Good morning. My name is Regina, and I will be your conference operator today. At this time, I would like to welcome everyone to the Wells Fargo Second Quarter Earnings Conference Call. All lines have been placed on mute to prevent any background noise. After the speakers' remarks, there will be a question-and-answer session [Operator Instructions]. Please note that today’s call is being recorded. I would now like to turn the call over to John Campbell, Director of Investor Relations. Sir, you may begin the conference.

Thank you, Regina. Good morning, everyone. Thank you for joining our call today where our CEO, Charlie Scharf and our CFO, John Shrewsberry will discuss second quarter results and answer your questions. This call is being recorded. Before we get started, I would like to remind you that our second quarter earnings release and quarterly supplements are available on our Web site at wellsfargo.com. I'd also like to caution you that we may make forward-looking statements during today's call that are subject to risks and uncertainties. Factors that may cause actual results to differ materially from expectations are detailed in our SEC filings including the Form 8-K filed today containing our earnings release and quarterly supplement. Information about any non-GAAP financial measures referenced, including a reconciliation of those measures to GAAP measures, can also be found in our SEC filings in the earnings release and in the quarterly supplement available on our Web site. I will now turn the call over to Charlie.

Good morning everyone. Thank you, John. I'm going to open the call by reviewing what is clearly a very poor quarter for us. I'll review the drivers of our results, make some comments about the environment and discuss the rationale for the intended dividend reduction. I'll then turn the call over to John to review second quarter results in more detail. Our view of the length and severity of the downturn deteriorated considerably from our assumptions at the end of the first quarter and this as well as the knock-on impacts from COVID substantially impacted our results this quarter, we added $8.4 billion to the allowance for credit losses. Charge-offs increased $204 million from the prior-quarter to $1.1 billion. Net interest income was down 13% from the prior-quarter driven primarily by lower rates. The constraints of operating under the asset cap has limited our ability to offset lower rates with balance sheet growth and we actually took actions during the quarter to limit loan and deposit growth, which John will highlight. Expenses included approximately $400 million related to decisions we made due to COVID, most of which we do not expect to be permanent, but was the right thing to do for employees and to improve the safety of our facilities, about $350 million of deferred comp with an offset and fee revenue, $1.2 billion of operating losses primarily for customer remediation accruals related to our ongoing work to remediate the historical issues in community banking as we took another look under new leadership at outstanding matters. This accrual will enable us to do the right thing for our customers, while resolving these matters as quickly as possible. Revenues were lower by about $295 million due to COVID related fee and interest waivers for certain products. In addition, a strong…

Thanks, Charlie. Good morning, everyone. Charlie's comments covered most of the information on Page 2 of the supplement including the largest driver of our reported loss, which was the $8.4 billion increase in the allowance for credit losses in the second quarter. So let me highlight just a couple things here. First, our income taxes in the second quarter reflected the impact of annual income tax benefits primarily tax credits driven by our reported pretax loss. As a result, we currently expect our effective income tax rate for the remainder of the year to be approximately 26%, excluding the impact of any discrete items. Also, deferred compensation plan investment results increased net gains from equity securities by $346 million and increased personnel expense by $349 million. As we've highlighted many times, while these hedges are largely P&L neutral, that can result in large swings in our reported revenue and expense trends. In late May, we entered into arrangements to transition these economic hedges from equity securities to derivatives in the form of total return swaps. As a result of this change, starting in the third quarter, our reporting for this item will be less volatile since most of the accounting impact from deferred comp hedges will be reported in personnel expense. Turning to Page 3, Charlie covered the support we’re providing to our customers and communities during the pandemic. But let me just highlight that approximately $400 million donation for small business recovery efforts we announced last week through the new Open For Business Fund will be donated when the gross fees are recognized in revenue. Turning to Page 4, while our earnings in the second quarter were significantly impacted by the economic environment. Our capital and liquidity continued to be strong with both our CET1 ratio and LCR increasing…

[Operator Instructions] Our first question will come from the line of Erika Najarian with Bank of America. Please go ahead.

Yes, good morning. My first question is a clarification question for Charlie. Charlie, during your prepared remarks, you noted that your expenses were about $10 billion greater than your peers or where you need to be to be equivalent to peers on efficiency. Are you saying that lopping off $10 billion in expenses is an eventual long-term goal for this company to be in line with their larger peers?

Well, I mean, what I said was that the math, if you do the math, what it says is that when you look at their efficiency ratios versus ours, our expenses are at least $10 billion higher than they should be. And there's no reason why that should occur. And so we are doing the work to create a roadmap for a company which is significantly more efficient. Exactly what the timeframe is and where we ultimately get to I think, we will provide more information on when the future will play itself out. But we can do the same math that you can do. And there's no reason why as a management team, we don't have the ability to be as efficient as the rest.

Got it. That's clear. And my follow-up question has to do with the potential for the Fed to extend the income test beyond the third quarter dividend. And I'm wondering, so as we think about you mentioned that expenses should start coming down in 2021. As I think about how consensus is formulating future earnings power, I think consensus is expecting that your majority of your reserve build should be behind you. But I don't think that restructuring costs for example that would relate to future efficiency initiatives are in with consensus and against the question that I'm really asking here is that if the Fed extends the income test beyond the third quarter, do you feel confident that according to how they're looking at dividend capacity, the $0.10 is supportable going forward?

Sure, this is John. We certainly have the ability to extend the current framework. And frankly, it even seems likely just given the way the calendar lines up in the resubmission process is going to work for the next CCAR, I think Charlie's point is we're going to do what's necessary to get as efficient as we can be. And to the extent that that kicks off one-time charges which you might expect, and if that has an influence on our dividend capacity as a result of the Fed keeping the current regime in place, then they will have to tolerate that. I don't think we're not going to do what's right economically, because of accounting consequences, we're going to do, we're going to follow GAAP, we're going to get as efficient as we can, the outcome is going to be the outcome, we in part, we set the current dividend or propose to set the current dividend where it is, so that it would buy us plenty of room to operate while we get through the next few quarters and chart the eventual path to greater profitability. But accounting consequences will be what they are, it wasn't a primary consideration in setting the number where we did.

The only thing I would add is I think that when we think of the work that we did, we didn't our boards didn't approach this conversation around the dividend with an idea of at each quarter and making a determination. And so our hope is that, this does become a level which is sustainable as we go through this period of uncertainty and as the Fed decides how they want to treat capital return over the next series of quarters, we do have some items that impact our capital, our ability to return capital with this rule that doesn't reflect our earnings power going forward, right. We had a $3 billion settlement with the Department of Justice, which is in our historical numbers, that $3 billion, when you look at it as something like round numbers, $0.18 a share of a negative that ultimately will roll out and is already actually in our capital number. So we have these dynamics that the board thought about when we set the dividend level for the quarter that don't relate to the future earnings capacity of the company, even as we look out into 2021.

Got it. Thank you for the clear answers.

Your next question comes from the line of John McDonnell with Autonomous Research.

Yes, hi. Good morning, John could you remind us just where you're on the asset cap flexibility, what needs to be done each quarter now with deposits coming in and some loan demand and what kind of flexibility you have to operate under that and where you are today on the way it gets measured? Thanks.

Sure, sure. So we were in compliance with it at the end of the second quarter. And the items that we did during the late first and early second quarter to maintain compliance, we're really focused on our wholesale funding footprint by shrinking the amount of external repo and other financing that we do and taking trading assets down and we had a focus on certain categories of non-operational deposits, the ones that have very low liquidity value. And it's really this is from this point forward. It's more of our liability management exercise to make sure that that we don't retain too much in the way of low liquidity value deposits that we're thoughtful about other liabilities. On the asset side, there's so much cash on the balance sheet right now that it gets plenty of flexibility having to do what we need to do with loans. You saw that our LCR is 129% for the quarter and deposits have grown nicely. So we're very thoughtful and cautious about how we price deposits, it's about those that have low liquidity value. We're thoughtful about maturities as they come up in non-deposit funding because with the inflow of deposits, we can rely more on that and less on notes and institutional CDs and other things. That's the work that we've been doing and that's the path that we have for the next quarter or two.

Okay, and you reiterated the net interest income outlook for the year, how should we think about kind of jumping half point for the net interest margin and net interest income as we go into next quarter, what are some of the puts and takes that we should factor in the model?

I think it's going to be relatively flat from where it is today. We're sort of we're in that zone. As I said, $41 billion to $42 billion for the year still feels like the right number. So I think it'll be, we're not really carefully managing the NIM as we're looking for the dollars in net interest income. But it shouldn't deviate too much from where we’re right now.

Okay, got it. And is there anything in terms of asset cap progress, Charlie can comment, I know you can't say too much, but in terms of the work being done and progress and doing what you need to do to satisfy the Fed?

No, John, I appreciate everyone being interested given the limitations of it and asking the question, it's going to be the same response every single quarter, which is we're focused on it. It is along with the other enforcement actions, the biggest priority that we have, we're doing our work. And the Fed will determine when the work is done to their satisfaction.

Understood. Thanks.

Thanks, John.

Your next question comes from the line of Scott Siefers with Piper Sandler.

Hi, Scott.

Good morning. Hey, thanks for taking. John, just was hoping you might be able to sort of update or refresh your thoughts on how and sort of when losses might evolve, I guess embedded in that is sort of how are you treating reups deferral request things like that, may I guess additionally, the updated reserve build kind of implies sort of what you think about cumulative losses through the period, but just any updated thoughts you can share, please?

Yes, well as it relates to deferrals which generally speaking is the consumer side of the house. The fact that we are deferring definitely pushes out, rolls through delinquency buckets into charge-offs and so the actual charge-offs themselves will probably come later than they otherwise would, we believe that we've fully provided or captured that in the allowance. So we've taken the credit charge today that we think is the right one at the end of the quarter even if the charge-offs come somewhat later. We're also seeing, we saw pick-up in charge-offs in commercial but there also things do take a little bit before they roll, I think I guess I would expect charge-off rates and they'll be different by asset category to sort of move up slowly through the end of the year, even into the first couple of quarters and next year, and then start to flatten out after that just based on the way things progress through loss recognition.

Okay, perfect. And then maybe just to switch gears a little, the additional customer mediation accrual. Charlie or John, could you go through sort of the, I know you alluded to sort of taking a fresh look at things under new management. But I was curious given the charges we've already seen over the past couple of years sort of what drove those additional accruals and the new thinking?

As Charlie said, it was his new leadership at the top of the organization in consumer lending and in the center capability that we have running customer remediation. I think they've gone, they've gone item by item and thought about how to be a little bit more expansive, a little bit more consumer friendly, many of these things aren't crystal clear. And you're always making a judgment as to who it applies to, how much should apply, and over what timeframe and really in an effort as Charlie said to speed it up and move it through. They were a little bit more expansive in order to, but think to accomplish that. But it's by and large, it's the same items that we've been talking about for the last couple of years. There are always new things that come in out of that bucket. But the bigger dollars relate to the same topics that we've been covering for a while.

And the only thing I would emphasize as John said is, most of the dollars do relate to those items. And there's valid, there's a lot of value in getting these things behind us. It's the work, it's the overhang. It's what our customers are going to do to think about us. And so we're obviously going to do what's right for the financial position of the company. But we want to treat people properly and we want to move on and move to the future. And so we made decisions around what we were willing to do certainly with that balanced lens.

Okay, perfect. Thank you very much.

Your next question comes from the line of Betsy Graseck with Morgan Stanley.

Hi, Betsy.

Hi, good morning. Hey, a couple of questions. So first off, Charlie just want to get a sense as to where we should be thinking about, where the expense improvements come from. And the reason I'm asking is, I know you're in the middle of business unit reviews, you've got new business unit heads in several places. Typically folks like that are going to want to make investments, you're not going to touch the regulatory side. So where should we anticipate you have room to start bringing down expenses ahead of regulatory framework changes?

Yes and I think your point is actually a very important one, which is part of the reason why we've been, we're trying to be very careful about making it clear that we are going forward and actively going to start to take actions to reduce expenses but we don't want to back ourselves into a corner until all of our work is done because of those two things that you mentioned, which are very important. Having said that, and the reality is that the work that we have to do the foundational work to build the risk of strong infrastructure and ultimately satisfy the work that the regulators would like us to satisfy. It's clear, it's distinct. It is fairly broad across the company, but we know exactly what it is and what resources are decked against that. When we look elsewhere in the company and I think I use the words in the prepared remarks it is we just, we have spans and layers at the company which are well beyond what I've seen at other places and makes us a very, very inefficient company. When we just look at the work that's being generated, the things that are being done, we as a management team believe that we can change the priorities. So that we're being really clear on what has to get done and stop a bunch of work that has to get done. We have duplicative platforms, duplicative processes across the company. So as we think about a series of these things, they are extremely significant because these things exist just about every part of the company. In addition, I just also want to point out that we have stopped any reductions that were going to take place just given the environment. And so there is a series of actions that we’re ready to take. In fact, we have a series of employees who've been told that their jobs will ultimately go away, but we were going to let some time passes we got through the initial stages of the COVID crisis. So we do see a clear path to start making an impact on the expense base. And it's like an onion, the more we do, the more clear the next round will become.

The thing that you could start in second half, I know you mentioned that would see the benefits here in 2021 with expenses below 20. But should we anticipate that some of this will start in second half 2020?

We are clearly going to take the actions in the second half of this year, and obviously, depending on what the economics of all that is and the accounting of it, not quite sure whether you'll see it in next year.

Got it. Okay, that's understandable. And then could I just switch gears to a question on mortgage? So the question here, yes.

I just want to add one thing which I just think is important, which is because I didn't say this in the prepared remarks. But I've certainly talked about this inside the company which is we don't look at a quarter like this and just say, okay, that is what it is. Losses are higher, our margins are narrow. We know we've got some work going on. And so we'll eventually get around to it. While we knew these things had to get done, and the work was getting done, it's not lost on us, our under performance relative to where we should be earning. And so while I think there was a sense of urgency towards both getting the regulatory work done, and improving our performance, whatever sense of urgency existed before is going to be small relative to what it is going forward.

Yes, I get that. No, I get that and I also am hearing in your commentary that the costs around the regulatory and the risk in those costs. Is it fair to say are more known today than they were maybe a year-ago?

Yes, I think absolutely. As time goes on and we become clear on what has happened. It's clearly easier for us to put a broad understanding of what that takes. And again, just to be clear, when we go and part of the reason why it takes us a period of time to do this properly is we're going to have a very formal processes in place to ensure whatever reductions in our expense base we take that they do not impact any of that work. And so that'll be informal, and it will be very, very formal because that would be just a terrible, terrible mistake for everyone if we were not to do that properly. So beyond heightened consciousness on that issue.

Okay. All right. Just switching to mortgage, refi speeds have been incredibly high and through second quarter. And John, I just wanted to get your sense as to what's in your base case assumptions for 3Q, 4Q. I mean part of the reason for asking is it impacts the servicing, prepayment speeds, it impacts your NII outlook with the refinancing on the agency. And then also I just wanted to have a quick follow-up question here on Ginnie buyouts that you did that, the American Banker highlighted this morning just understand is that the first of many or not? Thanks.

Yes, good question. So on mortgage speeds, and it shows up in the MSR, shows up in our investment portfolio, and it shows up in the runoff of book loans that are in our held for investment portfolio, in loan forum. The speed assumptions vary depending on the vintage the coupon, the debt to income, the LTV et cetera and the refinance ability of borrower by borrower. But I think we're as aware as anyone of how fast things have gotten. And we're seeing 30 handle CPR on various pools of loans. And so while we think we've captured that in our updated estimates on the MSR in particular, it does feed into this level of call it $500 million to $700 million per quarter of premium amortization for mortgage securities, which as I said is likely to remain for the rest of the year. On Ginnie buyouts, as what's happening there is that there are loans which have gone delinquent in part because of COVID. And as the servicer, we essentially have the accounting consequence of owning them whether we buy them out or not, they're deemed because of the option to purchase them is so deeply in the money we're deemed to have bought them. And so our calculus was either to have a giant pile of cash and that that consolidated asset, or to go ahead and buy them out and not have that asset, essentially that asset twice, but use the cash to buy the asset. And these are guaranteed loans, from our perspective, not a huge credit consequences just carrying the asset for a period of time before it either gets redelivered or sold or worked out in some way. So that's why we were a big buyer in the extra that was after the end of the quarter. And then with respect to whether it continues on, facts and circumstances, the same tension will apply if we're deemed to have them on our books because we have the option to buy them, then we may and if cash levels remain where they are, then we may go ahead and do it just so that we don't really double up besides of our balance sheet and that is an asset cap consideration.

Yes, that makes a ton of sense. But so it's a function of in more forbearance from here. Is that the driver?

More ongoing. That's right. And whether we're the servicer or not, but that's right.

Yes, that's right. Okay, thanks John.

Yes.

Your next question comes from the line of Ken Usdin with Jefferies.

Good morning, Ken.

Hi, good morning. Good afternoon now at East Coast. Just a follow-up question on the NII outlook, it seems like in the second half, some pluses or minuses to get to the mid-zone of your 41, 42. But just can you help us understand just how much more roll through there needs to be from here on both asset yields and securities yields to your earlier points of how you're reinvesting and then what from here can also happen on the deposit cost side as a partial offset?

Yes, so I think on the deposit cost side, our anticipation is that between the reduction in pricing for interest bearing deposits and the growth or continuity of non-interest bearing deposits that our average deposit cost is back in the single digit basis points by the third or fourth quarter, that's the trajectory that we're on. That's where we were in 2015, 2016. On the asset side, depending on what happens to the LIBOR probably in particular there spreads are holding firm where we're lending hence there will be some, there could be some lower spread loan product that that is replaced with higher, you've heard about that in autos, it's true in some categories of C&I, but that's a piece of it. On the security front, we've been trying to stay invested but the level of prepayments that Betsy just referred to, I think at our securities portfolio down by almost $30 billion in the quarter and so how much more duration we want to add at these low yields is a separate issue, we haven't been adding much in credit related securities product. But as I mentioned, I think to John the outlook for NIM is relatively range bound through the rest of the year, we're sort of bumping along what we think the bottom could be. I mean, obviously things could change. But zero in the front end and 60, 70 basis points in the long end, this feels about like where we're likely to be with the things that I mentioned.

Right and then so I guess then it really just NII growth next year or just you starting from a high point this year, so probably be in the hold still next year. But really, does it depend on the asset cap end or does it depend on the mix of earning assets in order to get that kind of off this $10 billion-ish type of NII number?

Yes, it's good question. It's both so it's what choices we make on the asset side and what the market is offering, where loan demand comes from, I think will matter a lot. Slope of the curve, if things get a little steeper that obviously could be helpful because we're so exposed to the long-end. And then if there's an opportunity to have a bigger balance sheet, we're certainly not budgeting that, we're accounting on it. But that that would be a difference maker.

Okay, one just quick follow-up, John on the servicing side of mortgage in a great production, and then the tougher servicing results. There's both the core fees that are contracting because of the prepays. And then there's all the hedging, what's the best way you can help us understand how that mortgage banking line item just projects from here given especially the uncertainty and how you model out the servicing side?

Yes, it's tricky. But so I think what we've said is we expect volumes on the production side to be a little bit higher and margins to be relatively constant. So if those two things hold true, the third quarter should be a great, relatively great production environment for mortgage and on the servicing side, we think we've captured the higher servicing costs for default servicing, modification servicing, et cetera. We now have faster speed expectations in the model. Although we said that a quarter ago or two, we were surprised on the downside. But if we've -- if both of those things are captured, then we will produce lower servicing fees because the book itself is getting smaller. But I'll take smaller servicing revenue to as long as we're not taking big writedowns on the assets that are offsetting the benefit that we're generating on the origination side, and hopefully the third quarter reflects that.

Okay, got it. Thanks John.

Yes.

Your next question comes from the line of Saul Martinez with UBS.

Hi Saul.

Hi guys. Hello, thanks for taking my questions. First of all, really, really specific question related to the fourth quarter dividend cap. Can you just verify John that that that's based on net income before preferred stock dividends and because I think that the guidance from the Fed is public that it's based on why not see net income figure and for you guys obviously that does matter given the size of the first stock dividends, so I just wanted to make sure that that point is clarified?

Yes, the way we're calculating it's not aftertax but before preferred stock dividends which gets you to NII available to common.

Okay, got it. Okay, so you're calculating before for preferred stock dividends just to be correct.

Yes.

Okay, got it. A much, much, much broader question and kudos on the donation to the CDFIs that I think a lot of them do a lot of very good work. And I guess on that point though, I do think that it's pretty clear though, that Wells does have to, maybe more than others really focus on multiple stakeholders and different goals. And the idea of strictly shareholder driven capital is obviously already were tapped. And you make your regulators meet their demands, employees, I think genuinely are concerned about the well being of the communities you work in. And then you have guys like me who talk about your ROTCEs and super high efficiency ratios and how you're going to right size your cost structures and I guess, how do you think about that, that that balancing act and those competing demands, I think in the past, most management teams have argued that they can do all of those things simultaneously and I think to a certain degree, maybe that is true, but there are some trade-offs and some element of some dynamic going on. So I guess, Charlie, I'm curious, maybe just more philosophically how you think about that. And I guess ultimately, how do you think about shareholder value in that total pool of goals?

Yes, I guess I don't think about it as a trade-off. And I don't think about it as something which is different for us versus other significant companies, whether you're a financial institution or not, I think it is very, very clear that our ability to be successful as a company for our shareholders includes the fact that we are broadly considering a much broader set of stakeholders, if we don't do that customers, whether they're consumers or companies ultimately won't want to be supportive of us will have issues in our local communities. It'll filter through to the legislators and likely the regulatory agenda. So I think we very much think that they are very much related and that there's no reason why the things that we should be doing to be more thoughtful of a broader set of stakeholders. They aren't a set of financial negatives. Ultimately, it should be something beyond that. The PPP fees were certainly something that was very unique. We’re in the middle of this really horrific time for small businesses and especially minority owned small businesses. The right thing for us as a significant company in this country is to be as helpful as we can with that community. It's also ultimately helpful for us if we can make a difference in the communities that we operate. And then we also looked at that relative to just the what we thought was fair for us in order to participate in the PPP program. And so I think, you put all those things together and there is alignment. And those that don't think about it that way will likely suffer over the long-term.

All right, that's thanks for the thoughtful answer. Appreciate it.

Your next question comes from the line of Steven Chubak with Wolfe Research.

Hi, good afternoon. So I wanted to start-off Charlie with just a theoretical question on the asset cap, you talked about the proactive steps that you were taking to manage the balance sheet to stay below, how that's negatively impacted NII, since most investors are focusing at this juncture on normalized NII and through the cycle revenue growth expectations. So if the Fed were to lift the asset cap tomorrow, I was hoping you can give us some idea or context around the amount of pent-up growth potential in the balance sheet today, I think it'd be helpful if you could frame the impact of the asset cap on NII or at least volume growth based on where things stand to that?

So, it’s John. If just as a data point using rough math if our balance sheet was expanded by call it $200 billion, or about 10% during this COVID timeframe and there is a question about whether there was ample opportunity to do that around several asset classes but in certain areas, it certainly was something like our average NIM. The impact that that would have had on us would have been and these are approximations. But to reduce the drawdown on NII by 50%. So half of how things have worsened would have been covered by that expansion of the balance sheet. That's one way to think about it. If there were more immediate opportunities to put loans on in particular I would say in March, as capital markets were closed, I think everybody knows that we saw customers drawing on available facilities in their requests for new facilities. The bigger probably more constant piece of an increased balance sheet, at least in the businesses that we serve today would probably be to have a bigger securities and securities financing portfolio in support of our Corporate and Investment Bank where we have drawn down as part of managing under the asset cap and there's a handful of benefits to that, including being able to do more business with the companies that were and the institutions that were financing in that realm. But you also end up with a big LIBOR funded book that is a little bit less asymmetric in a down rate scenario and we certainly suffered from that. And there's a real benefit to being substantially deposit funded in that it's very low cost to begin with. But in a down rate environment, it's a little bit more violent in terms of the outcome that it generates and to have a bigger component piece of LIBOR funded assets with LIBOR funded liabilities, it's a little bit less high producing in the best of times, but it maintains its margin in the down rate environment. So that would have been a benefit also. Charlie, you may have other thoughts.

I think that's okay.

Okay, it’s helpful color, John. So thanks for that. Just had one more question. This one, I guess I asked over the last couple of quarters but wanted to get some context around the core fee income level or the jumping-off point we should think about for the back half. You said some of the tail winds for mortgage production. Trust fees should benefit from higher markets, but you also have some normalization of trading activity. And just given all the different moving pieces, I was hoping you can give us some sense as to what the right jumping-off point might be for 3Q?

Yes, we don't put a number on it and call it core but rather talk about the component pieces of it. And so service charges on deposits, which is a big one for us, my assumption is that it's going to feel, at least for a while, like it does today, people are spending differently. They're maintaining cash balances at a higher level. And so there are whether it's waivers because of high balances or the absence of overdraft that puts pressure on that line item as our customers do what's right for them in this environment, you mentioned brokerage advisory, et cetera that should be stronger going into the second half of the year. Investment banking, we had a record high grade market in the first quarter, so while other activity may pick up a little bit, my sense is that that probably normalizes somewhat. Card fees have reflected what I mentioned in my prepared remarks which is at least in the debit card space, we've got balances or flows in dollar terms about equal to last year. But the number of transactions lower which has a negative impact in card fees and credit card fees have been improving, it haven't caught up so that, I don't think it's going to pop back up anytime really quickly. Mortgage, I mentioned on the production side should be very strong or should be strong. And hopefully we've accounted for faster speeds and higher costs in servicing. Trading, as you said probably gets a little bit softer. And other items are less material and there's nothing really noteworthy. So that's how I would think about the categories.

You covered again, thanks so much for that, John.

You bet, sure.

Your next question comes from the line of Matt O'Connor with Deutsche Bank.

Hi, Matt.

Hi, I want to circle back on kind of the longer-term view of getting your efficiency closer to peers? And I guess the first question is, why do you necessarily think it's an expense issue versus a revenue issue? Or is it a combination of both?

It's definitely a combination of both, revenue particularly interest income, which doesn't carry a lot of expense load would be very helpful, I think what we're trying to do is assess where the company is today and what we can do about it. And we can do more about expense than we can about revenue in a balance sheet constrained environment in a recession and in a low rate environment. So it's actionable by the management team, but without a doubt, some amount of normalization of certain categories of revenue would be, would contribute to it. But having said that, I think we've sort of factored in a variety of different ways on the idea that all things being equal and I'm sure they won’t be. But at least we think about it today, that $10 billion is a reasonable amount to go after to put Wells Fargo on a level playing field with the large cap peers.

And the only thing I would add to what John said is this isn't, the calculation of the $10 billion, that's a mathematical exercise. When the management team, the operating committee gets in a room, there is absolutely no disagreement in the room, not about the math, but about the inefficiencies that exist inside the company away from all of these risk related activities. And the work that we've been doing is to build the plans from the bottom up to identify where that is, and so whether that's the full $10 billion or not, we’ll see what we get to but there is we certainly have a clear belief that we can make a significant dent based upon what we know.

And just to be clear what you think kind of the longer-term cost base can be, when you use the $10 billion as kind of a reference point, should we just annualize this quarters costs that gets you about $58 billion, you take out $10 billion gets you around $48 billion. I mean is that the thought process?

I think of 54-ish is more of the normalized starting point without the excess expenses that are loaded into this quarter for the items that we mentioned.

So take $10 billion of the $54 billion?

Yes.

Okay. And I guess just relate to that, like whenever I think about kind of cost saves like there are areas that you'll want to invest in, there is just natural inflation creep. So I mean you guys kind of opened up a little bit of can of worms on the $10 billion. So I know these are things that are tough to predict like looking at a few years.

But we didn't open a can of worms because I don't look at it like we open a can of worms, I think we look at, you look at like we're acknowledging what the facts are, which is the facts are is we compete with other companies that are investing tremendously. And with that those set of investments, the math says the following. And so what we’ve been purposely having said, we're going to reduce our expenses by a certain point in time because we’re doing the work to figure out what the timing looks like with our reductions versus our investments. But I think what's important is not just that we acknowledge that that gap exists, but we are proactively working to get to a place which makes sense, both from an efficiency standpoint knowing that we should be investing in the business.

Okay, all right. Sounds like we'll get some more details in the third quarter or so. I think we all look forward to that.

Thanks.

Thanks Matt.

Your next question comes from the line of John Pancari with Evercore ISI.

Hi, good morning.

Hi, John.

On the credit side, just want to see if I can get your updated thoughts around your through cycle loss estimates that you would expect I know your 2020 company run DFAST is about $27.7 billion. Is that a fair way to think about it, and then also want to get your thoughts around the reserve, you took a pretty good addition this quarter and now your reserve is about 74% of that 2020 DFAST. Do you think there's a likelihood for additional substantial reserve additions from here? Thanks.

Thanks, thanks for the question. So we're, we do the math to compare our own estimations to the DFAST outcomes, but we don't think of them as necessarily better informed about our loans and our portfolios and our risk profile and our collection activity, et cetera. So it's a useful data point. It's an external one that people can judge against, but we think more about our own experience and the scenarios that we believe are the likely ones in the world that we live in. And so that's how we focused it. With the build that we made in the allowance, I think we're at almost 2.2% coverage of the outstanding loan portfolio and of course, it's very different by loan category like it is for every other bank. I think we believe that if the world unfolds in the way that we've got it modeled and assumed in our both modeled loss estimations, and in our bottoms up portfolio by portfolio work that we will have captured, the loss content in the portfolio as of the end of the quarter, and as a result less things really lag in a worse direction that this would be this would have accounted for those losses.

Got it, thanks John. And then related to that on the commercial real estate side, just wanted to see if you could discuss the credit trends that you're seeing in commercial real estate. I know that delinquencies in CMBS structures really spiked for the industry beyond even financial crisis levels. And but clearly, that is being staved off somewhat at the banks by forbearance efforts, are you can you just give us a little bit of granularity around what you're seeing and the level of forbearance in commercial real estate and is it seeing a greater pressure in the portfolio to forbear to given the pressure that your borrowers are seeing? Thanks.

Yes, the first distinguishing point, I would make is that and I know you know this but for everybody's benefit CMBS structures are non-recourse loans. And so there's no, there's no alternative other than realizing on the collateral, there's no mechanism for extra cash flow to enter into a structure unless somebody does something that they're not contractually obligated to do to try and shore things up. And I think as I've seen most recently, the June numbers in CMBS are about 13% of loans are not current. Conversely, on a bank's balance sheet, most of the loans that we have real sponsorship and recourse and generally speaking are lower LTV than CMBS to begin with, so our actual performance is quite different. And then, I think we talked about this last quarter too, but the variation in how deep we'll go from an LTV perspective is as you'd hope with a more stable property types, we might have higher leverage and with the least stable property types we'd have lower leverage which helps a lot in a downdraft. So we have in round numbers roughly $150 billion worth of commercial real estate loans outstanding at the end of the quarter. The biggest pieces, a quarter of that is office, 20% of that is apartments, 12% is industrial, 10% is retail excluding shopping centers and then 9% is shopping centers and everything else is below 9%. Actually hotels is about 8%, which is a volatile property type. And then among non-accrual loans, the shopping centers are 32%, hotels 14% and retail excluding shopping centers is another 14% and everything else is below 14%. There's about $1.3 billion of non-accruals overall. So that's what it feels like, we're working through these things borrower by borrower, sometimes the concessions that we're making are just covenant related. Sometimes they are real forbearance and we allow people to take a little bit more time to pay our borrowers have been generally calm and constructive. It's not a lot of panic. At this point in the cycle, the problem loans have skewed towards retail projects, many of which were already struggling and then also the hotel owners with lower capitalization. So I hope that's helpful.

Got it. No, that is helpful. So really, you're reserving within commercial real estate or you would say that that represents the similar stance for your overall portfolio. In other words, you're pretty much finished building reserves there as well?

For how we understand the world at the end of the second quarter, yes and we think that's relatively, we think it's very realistic. I should also add that in commercial real estate and elsewhere our teams have gone loan by loan, borrower by borrower and made an assessment of where we think we are and where we think things are going. So it's not just a model set of expectations, but real, a real careful review of every borrower, every property and their circumstances.

Got it, all right. Thanks, John.

Yes.

Your next question comes from the line of Brian Kleinhanzl with KBW.

Hey Brian.

Hi, thanks guys. One quick question. That's more of a clarification. You did mention that on Slide 15, that's a separate set of non-accruals were current on interest in principal. Was that referring to the $1.4 billion increase? Or was that referring to the total and I guess why non-accrual if they're current on interest in principal?

Total, the total amount.

Okay. And then separately when you think about the DFAST results, you may perform better than those results, I guess, where do you take exception with kind of how the Fed is modeling your stress losses versus how you see them coming through this cycle?

Yes, forgive me if I don't, if I don't start response by saying we take exception with the Fed’s results in the following way, because that's not really that will be helpful. But they draw from different models and have different approaches. And we draw from our own, as I said bottoms up, our own modeled outcomes or historical outcomes, changing the composition of the portfolio, changing the underwriting standards, since whatever we're comparing it to and we end up with the numbers that we end up with, I'm happy to note that I think in general, the Fed applies in general a lower loss rate for a variety of loan categories to Wells Fargo than they have for some other lenders, it's not universally true based on the composition of portfolios. But where we like our numbers a lot of work with a lot of very close inside knowledge of borrowers properties, et cetera goes into it and it's being compared to something that's more statistically driven from a model that we don't have access to.

Okay, thanks.

Your next question comes from the line of Chris Kotowski with Oppenheimer & Company.

Yes, good morning. Two things, one just to follow-up on Matt’s question. I mean just from 2017 to today, I mean your revenue runway went from $88 billion to roughly 70-ish billion. And your core operating expenses have kind of stayed flattish at 54-ish let's say it. So I mean, sitting here on the outside, it looks like it's primarily a revenue problem, not an expense problem. And I mean when you put out a number like $10 billion? Are you worried that that is going to like, forego the optionality on capturing back that $18 billion in lost revenues? Or should we assume that that's kind of gone?

I think you should go back and listen to the words that we used to describe what the $10 billion is and how we're thinking about this. Listen, there's no question in our minds that we should have the ability to generate higher revenues in the future. No question that will help when it comes to an efficiency ratio. What we're talking about is, if you go back and look at where we were as a company versus the others, the others that the big companies that we compete with have been working on this for five to 10 years. And there is again, I think we're being very factual about it, which you should, you should go back and check yourself, which is there is this meaningful difference between what our expense base looks like and theirs. And then I recognize on the outside, but what we're telling you is from one on the inside, that we as a management team continue to believe that the opportunities are substantial to improve the efficiency of the organization because we see it day in and day out. And we're going through a process to identify exactly what it is, where it is. It's not just people, it's the third-party spend here is extraordinary. The things that we rely on outside people to do is beyond anything that I've ever seen. Our ability to reduce facilities is substantial. And so there's this long list of things that we will actively be working on. Whether that gets to $10 billion, whether it gets to more, whether it gets to less, we'll see we're going to share more as we develop the plans. But I think it's just important for us as a management team to be very objective at what things look like for this company, before we wound up in today's environment and those efficiencies clearly exist in the company.

Okay, and then just a small thing I thought I heard John say that you're no longer accepting Home Equity and personal line of credit applications. And I mean, I realized that those have been declining categories and that they are not the kind of product lines but today that they were before the great financial crisis and all that, but still are those kind of sort of key products in a big consumer banks Arsenal? And doesn’t it send wrong message to not even take the applications?

Well, I guess let me I'll talk about a piece, John can talk about his, I guess the way I think about it is first of all, we do offer a personal lines in the company because we have a credit card business. And so for us, it's a question of making sure that we've got the right product in front of the customer. And so we think we have the ability to do that. The Home Equity product, as you rightfully mentioned has certainly declined in terms of the amount of production that was taking place. But we do have to make a determination in the uncertain environment as to what is a smart thing for us to participate in along with consumers as they add risk to their balance sheet. As time goes on, if we feel differently about the environment and about real estate values, those decisions could change as well.

Okay, fair enough. Thank you.

Your next question comes from the line of Vivek Juneja with JPMorgan.

Hi, Charlie, hi, John. A couple of questions, thanks for taking them. Firstly, Charlie, are you still on track to be giving us some kind of strategic review or strategic plan towards the end of the year or should we expect that with the cost details that are going to give us in the third quarter? How you think in terms of timing of the two things?

I think as we between the third and fourth quarter, we're looking at getting both done to share the complete or complete set of thoughts with you.

Okay, so you'll do them. So you will give it to us simultaneously so that we can see how the two fit together?

Again, I think that's what we're targeting but we will have to see how it plays out and our work progresses.

Okay. In that same vein, Charlie, as you're thinking about all of this, you talk about not having too much of an expense dollar relative to your peers. How much of this way you find businesses where it's because you just don't have enough scale on the revenue side? Are you thinking you're going to exit some of those businesses? What are you thinking there? Are you thinking about more business exits? Any thoughts on that?

Yes, that's a good question, Vivek. I think and I think we've talked about this a little bit over the last couple of quarters. There absolutely are some things that we do which either we don't have scale in or it just might not be big enough to have an impact on the company going forward and it's not clear that it's integral to us being able to fulfill the primary banking relationships that we have from the consumer to the small business and middle market up to the corporate. So I think as we think about what the company should look like, we absolutely are looking at those things. And so we would certainly expect that we would continue to, I think John has used the word prune some of these, some of these things that exist inside the company as we've been doing. I don't think about them in terms of say differently. The five lines of business that we've determined we do believe are key to the future of the company. But when you go below that, there's certainly some activities which might not meet our criteria for continuing to be here.

Okay. And then when you give us these combined reviews, will you give us some sense of we've been, we've heard about your need to spend more on technology areas that you're behind them, will you give us some sense also, where that stands business by business and what you need to do and how that sort of dovetails with the numbers too?

We'll see when we get closer level of detail that we go through with you. But certainly the work that we're doing contemplates the fact that we don't want to stand still in our businesses.

Thank you.

Your next question comes from the line of Charles Peabody with Portales.

Good afternoon. Thank you. Two questions, one I apologize if you've already covered this, but I transitioned over late from the Citigroup call. What were the variables that went into your thinking on the level of the dividend? I mean, was it this was a level that you didn't have to worry about it again, was it a function of what you think your core earnings power is going forward? Or is it is a desire to build capital more quick, what were the variables that touched you to that level?

A handful of things, of course and with the expectation that it's likely that the constraints on the calculation of allowable dividend hang around for a while, even though they may not but they certainly may, we found a level that we believe is something that gives us more of upside ability as the COVID environment clears up, as the medium term earnings power of the company becomes more known, both in terms of sources of revenue and what's happening with expense, et cetera. So that we wouldn't end up or have a low likelihood of ending up in an environment where we're making repeated changes to the dividend. So not so much about our capital levels are fine, we have $23-ish billion of excess on top of our regulatory capital requirements. And we feel it's gone up, as you may have observed, and that's even after building a $20 billion allowance. So not so much capital sufficiency, although, but in the future could turn out differently than we and others are planning right now, but really more about thinking about the core earnings power and resulting upward trajectory when the time is right.

And so I would just add, I know, we certainly appreciate the multiple calls that are going on today and it's a busy day for you all, I would encourage you to go back and look at the prepared remarks because we did walk through the thinking.

Good, thank you. And as a follow-up question, there's a June 22 letter from 40 or 50, 60 Congressman on both sides of the aisle, so bipartisan, and it's addressed the Mnuchin and Powell. And in this letter, they warn of the looming crisis in CRE and particularly the CMBS market, and they asked for help from the Treasury and said, I was curious what actions you think they might be thinking about taking to support the CMBS market, or what actions would you like to see them take?

I don't know that we have an opinion on what actions we'd like to see them take. I do think that as between the risk owners and CMBS transactions and servicers and borrowers people should be looking to maximize recovery value. But the contracts are pretty thoughtful. This isn't the first downturn that those market participants have been through and my expectation is that that a lot of decision making power is going to end-up in the hands of special servicers and I don't know how to, I don't know why it would be a good idea to impose some other regime on top of that, that changes those contracts. But I don't have a careful thoughtful review of what's being proposed.

Thank you.

Our final question will come from the line of Gerard Cassidy with RBC.

Hello, Gerard.

Thank you. Hi, John. I apologize if you've touched on this already. But when you guys gave this in Slide 2 or I'm sorry Slide 3. The number of customers you've helped with deferring payments and waiving fees. Can you give us some color on the trend in terms of the applications for these deferrals? I assume they were very heavy early on and then faded downwards. And then second, how many of the customers that have come up for renewal have actually asked for a second extension for the deferrals?

Well, it's different by loan category. And yes, it's true that the people initially asking that was sort of a high point. We peaked -- Our peak was the second week in April, I think on average, we had about 60,000 to 70,000 accounts per day, who were asking, we've dropped almost entirely. I think we're at 4,000 a day for the week of late June. So if that's helpful, and then of course the extension question is related to how long was the initial deferral to begin with, and in general, I would say that, that more people are getting comfortable with coming out the other side. But yes we still have a good base of folks who are in deferral.

And then second, John, have you guys gotten any color from the Fed on how long they're going to be supportive of the industry, yourselves included in granting these deferrals without having to reclassify the loans and put more capital against that?

I don't think we've got a specific conclusion on that. Although, we do assume that there's going to be some point in time after which, whether it's the regulators not only the Fed and/or our accounting convention is going to cause us to have to consider these as something other than a performing loan might be different by category, it might be different by regulator, but the longer we go on the greater the risk of that.

Great, and lastly thank you again for the great detail that you guys -- given your commercial and industrial loan portfolio. And I noticed as you mentioned the increase in non-accruals on Page 17 the different categories, can you give us some color on the real estate and construction? The non-accruals went to $290 million from I guess it was $49 million in the prior-quarter. How much was construction versus loans to the non-depository financial?

I don't think I have the breakout in front of me, but I can have the IR team follow-up with you.

Okay, great. I appreciate it, John. Thank you.

You bet.

All right guys. Well listen, thank you very much for the time. We appreciate it and we will talk to you soon. Take care.

Ladies and gentlemen, this does conclude today’s call. Thank you all for joining and you may now disconnect.