Good morning, everyone. It's Caroline Stewart here, Head of Investor Relations for UBS. Welcome to our second quarter results presentation. As usual, Sergio Ermotti, our CEO, will take you through the highlights of our results; and Tom Naratil, our CFO and COO, will talk through the numbers in more detail. We'd be happy to take questions from analysts on the line first; and then after a short break, we'll take questions from the media. Before I hand over to Sergio, I'd like to highlight our cautionary statement as regards forward-looking statements, and I'd ask you to read this carefully. With that, I'd like to hand over to Sergio.

Thank you, Caroline. Good morning, everyone. For the second quarter, we generated an adjusted profit before tax of CHF 1.2 billion. Net profit attributable to UBS shareholders was CHF 792 million, which includes CHF 254 million related to provisions for litigation, regulatory and similar matters. Excluding these costs, our operating performance was strong in a quarter marked by subdued client activity and risk appetite despite equity markets reaching new highs. We continued to build our industry-leading capital position, with our fully applied Basel III CET1 ratio rising to 13.5%. Same time, our Swiss SRB fully applied leverage ratio increased to 4.2%, meeting our expected 2019 requirements more than 4 years early. This is an important achievement for us not at least because we adapted our strategy fundamentally to address regulatory change. We have reduced our balance sheet by almost CHF 500 billion since we implemented these changes at the end of 2011. And at the same time, we have adapted -- we have added significantly to our high-quality capital base. Now putting this in an international context and taking in account the differences for accounting standards and banking systems, we believe that 4.2% is already a strong minimum, which doesn't require fundamental regulatory adjustment just because we have achieved it. And say that and consistent with our industry-leading fully applied CET1 ratio and what we said in the past, we will also target a premium leverage ratio. Now looking at the business divisions in more detail. Wealth Management earned an adjusted profit before tax of CHF 393 million, which included CHF 291 million in charges for provisions mainly related to our cross-border settlement with Germany. On an operating basis, we made solid progress as mandate sales, Lombard lending and invested assets rose. But overall, the significant drop in transaction volumes…

Thank you, Sergio. Good morning, everyone. As usual, my commentary will reference adjusted results, unless otherwise stated. This quarter, we excluded an own credit gain of CHF 72 million, gains on sale of real estate of CHF 1 million, net restructuring charges of CHF 89 million and a CHF 43 million gain in the Investment Bank from the partial sale of our investment in the financial information services company, Markit. The tax expense for the quarter was CHF 314 million. Our full year effective tax rate could change significantly based on the revaluation of our deferred tax assets, which we expect to occur in the third quarter. In the past, we have attributed 75% of the DTA revaluations in the third quarter and 25% in the fourth quarter, in accordance with the interim accounting principles of IAS 34. We reported an IFRS net profit attributable to shareholders of CHF 792 million. Net profit attributable to preferred noteholders and noncontrolling interests was CHF 112 million. As we announced in May, and as Sergio mentioned earlier, we expect to commence a share for share exchange offer, subject to regulatory approvals, during the third quarter in order to establish a new holding company, UBS Group AG. Currently, UBS Group AG is a wholly owned subsidiary of UBS AG. And the intention is for shares of UBS AG to be acquired in exchange for registered shares of UBS Group AG on a one-for-one basis. Upon completion of the offer, UBS Group AG will become a holding company of UBS AG and its subsidiaries and will be listed on the SIX and the New York Stock Exchange. The offer is expected to take up to 3 months. And its successful completion is subject to a number of conditions, including the acquisition by UBS Group AG…

[Operator Instructions] The first question is from Mrs. Fiona Swaffield, RBC.

I just had questions on a couple of areas. The first was on the number that you give in the quarterly report on potential capital loss from further litigation matters. I think it was stable. Could you talk about why that was stable when industry settlement costs are rising? And then the second issue was just on operational risk-weighted assets, which are drifting up, not much but a little bit. Could you talk about what could be driving that? And then the third was just on the Wealth Management business and particularly kind of on Asia, where the margin was particularly weak in Q2. Is there anything -- what do you think in second half? Or was there something particularly seasonal in transactions there or could that recover?

Okay, thank you, Fiona. For the first question regarding the estimated capital loss, if you look at the methodology that we used that drives off the AMA model and in terms of drawdown of exposures, it depends on the categories in which we see the losses. And on a quarter-to-quarter basis, we did not see an uptick in the amount of outflows that we would have estimated using that model and methodology. I would say I think, to some extent, we might have already anticipated some of that uplift earlier in the modeling. Second, on the op risk RWA, some of the uplift, we do have now 37% of our RWA in total on operational risk. You did see an uplift of CHF 1.3 billion that came from supplemental components that we arrived at in our discussions with FINMA. And then finally, on the Wealth Management business, you're asking about Asia and what we saw. We did see a very good first quarter high amount of transactional activity in APAC. However, with the declines in equity market volatility and FX volatility in 2Q, we did see that substantial decline in activity that you noted, and that was roughly about a 7-basis-point decline in gross margin during the second quarter. Now if you look back at the history of the APAC region, I'd say it's not abnormal to see a lot of volatility, in particular, 1Q to 2Q.

But is there any kind of hope that second half may be somewhat of an improvement?

Yes. I think, Fiona, if you look at our outlook statement, we continue to reflect in that what our clients see, which is an environment where there is a fair amount of geopolitical stability -- geopolitical instability, as well as concerns about timings of unwinding of easing at potentially different rates and, perhaps, even different directions by the major central banks. So I would say that the environment we saw in 2Q for our outlook statement is the same one we see in 3Q, however, with the addition of some of the seasonal slowdown you traditionally see in the summer.

Next question from Kian Abouhossein, JPMorgan. Kian Abouhossein - JP Morgan Chase & Co, Research Division: The first question is coming to top line margins in Wealth Management. Can you just discuss a little bit more in detail of what -- how we should think about the top line margin considering you're quite far off your targets -- your KPI target? And in respect to transactions, is there any change that you're seeing, especially in Asia? The second question is more related to litigation issues. Why you're bringing -- why you talk about high frequency in this quarter but not in the first quarter? So just what has changed between first quarter and second quarter, if I look at your statements, you didn't have in the first? The second question is regarding FX, regarding litigation. Did you self-disclose on FX? Is my first question. And the second question is, how does the NPA, which you still have, kick in, in case there is any wrongdoing in respect to any U.S. matters, such as FX?

Okay, thank you, Kian. So to take a look at the top line margin in Wealth Management, I think the best slide to look at is actually our Slide 7 to be that -- I mean, one, as you know, we are a fair distance away from the target that we've set, but as you know, we've always indicated that there's a multiyear process to get there, not a multi-quarter process. And if we look at what we did see in the quarter that we're very happy with is the fact that, first, our objective is to drive revenue higher, so we have a higher pretax in the business. Gross margin is an indicator of what we're doing to get there. Now I think if you look at this, some of the trends that I think are encouraging, as I mentioned, we're seeing a troughing of deposit margins. That will be a little stubborn. Certainly, it won't rise very quickly, but we could see some improvements in there as we move into early 2015, first or second quarter. Second, we are seeing some benefits of improved pricing on the lending side in terms of net interest income, so that's also a potential positive for us. Second, if you look at the recurring fee income line, where we saw a stable margin in the quarter but growth in income, now we're really seeing the impact of our mandate initiative, where we've increased the penetration in mandates from 22% to 24% just in the first half of this year. And that's something that is we believe more attractive for clients in the way that we manage their money. And also it's something that has higher gross margin for us over time than the average that we have today. So you see where…

I think, Kian, my answer that we began our own investigation is sufficient. Kian Abouhossein - JP Morgan Chase & Co, Research Division: Okay. And in terms of NPA, I mean, I read the document in detail myself, and frankly, I don't fully understand what it actually means. I'm not a lawyer. Now what -- if NPA kicks in, what does it actually mean for you, if it's triggered?

We are not -- we cannot be in a position to comment on hypothetical questions. Kian Abouhossein - JP Morgan Chase & Co, Research Division: Okay. And just on high frequency, just to come back to that, a lot of banks tell me at what point legal matters go into the public domain in terms of your reports. I would like to know what triggers for you to put something into the reports that you publish publicly.

Yes, Kian, it's no single factor. It's any number of factors, which could include whether or not it's pertinent to the industry at large, and we believe it's potentially sufficiently of interest to investors as a topic, or two, it could also be something where we expect a material outflow related to the matter. And as a result, that's another reason it could be highlighted.

Next question from Kinner Lakhani, Citi.

I've got 3 questions. So firstly, on the SNB financial stability report that just came out recently with a particular focus on risk weights and leverage ratio, I just wanted to get your thoughts on -- so both issues, both on the risk weights, as well as on potential higher leverage requirement, and specifically, what your views are on GLAC, as a means of higher "too big to fail" requirements. Secondly, just to understand the rationale behind the Group Treasury reallocations that we saw to the divisions and how much NII benefits in through each division to help us better understand the interest [ph]. And thirdly, is the Investment Bank hitting a ceiling -- a glass ceiling on risk-weighted asset target that you have of less than CHF 7 billion [ph]?

Okay. Kinner, thanks for the question. On -- in respect of the stability report, I think that what we're seeing, I think that to the extent that we can create more transparency in a level playing field matter, I think that we are in favor for a higher disclosure and setting clear rules and standards for international banks. In respect of the leverage ratio demand, I think that we have been quite consistent in our points in saying that our new business model, our plans for reducing balance sheet would lead into a significant improvement of our leverage position, which we achieved this quarter by reaching a 4.2% ratio on a fully applied basis, the SRB ratio. We're still going to improve this ratio going forward. We don't think it's necessary at this stage to change the minimum requirement. Also, because if you look at -- on an international comparison, when you adjust for different accounting standards and different banking system, those ratio are very solid. So we will continue to work, as we say, to put a premium on top of minimum requirements in line with our policies, but we don't believe this should be or will be a matter of big issues for us. In terms of GLAC, I think that is a quite interesting component of building up buffers and capital base. We do think that with the establishment of the holding company and the potential, also, introduction of bail-in-able debts, the structure with a very solid capital equity, core equity position we have, in addition to having completed our GLAC issuance, this will put our holding company and the group in an extremely strong position going forward. So we welcome this kind of actions. And as you know, in terms of GLAC, we do believe that it's better to have loss-absorbing structures rather than dilutive structures.

Yes. Kinner, if I could just add 2 things on -- to the other questions onto Sergio's comments, the first, we have said for the group holding company, we will issue contractually bail-in-able debt out of the holding company in the future. Obviously, we have a substantial amount of overfunding at this point in time, but that's something that's certainly in our menu of options as we look forward. Second, on the debates on risk weights and standardized versus advanced. I think, as you know, we continue to have a 3-pronged approach to the way we view our capital management, which is based on our CET1 ratio and risk weighting, which is based on the leverage ratio and also based on stress testing. And our own stress test that we run internally is one that has us stressing to the regulatory minimum CET1 ratio. So we think that 3-pronged approach is the best way to look at this and not just looking at any one single factor as the binding constraint. On the Group Treasury reallocations, I think there is an important thing to note. We've had -- our business divisions have been very disciplined about their use of balance sheet during the course of the year. And our approach and our methodology is that to the extent that we have excess term funding that we're carrying, if the divisions utilize less balance sheet, we do not allocate the incremental term funding to them. And so what we're trying to do is really have a very responsive mechanism. So if divisions reduce their demand, we want them to see the benefits coming through in their costs related to their P&L. We think that one of the advantages of doing that is to prevent people from thinking, "I've got term funding anyway, so why don't I just put on a few balance sheet trades to try to address the fact that I already have that expense." We manage that at Group Treasury. We do have a symmetric approach to that. So to the extent someone borrowed over their usual line, we actually have a more punitive system, where there's a penalizing charge on top of the normal rates that we charge out of Group Treasury. So in this quarter, where you saw some more efficient balance sheet utilization below limits, you do see the Group Treasury retaining more of the net interest costs, number one. The second piece that I referenced in my remarks is that I'm sure you noticed that our LCR rose to 117% in the quarter, and we continued to have a very conservative liquidity position based on some of the things that we've said in our outlook statement. And so again, that extra liquidity which we're carrying on a strategic basis, the costs associated with that are carried in Group Treasury. So I do think there's some benefit. If you look at the allocation, not everything is passing through directly to the divisions.

On the IB side, if you look at the performance year-on-year in terms of risk-weighted assets, utilization, excluding operational risk, went down by CHF 7 billion. So I would say that from a business standpoint of you serving clients, being a client-centric investment bank, there is no indication whatsoever that they are reaching a ceiling. Of course, over time, we do expect 2 issues: short term, we had a temporary uplift of risk-weighted assets that we do expect, short term, to phase out; but also long term, the proportion of operational risks associated with the Investment Bank should also help creating capacity, should market condition and clients' activity also increase because there is a high correlation between our utilization of risk-weighted assets and clients' activity.

Great. So just as a very quick follow-up, do you have any number in mind -- or range in mind in terms of how much contractual bail-in will be issued? Is that completely consistent with the...

At this point in time, Kinner, we're still doing the modeling on that.

Next question from Andrew Lim, Societe Generale.

The first one is on CoCos or BCNs. You issued quite a lot this quarter, CHF 2.3 billion. And you're standing out now at CHF 9.5 billion in aggregate, which seems a bit higher than CHF 9 billion that you were guiding to beforehand, if I base that on 4.5% of your risk-weighted assets. And I was just wondering what your thinking is here going forward. Are you at the limit now? Or are you intending to issue more for leverage ratio purposes? And then secondly, on recent litigation affecting some U.S. banks for CDOs, straight MBS [ph], if you could give us some color on how your market shares backed up [ph], leading up to the credit crisis and whether you've provisioned adequately versus the forthcoming litigation in this regard, any color here would be much appreciated.

Andrew, thank you for those questions. On the low-trigger loss-absorbing capital that we issued, including the issue this quarter, as you noted, it did put us in a position where it took us slightly above our 450-basis-point estimated requirement on CHF 200 billion of risk-weighted assets, as you said, CHF 9.5 billion. But let's not forget that we do issue in currencies other than Swiss francs, so we do have to have some buffer in there for anticipated FX volatility over the course of time. But in our view, we've completed all the issuance we need on low-trigger loss-absorbing capital until we get closer to the call dates on those securities. Your question on litigation -- and actually, another point as well. It's -- we issue to where we thought we need to be. We don't need to work on the numerator as much to reach and to have a further improvement on our leverage ratio because we're working down. Don't forget, our leverage ratio denominator target is CHF 900 billion from where we are currently, so there's still some substantial movement down. And at 4.2%, we're actually at our 2019 estimated requirement anyway. On the litigation item, regarding RMBS, we do have a very detailed RMBS note. Market share is one variable that you could certainly go back and find the data on, going back to the financial crisis. But each one of these matters, and if you look through this, depends on the facts and circumstances of each set of claims that are being made by a particular plaintiff or by a regulator, and so I think it's too broad. I think if you just did a market share analysis and said, as a result, that's my way to calculate what the exposures would be -- or the ultimate outflow would be; certainly, is a way to calculate the exposures. But to estimate the ultimate amount of outflows, I think, that would be a flawed approach.

Next question from Michael Helsby, Bank of America Merrill Lynch.

Just 2 questions from me. Firstly, just circling back to what Kinner was asking on the Swiss National Bank and on leverage, it's pretty clear that they're talking about the lack of international comparability. So if I use your leverage target of CHF 900 (sic) [CHF 900 billion], you've got a CET1 leverage ratio at the moment of about 3.4%. I think the U.K. is quite interesting at the moment because they're going halfway house between what the U.S. have set out and where Europe currently stands. So if the Swiss did go down that route of having a buffer for the G-SIB, and therefore, more like 4% was appropriate, would you consider changing your policy on high-trigger AT1 and look to issue that to close the gap? Or would you just let your core Tier 1 ratio drift higher from the 13.5% that it is at the moment? So it's just your -- how you feel about that, using AT1 from here? And secondly, in the Core Functions, Corporate Center, I'm just very curious why -- given the backdrop for litigation and regulatory matters, why you've actually released CHF 141 million this quarter, if you could tell us what that's for and why you just didn't keep it in the buffer, so to speak.

Go on, Tom.

Okay, Sergio. So Michael, first, on leverage ratio, I mean, I think considering there is a process that there will be both on a legislative and regulatory side in Switzerland that I don't think it's really appropriate for us to try to guess on the hypotheticals of where things will come out. I think just in terms of making a comment overall, when you talk about international comparisons, it's also important to note the differences in terms of the structure of the banking systems. And so on the U.S. comparison to Europe, let's just make it very generic, when you have quasi-governmental entity that purchase up the vast majority of the mortgage production of a particular country and take it off balance sheet, comparing the leverage ratios of 2 different groups of banks where that doesn't exist is an interesting way to do it, but they're very -- 2 very different systems. And the others [ph] should not have the same leverage ratios, unless you're going to make the changes necessary to go down that path. I think there's -- there are a lot broader set of questions on that. In terms of just what would we do, would we consider, in the event something came along, other forms of issuance that we haven't done publicly? We have used high trigger in our employee compensation plans. Of course, we'd have to consider it, but we'd have to wait and see what the environment looked at, at that point in time and what the rules and regulations were. On the release, the one thing I'd say about the release, you mentioned, "Well, why couldn't you just keep it in the buffer?" Well, we couldn't because that would not be in line with what the accounting standards permit. We can only carry a provision if it is both probable and estimable, that will be an out -- there will be an outflow for that matter, and if that estimate is, in fact, reliable. And based on the one particular matter for which we reversed the provision in the quarter, it was either no longer probable or estimable.

Yes. And maybe let me add to Tom's remarks on leverage ratio because, as we mentioned in the past, I think that's -- particularly for our Swiss domestic business, when you look at the Corporate & Retail business, the mortgage business, this is a business that would -- will be affected the most. And we would need to take appropriate actions in respect of adapting our business model and our on and off balance sheet strategy on this matter. So the response to potential changes, which we -- are difficult to predict at this stage, it's not necessarily by taking actions on capital on -- but it could well be based on different ways to manage the business going forward.

Next question from Jeremy Sigee, Barclays.

Just 3 specific questions, please, following up on things. Firstly, in Wealth Management European clients, your flow number and also your language was quite resilient, and I thought that contrasted a bit with Credit Suisse who are warning of further outflows from that area. And I just wondered if that reflects that you're at a different stage than they are. I know you won't want to comment on them, but if you could just comment on your own situation with Western European clients. Second question, in the IB, I sense your equities revenue number was a bit disappointing for you, and I just wondered if there are any specifics around that or any scope for that to bounce back from that number. And then third question, you highlighted the extra exit costs in the Corporate Center from exiting the correlation trading portfolio, and I just wondered if this is a -- reflecting a more aggressive approach that you are now taking now that you've made such good progress there, you're now sort of being more aggressive about tidying up some of the remaining portfolios. So is that a change of approach in the Corporate Center?

Okay. Thanks for all the question. I'll take the second and the third. I mean, in respect of our equity performance, I think that's -- if you look at the correlate -- at the correlation of this performance versus the volumes in the markets, I would say that it's exactly what we would have expected from a client-centric business. So of course -- and also, if you look at the overall activity in respect of a prime brokerage, where we have a -- we are running a substantial balance sheet but not as big as other players, you can justify, to some degree, the delta between our performance and some competitors. In respect of Non-core and Legacy, I think that we always had a fairly aggressive stance as long as that disposal of assets would be managed in a capital-efficient way in respect of making sure that we do something that makes sense from an economic profit stand point of view for shareholders. So our stance hasn't really changed. What has changed is that we have been quite carefully using the right time and not being in a scenario which we needed to sell out in order to achieve targets. That's the reason why we were always comfortable to run ahead of our targets so that we could manage those processes in a position of strength and not being forced to take action.

And Jeremy, I'm glad you noticed the positive trends that we see in our Wealth Management funds [ph], and they're a continuation of what we've been seeing for quite a long period of time. I mean, we have -- if you look at APAC, although the results are volatile quarter-to-quarter because it's a high percent of ultra-high net worth clients, that's a key area for us for growth, and it continues to perform well. We're very pleased to see a continued positive growth in Switzerland. In our home market, our ultra-high net worth percentage at 9.6%. EM, still positive, again, subject to those big-ticket flows. And if you look at Europe, I do think the comments that we've made about -- that we were negative 0.6, but we did see very good performance in our European onshore business. And as we complete in Europe the remainder of the voluntary compliance programs, we'll begin to see that offshore outflow drag begin to wane. And then you'll start to see that very good performance in the onshore business begin to show through on a net basis.

Next question from Jon Peace, Nomura.

Just sort of returning back to some of the comments you made earlier around the leverage ratio and how you think about your capital. With the special dividend that you declared last quarter of CHF 0.25, could you just remind us, how did you decide that, that was the right number to pay? And as we go forward from here, how should we think about the timing and the amount, if any, of future special dividends?

Jon, sorry just for the correction, but this is not a special dividend. It's a supplementary dividend that is focused exclusively to incentiv-ate. And I think -- and our shareholders to go through an exchange on -- by creating the holding company. So it's not meant to be a special dividend and has nothing to do with our future dividend policy, which remains the same. Our dividend is stated. We want to pay out 50% above -- 50% -- at least 50% of the net profit attributable to shareholders when we achieve our capital targets. So the rebate is -- that we will get through the creation of the holding company and the successful exchange offer will allow us to create further buffers for capital returns. But the CHF 0.25 that we said, at least CHF 0.25, is not a special dividend in that sense, but it's rather a one-off payment for -- in this process.

Next question from Robert Murphy, HSBC.

A quick thing on Wealth Management Americas first. You said the CHF 10.5 billion outflow, that was seasonal, but we didn't seem to get that last year, so that's the first question. Secondly, going back to Wealth Management. When you talk to the clients now, what's holding back the activity levels? Because it seems to be kind of a very long-term process, that they seem to sort of continually underperform expectations. And what's going to turn that around? I mean, if you look at the sensitivity with, I think, the transactional revenues of 21 basis points, so they'd have to go up 50% or something to hit your -- the bottom end of your target on gross margin. And then finally, also on the Wealth Management, in terms of interest rate sensitivity, obviously, I think the market's expecting U.S. dollar and sterling rates to move first. Should we imagine the impact of that will be sort of roughly in proportion to the assets that you have in that? That's basically it.

Yes, Robert. I think when I look at the first question on WMA, I think, last year, we had, indeed, outflows in the -- because of tax payments. But of course, they were offset by order inflows. And this year, inflows and outflows were not sufficient to offset the major seasonal effects. So the net number is -- happened to be that exactly what is the tax outflows, but it's just a pure coincidence. So I would say that the reality's that we didn't see any inflows from clients, as we mentioned before, the -- that 16 quarters of positive numbers, around CHF 60 billion. And also, when you look at the results of the U.S. banks, you can see, really, there's a risk aversion being in play. All banks have reported that substantial increase in their deposits. What happened there is that we are seeing inflows when clients' risk appetite for investments goes up. And clearly, that's another indicator that, that risk appetite is not there in the U.S. So we do think it's temporary, but we need to have a resolution of these macroeconomic and geopolitical challenges to see a new wave of inflows. I understand the point on ROA for Wealth Management that, as we outlined at investor update, ROA is one of the metrics we measure the business. If I look all other metrics as [ph] being penetration of mandates from advisory, if I look at our cost management exercise excluding the litigation charges, if we look at net new money, I would say that our performance in our Wealth Management businesses, it's quite solid. Our transaction revenues are under pressure because you can see volumes across the board being under pressure. So -- and we always say we're not going to force and go into campaigns of promoting better transaction revenues just for the sake of improving a quarter results if we think that this is against the risk appetite of the clients. So I would say that from a strategic stand point of view, our Wealth Management business and, I would say, our Wealth Management businesses combined are demonstrating a great potential not only in their results, with CHF 940 million adjusted results for the quarter, but also going forward. So of course, when you look at the volatility of the ROA during the quarter, this is the first time in the last 7 quarters, as Tom mentioned in his remarks, that we see very little volatility in the ROA. In the past quarters, we had 7, 8, almost even double-digit intra-quarter movements of ROA. This is the first quarter in which we have -- the variance are very close, 3 basis points, so -- which is another indication maybe that there is something that's changing in the marketplace. And we do -- our outlook statement speaks very clearly, once again, it's -- unless we have a resolution, we don't see our transactions will go up.

Fine. And just, obviously, with the ultra-high net worth and the focus on emerging markets, I mean, those markets have been relatively weak, I guess, compared with developed markets, I mean, we're starting to see a bit of a pickup. Would that make a massive difference there in your overall margin? Because I think you said the June was higher than the other 2 months of the quarter in terms of margin.

There is a high degree of sensitivity about macroeconomic and geopolitical things. I mean, we -- as we saw in the past with this volatility intra-quarter, things can change very quickly. The reality is that the underlying fundamental issues are still unresolved. And we work hard on -- that's the reason why we are working very hard on the mix of our businesses. That's the reason why we work very hard on costs and anything we can control to create sustainable value but...

Rob, you had your third question, which is on interest rates. So I mean, you can look through in the annual report to get the currency breakdown according to our -- for our investment of equity. And then you can also see -- and also look at the deposit percentages in the currencies. But what you'll see there is, we're more weighted to dollar; second, most weighted to Swiss; third, to euro; sterling is far behind. And so if you want to figure out sort of what's going to be moving, the fact that the Fed is -- the Fed appears to be a little ahead of the curve on the tightening cycle is something that would be more advantageous, given our currency mix.

Next question from Christopher Wheeler, Mediobanca.

A couple of questions really on Wealth Management. First of all, on the ultra-high net worth, I think up to 48% of the assets under management in the Wealth Management division. I mean, where would you see that going over time? Is that something that heads up to sort of the mid-50s? And is that something you'd like to target? And perhaps attaching to that, obviously, the 3-basis-point decline in the gross margin was a bit higher than the market certainly was expecting. And your major competitor suggested that the shift towards ultra-high net worth may well result in a more volatile gross margin. I just wondered what your view is on that. And then perhaps on the emerging markets, I think CHF 157 billion of AUM was in emerging markets. Can you give us a clue as to how much of that relates to what I think has been a pretty successful Russian business? And what are you going to have to do around that business? I saw Sergio quoted on Bloomberg on this, but what are you going to have to do around that in terms of the very awkward situation, to put it mildly, that's now developing around the Russian market?

Yes. Let me tackle the last point, and then Tom will take the rest. I think on the Russian business, it's a very important business for us, but I wouldn't describe this business as critical in terms of affecting our targets and our long-term prospects for growth. I think we are watching the situation very carefully, how it develops, but I really don't believe that this is going to be of significance, long term, in our capabilities to grow and in emerging markets in general. So I guess...

Yes, so Chris, I'll answer your first 2 questions, so on the ultra-high net worth, with the faster growth rate in -- that we see in ultra-high net worth, both in terms of our own ability to attract the assets but also in terms of creation of wealth, if you look at the industry-wide data, ultra-high net worth growth -- wealth growth rates are higher than those for high net worth and high net worth for Cora [ph] on down the line. So you would expect us to start to creep over 50s, and that certainly wouldn't be inconsistent with the strategy we're executing. At the same time, we do have a focus on our high net worth businesses as well. So it's not that we're not focusing on high net worth. I just think we're -- we've been exceptionally successful in the segment as a whole. And the benefit for that, away from gross margin, is actually net margin because, as you know, that's a segment that has a better profit margin than the high net worth segment. On the gross margin comment, I think if I differ a bit from your -- from -- not from your comments about the consensus on it, but I think our 3-basis-point decline, I think, relative to what we've seen from competitors, looks pretty good. And I think we performed well, and we're executing on what we want to do in the business; in particular, growing that mandate penetration, which is clearly a key part of our strategy and the longer-term improvements in gross margin. I don't think we subscribe to the theory that it's because of our focus on the ultra-high net worth and our great success there, that we're going to be unable to improve our gross margins over time. We set our 95 to 105 target, which is a substantial improvement from where we are today based on the fact that, as you mentioned in your first question, our ultra-high net worth business is going to continue to grow more quickly than the high net worth business. So we don't see those 2 as conflicting; a little bit of a headwind to do it, but we think both are achievable.

Sorry, maybe to add, Christopher. When you look at this issue on -- in respect of the ROA, if you have the denominator going up as a function of financial markets, in addition to the risk aversion and net new money inflows, you have -- you are creating also a kind of headwind. So to some extent, we have to be able to live through this issue. And while I understand the questions about ROA, we are working based on creating profitability, bottom line profitability in a balanced business approach. 60% of our assets are in high net worth individuals. And we think, by the way, also in Asia, the next real opportunity is going to be the creation of the new millionaires, and those are the next clients that we also want to really be close to. So I think that our strategy continues to be very combined, high net worth and ultra-high net worth, and we will be successful in doing that. So I see we have no more questions. Before I close, let me reiterate that we -- these set of results are, in our point of view, quite strong. When you look at the underlying profitability of the group, not only we were able to achieve better results than last year by 20%, but most importantly, if you look at the underlying profitability of our businesses, reaching almost CHF 2 billion. And our Wealth Management business clearly indicating its capacity to go above CHF 1 billion in pretax profit in a normalized environment makes us very confident that we are moving in the right direction. We have an Investment Bank that has showed during the last 6, 7 quarter now that it can provide superior -- I would call it superior returns in very challenging market conditions. We are counting on our reliable Retail & Corporate business in Switzerland. We are making a huge progress, and we are yet again ahead of the curve in taking down our Non-core and Legacy assets. So we are managing the bank with the highs to create long-term value for shareholders, and our determination to continue to do that is very high. So we are prepared and we are preparing ourselves for any kind of market condition. And as I mentioned before, myself and my team here, we are really confident that we can achieve our results. Many thanks for your attention, and I guess now we move into media session.