Yes, good morning, Barry. I think the starting point for us, VICI, is that over our seven years, led by John and the team, we have developed very positive, powerful relationships with American tribal nations. We currently have four tribal relationships. As you know, Barry, they all obviously involve partnering with tribes in commercial gaming opportunities off of tribal land. And when it comes, again, to doing business with tribes, we love doing business with them. They're commercial, they're collaborative and great to do business with. When it comes to doing business on tribal land, it is, again, not about tribes being idiosyncratic. It's about the structure that applies to tribal gaming on tribal land that is idiosyncratic. And when you have an idiosyncratic situation, it's sometimes useful to create a counterfactual that enables you to better understand the idiosyncrasy, the risks associated with the idiosyncrasy, and perhaps a better understanding of how to price the risk of that idiosyncrasy. So to create a counterfactual, I'm going to ask you, Barry, to imagine a scenario in which we announce that we've done a deal with a commercial gaming operator on freehold commercial land. But in that deal, we tell you that that commercial gaming operator is the only party in the world entitled to operate the gaming floor at the center of the asset and likely the economic engine of the asset. And moreover, that same operator owns the land underneath everything and thus would be the ground less sore to us as the ground less sea. So that is by definition a sandwich lease. And from everything we've been able to learn, that is what applies to the transaction you're implicitly referring to that got announced last week by our peers and colleagues at GLPI. We give full credit to GLPI for announcing this, for doing the work that went behind it. But I would say we are still coming up the learning curve when it comes to understanding the risks associated with that structure and how to best price the risk. At VICI, we spend a lot of time focusing on tail risk. And in fact, there may be moments when some people feel both externally and internally, maybe we spend a little too much time focused on tail risk. But in this particular case, the tail risk, again, is so idiosyncratic and so unique to this situation that we're not at a point where we can say with any confidence, okay, the code has been cracked and the idiosyncratic risks that have always applied here have either been eliminated or have been minimized to a degree where we can confidently price the risk.