat connected to the question by UBS, but it's more about income trends in the U.K. in the future, what do we expect as far as risk-weighted assets because of the RBS thing, but in general in the country. And Daragh Quinn's question is about the U.K. IPO. Are we still planning to have an IPO for our British subsidiary? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: It's true that income, as you've seen, has been falling. That is a natural and inevitable consequence of falling volumes in lending and deposits in the U.K. and an increase in the cost of wholesale funding in our bank, also some retail funding, but mostly wholesale funding. Most of the income fall has already occurred. We may still see a small fall in Q4 and in the first quarter next year, but to a much more limited extent. We will probably reach a turning point for net interest income, as I said, between Q4 and the first quarter next year. But in any case, the falls will not be as significant as those we have seen in the past quarters. That's my -- and what was the second question?

About the IPO in the U.K. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Right. We've already said that there is no deadline for the IPO. And months ago, we've said that we were keeping it on the back burner for 2 reasons mostly, waiting for markets to change their attitudes in the U.K. and for our own profit to stabilize and to go back to the kind of growth we saw in the past. So it's something that we do intend to do. But as far as the win, it is really impossible to predict at this point.

I'm finished with strategy and regulation questions. There's one from Andrea Filtri from Mediobanca and Daragh Quinn from Nomura about dividends. First, what is our plan? Are we going to maintain our current payout policy? Will we be offering cash and scrip dividends? And then a question about IPOs of group subsidiaries. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, this is of course, the board's decision at any given point, and so to predict now any specific payout policy is not appropriate. But with that caveat, the basic concept is to maintain the same payout policy next year and to have full scrip dividend and/or cash dividend. So that's my best impression of what the payout policy will be for next year. Although, again, this is a decision that the board has to make.

Moving on to financial management, there's 2 questions about capital. First, from Matteo Ramenghi from UBS, David Vaamonde from Fidentiis, Rohith Chandra from Barclays and Francisco Riquel from N+1. Could we give more detail about capital variations in the quarter, including the Mexico IPO? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Remember that the Mexican IPO has a 50 basis point positive impact on core capital, but then you have to substract the negative impact of exchange rates on the book value of our subsidiaries. So that's why there's that 10.1% to 10.4% difference in our core capital ratio.

And there's a second question from several analysts, David Vaamonde from Fidentiis, Francisco Riquel from N+1, Jaime Becerril from JPMorgan, Antonio Ramirez from Keefe, about Basel III. How much will the capital ratio be under fully-loaded Basel III scenario, and have we modified our criteria? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: No, the criteria are the same that we've reported in previous quarters. Our plan is to remain at above 90% core capital under Basel III in the coming years, so there's not really a change with respect to previous quarters.

There's more questions about DTA, about the treatment to intangibles and DTAs in future regulations. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: We'll have to wait until that regulation is announced in the R4, [ph] and then we'll let you know.

As for liquidity, there's several questions. Carlos Peixoto from BPI is asking about exposure to SB. [ph] Where are we? And questions about the ALCO portfolio. What's our exposure to government debt? Carlos Peixoto is also asking a question in the same direction, basically liquidity exposure to SB [ph] and composition of our ALCO portfolio. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, as for liquidity and exposure to SB [ph], we have the IPO, we mentioned EUR 35 billlion, we mentioned in previous quarters, there's no change there. Our ALCO portfolio overall, as you know, the ALCO portfolio, we don't have any portfolios until maturity in the group. Everything is classified as financial assets available for sale. And the balance is EUR 97 billion for the whole of the group, of which EUR 66 billion is public debt and EUR 26 billion other private debt, and there's EUR 4 billion which are capital instruments, basically to do with trading. As for public debt, our exposure to Spanish public debt is around EUR 30 billion. Last quarter, I think it was about EUR 35 billion, so there's been some maturities. And our second largest exposure is Brazilian public debt with EUR 11 billion, then smaller amounts, EUR 5 billion in the U.K.; EUR 3 billion, Mexico; EUR 2 billion, Chile, the U.S. These are the main exposures. And the rest of the portfolio is EUR 26 billion in other instruments. And these are basically 40%, 45% in the U.S. agencies, basically GNEs [ph], some corporate, and in Brazil, where there are some corporate bonds. So that's basically the breakdown of the ALCO portfolio. Something in Spain, too, but basically, those are the main exposures or the main risks. The portfolio is relatively stable. Quarter-on-quarter, there's a variation of maybe EUR 400 million in the total ALCO portfolio.

About liquidity or continuing with liquidity, Mario Lodos from Sabadell is asking whether we can give them an update on maturities and issuance policy. I suppose he means 2012 and '13. And connected to that, if you like, we could talk -- Fabio Mostacci from Ahorro Corporacion is asking why there's this weakness in net interest income in the corporate center in this quarter. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Maturities in 2012 in the Eurozone, I think there's maybe a covered bond issue, I think EUR 1.6 billion. And then in 2013, in the Eurozone, the parent has like EUR 13 billion, EUR 14 billion; Banesto, EUR 3 billion or EUR 4 billion; and Portugal, EUR 2 billion or EUR 3 billion. The other units, I don't have the figures here, but it's a total of about EUR 20 billion issues. Well, if current trends continue, deleveraging is still significant. As a general rule, I think that an issue of 1/3 of the maturities would be appropriate for 2013, given our current forecast that deleveraging will continue and deposits might not grow as much as we've seen this year but will still grow. If deposits were to grow as much as they have this year, then deleveraging would be greater than maturities. We don't expect that to happen, but we do expect to issue maybe 1/3 of total maturities. The weakness of net interest income, as Angel said, is connected to issues. We're replacing cheap issues with issues that have a cost against swap of over 300 basis points, and part of that is charged to the corporate center, which is why net interest income in the corporate center is so weak.

As for deleveraging, Fabio Mostacci from Ahorro Corporacion and other analysts are asking about the loan-to-deposit ratio in Spain. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: As we said, it's close to 100%.

They are asking whether deleveraging is completed and whether it will continue, whether we have any sort of target or what the plan is in our loan-to-deposit ratio in Spain. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, it's not that we have a plan. What we have is a general deleveraging of the economy. Private debt, which is the best proxy we have, over GDP. Private debt over GDP at its peak was 180%. I think it's now at 150-some percent, 155%. So we think that private debt in relation to GDP will continue to fall to levels of at least 140%, given what has happened in other countries that have gone through similar processes. Most of this process, of this fall, will be concentrated in the property sector, of course, where I seem to recall that the latest figures I've looked at was about EUR 300 billion in -- I don't know if it's loans or foreclosed assets, but that number will fall significantly in the next months or quarters, and that will bring us to a level that might encourage us to not reduce lending further or at least not in anything that's not connected with the property sector.

As for hedges, Ignacio Moreno from Citi and Patrick Lee from RBC are asking about our hedging policy. Specifically, they're asking about LatAm and Poland. Do we have hedges there? What percentage of our net operating income is hedged? Do we expect the weight of these units and hedges to grow significantly in 2013? And Patrick Lee is asking, in these 2 units, specifically, about an explanation of the hedge in Brazil. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Right. We have 2 kinds of hedging policies. One is with respect to expected profit, and one is for the book value of our subsidiaries. So generally, we have hedged a high percentage of profit budgeted for the year, and that's the case both, for Mexico and Poland and Chile and other units. In Brazil, in some cases, the hedges or the instruments are different. In some cases, it's just forward. In other cases, it's just spot. And in other cases, it's caps and floors. So caps and floors. So there are different instruments to hedge, both the expected profit and the book value, to protect our equity. And of course, the hedge is, in some cases, particularly the equity hedge in countries, particularly Brazil, where it's high-volume, these are hedges with caps and floors, which is why, when we said earlier that there was a variation in the group capital because of exchange rate impacts. That's because we are not hedged 100%, particularly in Brazil. In the other LatAm, [indiscernible] countries, the main ones, Mexico, Chile and then in Poland, our hedges are perfect forward, both for profit and for book value of our subsidiaries.

Then there are 2 more questions asking for more detail, coming from Espirito Santo, about the valuation of the joint venture means of payment here in Spain. And Ignacio Moreno is asking about risk-weighted assets in Spain, and if you agree, we will answer that in detail in writing. And the evolution of risk-weighted assets in the Santander network is up EUR 400 million or EUR 500 million in the quarter. It's basically a business mix effect and others, but we can give you the details later, if you agree. And there's actually one more question about financial management and strategy from Benjie Creelan. Can we get some guidance or forecast for growth for the group, particularly, net profit in 2013? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: So we don't really give any guidance on net profit, but we do -- or will have an impact that will be different in 2013 and 2012, which will be the Royal Decrees. But we don't give guidance on net profit for coming years, ever.

Moving on to credit quality and risk, this is a question from Carlos Berastain from Deutsche, Ignacio Cerezo from Crédit Suisse and other analysts about the impacts of the 2 Royal Decrees, basically whether the impact on profit was EUR 6.8 billion, which is what we've provisioned approximately in the year. And can we explain the 90% coverage on that 10% that remains, or how much is still to be provisioned to meet 100% of the Royal Decree requirements in the rest of the year? Can we elaborate? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Okay, perhaps the figures don't match exactly because there are some additional things over and above what's required by the Royal Decrees. There are some additional provisions with things that are connected with real estate, but not directly covered by the Royal Decrees and which we have decided to also provision and charge to the same item of real estate provisioning, also, some portfolio sales. So small things, but all of them together, add up to that apparent difference between the requirements in the Royal Decrees, what we've provisioned already, and what we said that we still have to provision, approximately 10% of the total. And so that's what remains to be provisioned in the rest of the year, 10%, about EUR 700 million approximately, which is that 10% that remains.

Okay, there's a question from Antonio Ramirez from Keefe and Ignacio Cerezo from Crédit Suisse about whether we see any risk of a third Royal Decree raising provisioning requirements for real estate and non-real estate risk or where do we think coverage levels should go. Are they at sufficiently a high level, or are we going to need higher levels? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, I suppose this question is related to the one that was asked before that I answered already about the influence of the transfer prices for assets to the bad bank and the impact on the valuation of the assets held by banks, net of the Royal Decree. I think I've already answered that. There's no other reason why we might require other kind of decree because the provisions are more than enough for real estate, so we don't really see any need or any chances of a third decree unless there's an impact from, what we've said, the valuation of the assets to be transferred to the bad bank, but not really.

Moving on and continuing with Spain and the cost of risk, a question from Sergio Gamez, Britta Schmidt from Autonomous and Jaime Becerril from JP, along the same lines, the cost of risk, current and future, in Spain in 2012, 2013. Provisions have fallen in 3T compared to 2T. Do we think that, that can be extrapolated? And where might the cost of risk move structurally or in the next quarters? And what do we expect in terms of provisions in 2013, higher, lower or similar-type to 2012? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Earlier, there was a similar question about what's going to happen to the rest of the portfolio because, really, that's what they're asking. What about the other loans? What about the whole portfolio in 2013? And in the presentation, since this is a question that comes up again and again in our results presentation, there's a table in which we try to answer that question or a chart in which we try to answer that question, and that was a graph with net NPL entries, not including real estate, individual loans, mortgages, consumer finance, cards and business. It was a very detailed chart, and that's in Page 52 or Slide 52. I hope that's the same number in your documentation. But in my Page 52, you have a detailed graph with net entries over 90 days for -- in loans to businesses, nonperforming loans over 90 days in individual mortgages, NPLs over 90 days in consumer finance and in cards. And what you can see there is that the portfolio, these 4 sets of loans, so everything except real estate, is relatively stable, slightly up but only very, very, very slightly and basically has remained very stable. So we don't expect beyond this very slight rise, which probably will continue in 2013. I think probably non-real estate NPLs of the group will peak towards the end of 2013. So they will rise very slightly in 2013, but really not very significantly. As you see if you look at this period from 2008 with these curves -- it's Slide #27 in the presentation that the analysts -- so I think that really answers that question and any concerns about performance of the rest of our loan portfolio and what we expect to happen in the next year, where our NPLs will rise, but only very slightly.

And then there's a question going into different divisions from Carlos Peixoto from BPI, Patrick Lee from RBC and other analysts, about our outlook on NPL ratios for the different regions. Specifically, they're asking about Brazil, the U.K. and Mexico, asking about trends in Q3 in NPL ratios and cost of risk and do we expect both provisions and NPL ratios in those 3 countries to rise. So Brazil, Mexico and the U.K., what do we expect in terms of risk quality and in terms of the impact on profit, of provision? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, my best forecast for those 3 countries is that in the U.K. and in Mexico, we don't expect any surprises with regards to the NPL rate, just a slight movement up or down, but we really don't expect anything to change much. There is no driver that could make us think that the NPL figures might change significantly in the next -- in the near future. Now Brazil is a different story. We come from very high provision and NPL rates, and we have already been announcing that we were in a very comfortable area. And provisions and NPL rates have somewhat leveled off. The improvement of the economy will help these figures to stabilize because in 2011, there was economic slowdown in Brazil. And therefore, we think that looking forward, the growth of the NPL rate and our provisions, we think that, that is going to be a part of the past and that things are going to normalize from now on.

On Mexico, there is a specific question about provisions. Why have they increased? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Of course, there's the volume impact, but also, there was a release of generic provisions of $30 million, which is, of course, affecting the figures when we compare one year to the next. There's nothing more to it.

Mario Lodos, Sabadell [ph]. What about the selling of our portfolio to Bank of America? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: We already reported to the market the data that we had to communicate with regards to possible selling of portfolio, and we also -- there's some of that in the provisions.

Axel Finsterbusch from JP is asking about the selling of repossessed assets. They're still negative in the second quarter in a row. Can you give more information as to how those sales are performing and what are your expectations in 2013 in the volume of foreclosed assets? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, yes, in 2011, the number of repossessed assets fell, the net of entries and outflows. In fact, we started the year with EUR 8.6 billion, and right now, we have EUR 8.3 billion. And our forecast is that in the last quarter, there will be an additional fall. And our best estimate right now for the year end of 2011 is that, that figure, which today is EUR 8.3 billion, shall be EUR 7.5 billion. So that will be a net decrease in the number of repossessed assets. And I say net because, of course, there's still some coming in, very few. So a reduction of the net balance would be EUR 1.1 billion. Now we still haven't drawn up the budget and the details of the budget for the year 2013, so the only thing I can tell you is that it will continue to fall, undoubtedly, but I don't dare say by how much. Probably, by the end of the year, we can tell you more because we will have the budgets ready for 2013, and we could say much more about this, I'm sure. Also, in January, when we make our year's announcement, earnings announcement, we can say more because we will have more information. But basically, they will continue to fall, as they have this year.

And to finish with the risk question, there's a question on the restructured loans at Santander. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: We already gave some information on this. It's usually about 1% of the total book of the group, and there isn't too much variation there.

There are certain questions from Britta Schmidt from Autonomous, and Rohith from Barclays, and Ignacio Cerezo from Crédit Suisse. Can we say a bit more about the performance of the NPL rate sustained by segments, how they're performing by segments, because you talked about entries with different concepts, but can you elaborate a bit more as to the coverage of the cost of the risk in SMEs, mortgages, consumer loans and corporate? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: In the information that you have at hand, there is some of this, there is an answer to this. Perhaps, not detailed by segments as you ask in your question, but there is an approximation to this question on my Page 50, it's my Page 50. I don't know what page it is in the document that you have. But in any case, there, in this chart -- 26, I'm being told, on your Page 26, in your document. In that chart that you can see on Screen 2, what we break down here is the NPL rate of the loan book for our real estate purposes and broken down into real estate and non-real estate and then the total. So today the NPL rate is 7.4%. And in real estate, which is the rest of the book aggregated, not by segments, as the question says, has gone from 3.3 in December 2011 to 3.6 in September 2012, so it's gone up by 3/10. Another approximation, although different, is what I mentioned earlier that you see on the next page, which is new entries of NPLs. And my remark here is that it's very surprising to see the huge increase in the NPL rate in the real estate portfolio. But I want to put this into context. Although the percentage goes up from 39% to 42%, the absolute figure falls, because here we have a denominator effect. The NPL rate does not go up in loans for real estate purposes. It is exactly the same amount -- actually, it's less than what we had. The thing is that the denominator of this ratio falls, and consequently, the figure increases. That is just a comment on the side.

And now if we look at it by different businesses, there are several questions on the U.K., once again from Britta Schmidt and Rohith Chandra from Autonomous -- Rohith from Barclays and Ignacio Cerezo from Crédit Suisse, on the performance of the net interest income in the U.K. Alfredo Sáenz Abad: I think enough has been said about this as to how it is performing and why, and what is the trend for the next few quarters.

Ignacio Cerezo from Crédit Suisse asked about extraordinary items in the U.K., José Antonio mentioned them already in his presentation. If you want, later on, we can pass on the data. And Britta Schmidt asked about the impairment of the interest margin in Brazil and the outlook for Brazil, if we expect any impact of hedging for 2013 and '14, would you like to elaborate on that? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, on Brazil, what I wanted to underline -- well, I have to say, first of all, that there has been a significant drop in interest rates. And of course, that has an impact on our interest income and margin. But the top part of the statement in Brazil is the one that best compares Santander with the peers, with other large Brazilian banks. We're growing in revenue and net interest income, more, we're growing more than our competitors. Now it is true that, that better performance might have something to do with the product mix, with our business mix in Brazil, which is a business mix that, that is more focused on individuals. But the truth is -- but that's the truth. So the growth of the net interest income is very positive. Brazil is doing very well. And the way to judge whether it's doing well or not is when we compare to our peers. And if we compare to our peers, the net interest income is clearly performing much better in our case. Also, we must take into account that it's not growing or growing very little, because of the interest rate environment, which as you know, in Brazil, there's been a sharp drop in interest rates.

And now, wholesale banking, there's a question from Sergio Gamez. Why has revenue fallen? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: I remind you to think dividends and insurance. The third quarter dividends are not so good, and the revenue, and the selling of insurance also had an impact on these results.

There are 2 questions, or the same question from 2 analysts from Mexico and Fabio Mostacci from Ahorro Corporacion, on the new regulation -- sorry, on the restrictions of the transfer of capital. Can that affect the bank with regards to the [indiscernible] that the regulator is trying to impose? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Do you want me to elaborate or will you? José Antonio Álvarez: Well, let me do it. Basically, there is a limit now on the repatriation of capital of more than 25% of the equity. So these are extreme cases where you need to ask the regulator or the authority for authorization. We hope that this won't affect us, and certainly, we do maintain our commitment, that we said in our IPO, to remunerate the shareholders with dividends.

Two questions to finish, about the U.K. Do we expect to make additional provisions of PPI, as other banks are announcing extra provisions, will we have to do that? This is from Jaime Becerril from JP. And Antonio Ramirez, a question on deposits in Spain. Have we rolled out any campaign at 4%? Do we have any volume objectives? What about the competition for deposits in the Spanish market? Alfredo Sáenz Abad: Well, in the U.K., in principle, we don't -- what was the question, sorry, about the U.K.? Oh, yes, about the PPI. Well, in principle, we don't think that we're going to have to make more provision for the PPI. We don't think it's going to cost us any more. We don't have any indication that we will have to make further provisions. Of course, there is always a risk that, that might happen. But we don't have any indication right now that, that can happen. So that's with regards to the first question. And now, the question on the deposit market in Santander in Spain, we are not trying to compete through price, although, of course, we always have a product, a deposit product. But if you look at our products in Spain, well, we are paying less for our deposits, 1.44. So our price policy is a mix, really increase in side accounts and current accounts and deposits, and that sometimes are offered with a higher interest rate, but we are not concentrating on a -- more on deposit. And taking into account that we're talking about the cost, not only of deposits, but we also include commercial paper. So no tricks there. We include all the funds that the bank raises in its network of branches and that generate liquidity, all the liability products, not only deposits per se, but other instruments as well.

Well, I think we've already answered a question earlier by Ignacio Moreno. They're asking about the cost of terminating the contract with RBS, BZ and RSB [ph] in the U.K. We already answered that question. There is no additional cost in terminating that contract. More questions, we received more questions as we went to our Q&A session. If we have not answered your questions, please get in touch with us, and we'll try to answer your question. We finish now. We have no questions from the conference call, so thank you very much, and we'll see you next quarter.